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Abstract 
 Heritage buildings in Canada are a cultural resource that bear witness to Canada's defining 
moments and form a link to the past [1]. Several heritage buildings in Canada sit empty or underutilized 
and would benefit from rehabilitation so that they can be used for modern occupancies.  From a fire 
protection standpoint, rehabilitation of heritage buildings in Canada is very challenging due to two 
major obstacles: 1) balancing heritage protection and fire protection requirements, and 2) evaluating 
alternative solutions for compliance. The first relates to the overlapping priorities of heritage protection 
and fire protection of the building. The fire protection codes and standards in Canada are rooted in 
prescriptive requirements that are generally written with new construction in mind and with the 
objectives and functional statements behind provisions provided. Heritage buildings cannot be 
unilaterally upgraded to meet requirements of the current fire protection codes and standards because 
often times, the required changes will alter the heritage character of the building. In order to develop 
alternative solutions that address both heritage and fire protection objectives during rehabilitation of a 
heritage building, alternative fire protection frameworks, tools, knowledge and experience have to be 
used. The second obstacle then becomes how these alternative solutions should be evaluated to assess 
whether the final design is code compliant or not. Development of a fire protection framework for 
managing heritage rehabilitation projects under federal jurisdiction in Canada that addresses these two 
issues forms the main focus of this research. 
 Prescriptive, objective and performance based codes were reviewed for their strengths and 
weaknesses for use in design of fire protection strategies for heritage rehabilitation projects. It was 
concluded that the objective-based framework that forms the basis of the current NBC and NFC 
provides an excellent platform on which to frame the approach to an alternative solution. Evaluation of 
fire risk assessment methods led to the conclusion that fire risk indices are the best way to evaluate 
alternative solutions. The final framework is tested through the use of three case studies. These case 
studies demonstrate that through application of fire risk indices, stakeholders can utilize fire science, 
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combined with their knowledge and experience, to compare relative fire risks of an alternative solution 
to those of a prescriptive solution, allowing for a structured way to argue for code compliance of an 
alternative design.  
 This thesis recommends the continued use of this framework in heritage rehabilitation projects 
for the design of fire protection strategies in order to refine the values for specific fire risk indices 
identified in this work, as well as to identify and document new fire risk indices that may be required, 
along with the science and rationale behind each. It is expected that centralizing the information 
obtained through sustained use of the framework developed here will benefit the fire protection 
community by sharing knowledge and experience garnered from working through these types of 
projects.  
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1 Introduction 
 Canadian heritage buildings are a cultural resource that bears witness to defining moments in 
Canadian history and provide a link to the past [1]. The Government of Canada owns or leases 20,220 
properties containing 36,715 buildings which make up over 27 million square meters of floor space [2]. 
As of 2009, these included 219 federally owned national historic sites and approximately 1,300 federal 
heritage buildings [3]. This number excludes heritage buildings that are not owned by the Government 
of Canada. It is important to preserve and maintain the historic sites and heritage buildings, as they are 
key resources and important tributes to the culture, history and social development of our country [1]. 
The overall significance of heritage buildings can be defined as "An historic building is one that gives 
us a sense of wonder and makes us want to know more about the people and culture that produced it. It 
has architectural, aesthetic, historic, documentary, archaeological, economic, social and even political 
and spiritual or symbolic value; but the first impact is always emotional, for it is a symbol of our 
cultural identity and continuity, a part of our heritage" [4]. 
 Indeed, several heritage buildings in the federal inventory are on national historic sites, 
preserved to bear continued witness to Canada's defining moments, illustrating our human creativity 
and cultural traditions [1].  In addition, many of the historic places are the most familiar landmarks in 
their community and since they form a link to the past, they evoke personal memories and feelings of 
pride.  In a different vein, heritage places are important resources for education, through which 
Canadians and others learn about the history of our country. Such education can also be a potent driver 
for community action by increasing community values and promoting greater social inclusion through a 
shared understanding of the unique cultural identity that our heritage gives to a particular area [5].  In 
short, preservation of our heritage sites and buildings is of key import as they form an irreplaceable 
component of our collective history and identity [6]. Figure 1 shows a picture of Canada's Parliament 
Hill Centre Block, a historic building that is a symbol of Canada's nationhood [7]. 
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Figure 1 - Parliament Hill Centre Block [8] 
 Heritage building designations are established when an authority having jurisdiction evaluates a 
building, or group of buildings, for its' historical associations, architecture and environment and 
formally recognizes its importance as a historic resource [9].  This recognition then protects a building 
from activities that will adversely affect the historic qualities of the building [4].   Therefore, many 
heritage buildings are used as parliaments, places of worship, historic sites, museums or for other 
monumental purposes [4].  There is a common myth that historic buildings need to be left as is in order 
to preserve their cultural importance. The reality is that these buildings need to be upgraded from time 
to time in order to remain operational. The key instead is to protect the character-defining elements of 
the original building when alterations, upgrades and repairs are made.  As such, three different 
approaches can be followed toward long term utilization of a heritage building.  These include 
conservation, restoration or rehabilitation of the building as defined below [10].   
1. Conservation of a heritage building involves preservation of the building by continuing to use it, 
without changing the layout or original character of the structure and decoration. The surroundings 
should also be protected, so no transfer or removal of ornaments is permitted except under 
exceptional cases [10]. 
2. Restoration of a building or structure is undertaken only when necessary and does not involve 
reconstruction of the structure.  Areas can be restored using either the traditional methods or, when 
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those prove inadequate, well tried modern restorative techniques are sometimes used [11]. 
Independent of method, the structure and authenticity of the original materials must be maintained, 
as should elements of value from any other period. In cases where new materials are required, the 
design should ensure these are clearly distinguishable from the restored areas [1]. 
3. In contrast to conservation and restoration, rehabilitation of historic places is more challenging.  It 
involves the process of returning a property to a state of utility, through repairs and alterations, to 
ensure that the property can then be used for an efficient contemporary use and function.  At the 
same time, the character defining elements, which are portions and features of the property which 
are significant to the historic, architectural, and cultural values of the original use must be carefully 
preserved [4]. 
 Heritage preservation laws cover conservation, restoration and rehabilitation of heritage 
buildings.  Such laws are broad and diverse. Internationally, several nations use principles established 
in the Venice Charter, which was written by the Second International Congress of Architects and 
Technicians of Historic Monuments in 1964 [10,11]. The primary purpose of the Venice Charter is to 
provide guidance on safeguarding of historic monuments. As such, it incorporates principles which can 
be applied by individual governments within the framework of their own culture and traditions. Most 
federal, provincial and local governments in Canada also have heritage legislation in place that defines 
how heritage buildings are to be identified and regulates actions that can affect the historic qualities of 
heritage buildings that fall under their jurisdiction [4].  
 In addition to any legislation surrounding preservation of heritage buildings, one of the major 
considerations with management of heritage buildings is related to managing fire risk through designs 
that effectively implement fire protection measures, since fire not only damages and destroys historic 
building components, it often destroys the irreplaceable collections they contain [12].  Jurisdictions 
manage fire risk by developing a legal framework using legislation or policies. The legislations or 
policies then adopt building codes and fire codes as the regulatory documents used to regulate fire 
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protection in design, construction and maintenance of real property [13, 14, 15].  Canadian codes, such 
as the National Building Code of Canada (NBC) and National Fire Code of Canada (NFC), also make 
reference to other fire protection standards such as those published by National Fire Protection 
Association (NFPA), Canadian Standards Association (CSA), or Underwriters Laboratory of Canada 
(ULC) [14, 15].  Together such documents provide the fire safety stakeholders (designers, fire 
protection engineers, authority's having jurisdiction, and building owners) with tools by which to 
manage fire risk through the design of fire protection systems for a building under a variety of different 
possible fire scenarios. 
 Building codes deal primarily with new construction; however, heritage buildings were built in 
the past under different rules and regulations. Application of building codes to these buildings becomes 
challenging, especially since some heritage buildings were even built when no official standard of 
safety was in existence. In the case of rehabilitation, the challenge becomes greater since the character 
defining aspects of a heritage building must be protected both during and after rehabilitation even when 
the final way a building is utilized may be quite different from how the building was originally built and 
used [16]. To meet the challenge of protecting heritage buildings and maintaining an effective fire 
protection regime, there are several different fire protection frameworks available for use by 
stakeholders. The stakeholders, who include building owners, property managers, authorities having 
jurisdiction (specifically fire and heritage), tenant representatives, design consultants, and general 
contractors, must agree on which framework to use in each individual situation. The applicable 
frameworks range from direct application of fire protection requirements contained in existing 
prescriptive building and fire codes, to application of more objective and functionally based 
requirements as are incorporated into objective based codes like the NBC, to full performance based 
(alternative) solutions as allowed by other codes. Fire protection and fire science knowledge, 
experience, codes and standards are available for use within a given framework to achieve project 
success.  
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 When prescriptive code provisions cannot be applied because the resulting solution would 
damage the heritage value of a building, alternative solutions need to be designed and evaluated using 
an appropriate fire protection framework. This thesis will begin by reviewing the heritage and fire 
protection frameworks currently in place for federally owned buildings in Canada and discuss the 
status, strengths and weaknesses of each framework being examined. Additional fire protection 
frameworks that may be suitable for heritage rehabilitation projects in Canada will also be investigated 
and discussed. Finally one framework will be selected and its suitability demonstrated using case 
studies involving hypothetical Canadian rehabilitation projects that incorporate alternative fire 
protection solutions. Throughout the analysis, case studies will be used to determine gaps in the 
proposed framework. Identified gaps are also addressed via the studies in order to further refine and 
develop the selected framework as a more universal tool for fire risk management when implementing 
fire protection design principles in Canadian heritage buildings.  
 The objective of this thesis is to develop and propose a new fire protection framework that will 
aid with the development and evaluation of alternative solutions for projects where heritage buildings 
are being rehabilitated. Chapter 2 of this thesis will describe and discuss the present heritage framework 
and fire protection framework currently existing in Canada at the federal level. Additional fire 
protection frameworks that could be used to manage fire risk in heritage buildings will also be 
described in detail with the advantages and disadvantages of each framework also discussed. The best 
suited fire protection framework for this thesis is then proposed and known gaps in the proposed 
framework are studied and solutions proposed. The methodology of the framework will be proposed 
and further developed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 will use case studies of existing federal heritage 
buildings and propose a hypothetical rehabilitation project in order to discuss and demonstrate the 
suitability of the proposed fire protection framework. Any additional gaps in the framework will be 
addressed and mitigated to further develop the final fire protection framework. Finally, Chapter 5 will 
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provide conclusions and recommendations on how to continue to improve the fire protection framework 
proposed here for on-going use in fire safety decision making for Canadian heritage buildings.   
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2 Background Information 
 This chapter will discuss general background necessary to provide context for the thesis, 
including the current Canadian Heritage Protection Framework for federally owned buildings, the Fire 
Protection Regime that is applicable to federally owned buildings in Canada, and the fire protection 
framework currently being deployed in Canada. From this foundation, the challenges facing 
stakeholders who have to operate under the unique dual constraints of heritage protection and fire 
protection during rehabilitation of a building will also be explained. From this perspective, the 
importance of a flexible fire protection framework will be outlined and additional fire protection 
frameworks will also be explored. Finally, a potential solution will be proposed and its suitability for 
use within the Canadian context for heritage protection and fire protection context will be discussed.  
2.1 Fire Protection and Fire Safety 
 Fire protection of a building involves protecting the environment, property and people from the 
dangers of fire [17]. Fire protection engineering applies science and engineering principles to protect 
people and their environment from fire and includes:  
 analysis of fire hazards,  
 mitigating risks of fire damage by using proper design, construction, arrangement and use of 
buildings, materials, structures, industrial processes and transportation systems, and  
 the design, installation and maintenance of fire detection and suppression and communication 
systems [18].  
 Other areas of study that are relevant to fire protection are fire sciences, fire dynamics, fire 
statistics, and occupant behaviour in fire situations.  Fire protection engineers develop and integrate 
different strategies to create a balance of protection measures that reinforce one another and provide 
redundancy for critical facets of the system [4]. 
 Fire Safety is the system that is intended to reduce the destruction caused by fire [19]. Building 
codes specify a minimum level of safety where provisions contained within are deemed appropriate for 
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enforcement. Building codes regulate fire safety aspects that are enforceable through plan reviews and 
inspections. Fire codes deal more specifically with contents and the human activities that take place 
within the building [14, 15].  
2.2 Current Canadian Heritage Protection Framework 
 Discussing fire safety solutions for heritage buildings in Canada necessitates some familiarity 
with how heritage buildings are designated and managed in Canada as outlined in this section. In 
Canada, the Treasury Board Policy on Management of Real Property governs how real property owned 
by the Government of Canada is to be managed in a sustainable and financially responsible manner in 
order to support the cost-effective and efficient delivery of government programs. The policy describes 
the role of the deputy head of each government department and how they are responsible for ensuring 
that their department complies with all the requirements contained within the policy on management of 
real property. For buildings that are over 40 years of age, the policy specifies Parks Canada Agency as 
the organization that evaluates these buildings for their heritage character [20]. Parks Canada's Federal 
Heritage Buildings Review Office (FHBRO) conducts heritage evaluations of federal buildings, reviews 
proposed interventions to classified federal heritage buildings, provides conservation advice regarding 
designated heritage buildings, and provides training on the heritage obligations under the Treasury 
Board Policy on Management of Real Property [21]. FHBRO consists of a committee made up of 
professionals from various disciplines and different federal departments who evaluate the heritage value 
of a building based on its historical, architectural, and environmental significance and recommend to 
the Minister responsible for Parks Canada what type of heritage designation a building receives. The 
Treasury Board Policy on Management of Real Property places protection of heritage character at the 
same level as other considerations related to real property management such as fire protection and 
financial stewardship of real properties [22].    
 FHBRO advises custodian departments on how to meet their heritage obligations under the 
Treasury Board Policy on the Management of Real Property. When it comes to heritage matters, the 
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Treasury Board Policy on Management of Real Property states that deputy heads of government 
departments are responsible to ensure that:  
1. The heritage character of buildings are respected and conserved throughout the building's life 
cycle. Buildings that are 40 years of age or older, whether crown-owned and already under the 
administration of their minister or buildings they are planning to purchase, must be evaluated by 
Parks Canada for their heritage character.  
2. Where the minister has administration of heritage buildings, conservation advice is sought and 
consultations with Parks Canada are undertaken before demolishing, dismantling or selling the 
recognized heritage building and before taking any action that could affect the heritage character of 
a classified building. In addition, best efforts are made to arrange for appropriate alternative uses 
of under-utilized or excess classified and recognized heritage buildings, first by users within the 
federal government and, failing that, by users outside the federal government [21].   
 FHBRO also develops policies, standards and guidelines in consultation with other 
departments. They provide criteria and a process for evaluating and designating heritage character, 
provide advice and recommendations to other departments, and maintain a register of federal heritage 
buildings. The minister responsible for Parks Canada is responsible for approving the heritage 
designations for federal buildings based on the recommendation of an interdepartmental advisory 
committee [21]. Under the policy on the management of real property, FHBRO develops a heritage 
character statement which includes basic general building information, along with a description of what 
is being designated for preservation and the heritage value in terms of historical (thematic, 
person/event, local development), architectural (aesthetic design, functional design, craftsmanship and 
materials) and environmental (site, settings, landmark) significance. The character-defining elements 
identify what the key elements or features of the building must be protected. This may include formal 
elements (volume, elements of its composition), materials, construction elements and craftsmanship, 
spatial configurations, finishes and ornamental details [23]. While this is a good approach for 
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recognition and preservation of key attributes of heritage buildings, it stops short in addressing the full 
complexity of the situation since fire protection requirements for designated heritage buildings are not 
addressed in any of the associated documents in Canada. 
2.3 Current Fire Protection Framework at the Federal Level in Canada 
 The current fire protection framework in place for the Government of Canada, and thus 
applicable to federal heritage buildings, is also regulated under the Treasury Board Policy on 
Management of Real Property and further expanded on under the Treasury Board Fire Protection 
Standard. In the context of federally owned heritage buildings, the Fire Protection Standard names 
federal custodians and tenants, and local fire services as stakeholders in fire protection of federally 
owned heritage buildings. Collectively, these stakeholders help the Government of Canada avert 
interruption of government services as a result of fire in the federal physical infrastructure. The 
objective of the standard is to have sound fire protection practices in place so that  
1. the public is protected from fire-related injury on federal property; 
2. damage from or destruction by fire of federal real property assets is averted; 
3. fire-related interruption of federal program delivery is prevented; and  
4. federal legal liability and costs to the Crown for loss due to fire are limited.  
 The standard recognizes that fire protection is a continuous risk management process in which 
fire risks to real property and to the public are identified and reduced, and the costs and consequences 
of harmful or damaging incidents arising from fire are minimized and contained. The accepted fire 
protection strategy involves the application of building, fire and occupational health and safety codes to 
each heritage structure. The standard also establishes the role of a Departmental Fire Protection 
Coordinator who is responsible for many fire protection tasks including ensuring that: 
1. Real property administered by the department complies with the following:  
a. the fire protection requirements of the National Fire Code of Canada (NFC), the National 
Building Code of Canada (NBC), and the National Farm Building Code of Canada (NFBC) or 
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of applicable local codes when there is a change in use of the real property, when real 
property is acquired or new structures are constructed, or when existing real property is 
altered, and 
b. the NFC or applicable local fire codes throughout the life cycle of the property.  
2. Fire protection equipment and systems under a department's control or installed to meet a tenant 
department's operational needs, are compatible with a building's existing fire protection system and 
are inspected, tested and maintained in accordance with the NFC and applicable local codes [24].    
 It is clear from the above, then, that fire protection for federal heritage buildings inherently 
must adhere to clauses outlined in the NBC and NFC, which are the second iteration of the Objective-
Based National Model Codes. These are developed as complimentary and coordinated documents and 
each contain provisions that deal with safety of persons in buildings in the event of a fire and protection 
of buildings from the effects of fire. Furthermore, every NBC and NFC requirement must address at 
least one of the Code's four stated objectives: safety, health, accessibility for persons with disabilities, 
and fire and structural protection of buildings [14, 15].  
 The application of these codes when rehabilitating heritage buildings presents some interesting 
challenges. The NBC governs how buildings are to be designed and constructed and is thus most often 
applied at the time of construction and/or sufficient reconstruction of a building. Division A defines the 
scope of the codes and contains the objectives, the functional statements and conditions necessary to 
achieve compliance. Division B contains acceptable building design solutions (which were referred to 
as "technical requirements" in editions before adoption of Objective-Based Model Codes) deemed to 
satisfy the objectives and functional statements listed in Division A. Division C contains administrative 
provisions relating to the application of the Code [14]. On the other hand, the NFC applies to the 
operation and maintenance of the fire-related features of the building in use. There will inevitably be 
some overlap between the NBC and NFC, however these instances are reduced through the use of cross 
references between the two codes [15].  Since these codes are updated in a continuous 5-year cycle, 
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cases can arise where there are significant changes in code requirements between when, and for what 
purpose, a heritage building was constructed and the code requirements for its present use. 
2.4 Challenges of Working with Heritage Buildings 
 A major challenge facing fire protection engineers, designers, authorities having jurisdiction 
(AHJs), building owners and occupants from a fire protection and heritage protection point of view is 
how a heritage building can be redesigned for contemporary use while protecting the heritage value of 
the building, managing fire risk properly and implementing fire protection measures smartly.  Building 
owners face multiple challenges when managing fire risks in a heritage building. They have to balance 
current code requirements, utilize the building, maintain the building, and make investments in the 
building for sustained and future uses. Yet, there is a lack of guidance in the existing codes on how to 
proceed. For example, a building left vacant may be prone to illegal occupancy and vandalism. On the 
other hand, if a heritage building is under renovation, it may have minimal, sometimes non-operational, 
or inadequately serviced security or fire detection systems, which, in the event of a fire, can allow 
significant fire growth and spread prior to the fire being observed and acted upon. Some buildings may 
not have safe access for fire fighters during an emergency, thus affecting occupants, adjacent structures 
and fire fighting personnel in the event of a fire [4].  After renovation of a building, a proper 
maintenance regimen for the building, whether occupied or vacant, is critical.  On-going activities 
including removal of hazards such as accumulation of combustible materials and servicing of 
antiquated equipment are critical steps that can greatly reduce the fire risk to a heritage building but are 
generally not addressed specifically in the context of fire safety concerns within the applicable codes. 
 The challenge of balancing fire protection and heritage protection considerations often results 
in the standard approaches to fire protection running counter to preserving the heritage features of a 
building as identified under the heritage protection regulations. The balance achieved in the final design 
is extremely important as it impacts the property value of the building in complex ways while at the 
same time the legal costs incurred while navigating through the regulations, codes and standards are 
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fully borne by the owner [26]. With such inherent added costs of ownership and operation of a heritage 
building, it becomes critical that an owner have the flexibility to rehabilitate a heritage building so that 
it supports a viable economic use, such that the owner is able to make a reasonable return on their 
investment and generate sufficient income to cover the long term maintenance of the building fabric 
and associated space around it [27].   
 On the other hand, fire protection codes and standards are written to use one or more of three 
common design frameworks to demonstrate code compliance with intent to achieve flexibility in 
obtaining code-based design solutions. These codes can be prescriptive-based, objective-based and 
performance-based design. In reality, however, most modern building and fire codes focus on new 
construction and some may provide little information relating to upgrades and rehabilitation of heritage 
buildings. In addition, modern codes often present the inherent presumption that modern construction is 
safer than construction which used the traditional materials found in heritage buildings.  
 Under the present codes, there are no clear guidelines for dealing with heritage buildings. A fire 
protection engineer can decide to approach heritage building rehabilitation projects by complying with 
either the prescriptive provisions of the codes, by developing alternative solutions to comply with the 
objective-based requirements, or by utilizing performance-based fire protection codes and standards. 
Despite these choices, however, existing legislation, codes and standards are written in a way that may 
actually limit this flexibility since it permits an authority having jurisdiction (AHJ) room for 
interpretation as to which is the most acceptable method for any given case [24, 28]. This environment 
makes it difficult, if not impossible, to achieve code compliance in heritage buildings when there is no 
clear line for when retroactive upgrades to existing fire safety systems or installation of new systems are 
required to achieve a particular level of fire protection [4]. Therefore, despite recent advancements in 
knowledge, tools and expertise in fire science and fire safety engineering, limitations of our present 
system often make it difficult to implement what could otherwise be very exciting, new uses for our 
important heritage buildings [27]. As a result, there is a need for a flexible, robust and consistent 
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framework through which fire protection engineers can develop fire safety solutions in heritage 
rehabilitation projects. Towards this end, a range of possible methods that can be employed in 
designing fire safety solutions are outlined in the following section and some of the strengths and 
tradeoffs in their use are also discussed. 
2.5 The Different Fire Protection Frameworks and Choosing an Appropriate 
Framework for Heritage Rehabilitation Projects 
 Heritage buildings are assumed, for the purposes of this thesis, to be built in accordance with 
the governing building and fire codes of the day. When these buildings are rehabilitated for modern use, 
the occupancy type may change and improvements to the building are often needed to comply with 
current codes. Some examples include the rehabilitation of residential buildings for use as public 
buildings, office buildings, or museums that house one-of-a-kind artifacts.  For these situations, a 
variety of fire hazards may exist that require a fire risk management strategy to mitigate them [27], such 
as electrical wiring in the building may need to be upgraded to satisfy the electrical code and the needs 
of the new occupancy, a sprinkler system may need to be installed to protect the building and assets 
inside, and it may be necessary to construct a fire separation to separate one occupancy from another.  
In order to protect the heritage character and value of the building during such a rehabilitation project, a 
flexible fire protection framework must be deployed to manage fire risk for the building during the 
entire course of the project from the design phase through to the occupancy phase. Whether it is best for 
the framework to utilize prescriptive-based, objective-based or performance-based frameworks for 
analysis will be investigated in the sections below with advantages/disadvantages to their use discussed.  
2.5.1 Prescriptive-Based Code Framework  
 Prescriptive based codes are used in most countries to specify fire protection requirements in 
buildings. They become law when they are adopted as part of legislation.  During the architectural 
design process, the designer utilizes the code and designs a building that complies with the code's 
prescriptive requirements on building size, use, design, and materials [4]. The prescriptive requirements 
for construction characteristics, limiting dimensions of key attributes, such as travel distances and 
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clearances, to within certain values or requiring specific types of fire protection systems form the basis 
of an acceptable level of performance [29]. The codes have evolved over several decades, with new 
requirements being adopted over existing requirements through various code change cycles.  
 The NBC and NFC originated as prescriptive based codes and as they evolved into an objective 
based format, the prescriptive requirements remained in Division B of the codes. Compliance with the 
code provisions in Division B is generally recognized as achieving the minimum level of performance 
that satisfies the objectives of the code provisions.  As such, conformance to these requirements will be 
acceptable to the authority who adopts the NBC and NFC into law or regulation [14]. Outside the 
intended application of a prescriptive requirement; however, it is difficult to determine how a given 
requirement, or set of requirements, might be applied to achieve a certain fire protection goal.  The 
main objective of a code written in this form is to preserve life by regulating the provision for safe and 
adequate emergency exits for occupants of a building in case of a fire and also for protecting 
neighbouring buildings from the spread of fire.  The code provisions generally do not deal directly with 
property protection within the building, which can clearly be a limitation when dealing with 
irreplaceable heritage buildings and collections [12]. The primary assumption behind prescriptive-based 
code provisions is that there is one single fire source. Historically, this assumption has proven 
appropriate and led to fire safety solutions that met society's expectations [30].  
 Prescriptive codes are advantageous because the process of determining whether or not a 
requirement is met is very straightforward [31]. The disadvantages are that the codes specify 
requirements without stating any objectives behind those requirements, what objectives are being 
achieved nor the outcomes of implementing the prescribed solution [32]. As such, they provide very 
little flexibility for innovative solutions and unusual situations such as those that may be encountered in 
fire protection designs in heritage buildings.  Further, they presume there is only one solution to 
providing a minimum level of safety, though the actual level of safety that should be achieved is not 
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specifically stated.  As a result, it is difficult to directly apply the provisions of prescriptive-based codes 
in design of fire safety solutions for unusual buildings [13]. 
2.5.2 Objective-Based Code (OBC) Framework 
 The code development committee for the NBC and NFC recognized that the acceptable 
(prescriptive) solutions could not cover all possible valid design and construction options. Therefore, 
the codes were recast into Objective-Based National Model Codes that are currently in their third cycle 
of revision.  Such objective-based codes and standards work by linking a fire safety intent, 
application(s), objective and functional statement to each prescriptive code provision. Intent statements 
provide the basic thinking behind a code provision and are expressed in terms of fire risk avoidance and 
expected performance. Application statements serve an explanatory purpose and provide guidance on 
when a code provision is applicable [15]. Objective statements describe, in broad terms, the overall fire 
safety goals that the prescriptive code provisions are intended to achieve. They define the boundaries of 
the subject areas. Functional statements are more detailed and describe conditions necessary in the 
building that will help satisfy the chosen fire safety objectives. Objective and functional statements are 
qualitative in nature and are not intended to be used on their own in determining compliance. Instead 
the minimum technical level of performance required in the areas defined by the objective and 
functional statements is prescribed through requirements provided by the prescriptive clauses in 
Division B [25]. Compliance with an objective-based code is achieved by complying with the 
applicable acceptable (prescriptive) solutions, or by using well-justified alternative solutions that can be 
demonstrated to achieve at least the minimum level of fire safety performance necessary for compliance 
with those acceptable (prescriptive) solutions in the areas defined by the objectives and functional 
statements attributed to the applicable acceptable solution [15]. 
 Objective-based codes are advantageous for code users and authorities having jurisdiction as 
the objective, functional, application and intent statements provide: 
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 Clarity of intent: Rationale behind a code provision is explained which will facilitate 
understanding of what must be done to satisfy that requirement. 
 Clarity of Application: Applicability of a code provision can be clarified. 
 Flexibility: A person may propose a new method or material not described in the code and use 
the information provided to understand the expected level of performance that their alternative 
solution must achieve to satisfy the Code [15].  
 The disadvantage behind objective-based codes is that they do not provide specific guidance on 
how to evaluate whether an alternative fire safety solution, such as is often required in heritage 
buildings, satisfies the minimum requirements of the code [31].  
 Due to the layered use of objective statements, functional statements and associated technical 
requirements, as well as the many cross references between the NBC and NFC, determination of the 
equivalency of a proposed design solution with an acceptable solution will often involve very careful 
analysis of the objective and functional statements behind the code requirements of interest [25]. 
Unfortunately, the code itself does not address the question of who is responsible for doing this; nor 
does it provide a framework within which consistent assessments of conformity to the requirements can 
be carried out [15]. To some degree, this is done by legislation or policy that adopts the codes into 
force; however, often times these do not provide clear guidance as to how to assess compliance either. 
As a result, the preference, particularly amongst many AHJ's, for designs to comply with Part B of the 
NBC and NFC continues. There are sporadic uses of alternative solutions across Canada but that 
depends on expertise and established practices that are present within the fire safety engineering 
industry in a particular jurisdiction [34].  
 The Canadian Commission on Building and Fire Codes adopted the objective-based code 
format to provide guidance to the building community on how to assess alternative solutions and to 
permit more flexibility in design. The intent was that provisions would be easier to apply to renovation 
and other unique applications, as well as being more responsive to innovative design solutions [35].  
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The reality, however, is that there are jurisdictions in which it is not common practice to consider fire 
safety design solutions outside those prescribed in Part B of the code.  This undermines the 
advancements that were intended by the new objective-based format and poses significant challenges in 
the design of fire safety solutions during rehabilitation of Canadian heritage buildings [34]. 
2.5.3 Performance-based Code Framework 
 Performance-based codes (PBC) specifically state fire protection goals, desired level of safety 
and reference sets of approved methods that can be used to demonstrate a design's ability to meet the 
stated goals [36]. The clearly stated goals are an attempt to provide better guidance when dealing with 
increasingly complex designs and fire risks [37]. In practice, performance-based codes can be described 
as a framework under which fire protection goals and performance objectives can be identified and 
developed while uncertainties related to fire protection engineering, such as analysis and design 
methods used, can be managed [38]. Under this type of framework, any and all solutions that 
demonstrate compliance with stated goals are acceptable design solutions.  Such a framework, then, 
allows the stakeholders in building design projects the flexibility to design new and innovative 
structures while maintaining a specified level of safety [36]. The fire safety objectives of performance-
based fire protection codes are: 
 To prevent structural damage; 
 To prevent loss of life in room of fire origin; 
 To separate occupants from the effects for a "specified period of time;" and  
 To contain the fire to the room of origin [36]. 
The advantages of performance-based fire protection codes and standards are that they 
 establish clear fire safety goals and leave the means of achieving those goals to the designer; 
 permit innovative design solutions that meet the established performance requirements; 
 permit the use of new knowledge as it becomes available; 
 allow cost-effectiveness and flexibility in design; 
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 enable the prompt introduction of new technologies into design; 
 eliminate the complexity of the existing prescriptive regulations; and 
 eliminate technical barriers to trade and allow international harmonization of regulation 
systems [13]. 
 Even though PBC allows the designer more freedom to design a space, there are several 
disadvantages when working within a performance-based framework. One disadvantage is that these 
codes use general guidance documents which may result in important fire performance concerns being 
missed, which becomes more pronounced when they are applied by inexperienced personnel. Further, it 
is the FPE who defines, uses and quantifies performance and acceptance criteria on a project specific 
basis, while these criteria should be determined by third party policy and decision makers (AHJs) since 
they establish minimum targets for public safety. In addition, the selection of the design fire scenarios 
tend to focus on the evaluation of fire protection system performance, often in isolation, rather than 
being specified in a way that tests the building holistically for fire safety performance. Another 
challenge arises when trying to compare the level of performance resulting from the performance-based 
engineered solution with the code compliant one based on prescriptive requirements. This is often not 
possible on an appropriate or comprehensive basis in part, as well, due to the fact that there is currently 
insufficient guidance as to even how to determine the most influential factors to assess, or necessary 
information to provide during evaluation of trial design. For example, the assumption of "idealized" 
performance of fire protection measures might be used, but never compared with "real life" 
performance of installed measures that change over time when impacted by age, occupant action and 
related issues. Many input values may be taken from the literature and used in analysis and modelling 
without a sensitivity analysis or other demonstration that the values are appropriate and/or utilized 
appropriately [39]. Finally, the  focus of a PBD analysis may often be placed on the consequences of a 
given design fire scenario solely with respect to the occupants, or only on the structure, or might lean 
toward only one narrow aspect of building performance without adequately defining the whole picture 
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of fire performance. Again, the limitations inherent in current application of PBD methods pose their 
own challenges when utilized in design of fire safety solutions related to rehabilitation of Canadian 
heritage buildings.     
 From the analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of working within a prescriptive-based, 
objective-based and performance-based framework above, a decision was made on what framework or 
combination of frameworks will be best suited for use in heritage rehabilitation projects. This is 
outlined in the section below.  
2.5.4 Choice of Fire Protection Framework for Rehabilitating Heritage Buildings 
 The optimal fire protection framework for heritage rehabilitation projects amongst the three 
frameworks described above must allow a user to satisfy the needs and objectives related to both 
heritage protection and fire protection. In this respect, prescriptive-based fire protection codes would 
not be suitable because the prescriptive nature of the code makes the provisions too specific to apply to 
unique situations that could be encountered in a heritage building rehabilitation project. Performance-
based codes do provide the flexibility for developing creative solutions to achieve a minimum 
acceptable level of fire protection; however the generic nature of the code provisions may result in 
important fire protection options or concerns being missed. Further, specification and control of input 
parameter values can be difficult and a universally accepted method for comparative analysis between 
the levels of performance for a performance-based engineered fire safety solution with one based on 
prescriptive requirements currently does not exist.  
 At the present time, it was concluded that the most suitable fire protection code type for use in 
heritage rehabilitation projects, and therefore the method to be used in this thesis, is the objective-based 
code formulation. Objective-based codes provide better understanding behind the required provisions in 
the code than do prescriptive options, as well as being formulated through a logical progression from 
the prescriptive-based codes with which fire protection engineers, designers, owners and occupants are 
familiar. They are easier to use to evaluate innovative alternative solutions because the intent, 
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objectives and functional statements can be directly linked to a prescriptive code provision more easily. 
The greatest asset of objective-based codes, however, is also one of their chief weaknesses. There is 
still difficulty with how to document and evaluate alternative solutions for comparison against 
prescriptive-based design. With the decision to pursue heritage rehabilitation under an objective-based 
fire protection decision making framework, the next challenge is to find or develop a consistent method 
for evaluating alternative solutions so that there are consistent guidance and expectations for the various 
fire protection stakeholders to proceed with alternative fire safety design and evaluation.  
2.6 Evaluating Alternative Solutions in an Objective-Based Framework 
 It is a difficult challenge to evaluate a set of alternative fire protection solutions for a single 
situation, even though all are designed to satisfy the functional and objective statements stipulated in 
objective-based codes. Since objective-based codes do not provide specific assessment criteria, 
establishing performance criteria and evaluating the design against those criteria would be an extremely 
difficult task and therefore will not be pursued in this thesis. Rather, fire risk assessment methods will 
be reviewed and developed for use in evaluation of alternative solutions. The criteria important in 
development of an assessment method for evaluating alternative solutions for compliance with the 
objective-based codes are 1) ease in determining equivalency with objective and functional statements, 
2) ease of use by fire protection engineers, and 3) ease in understanding by fire protection stakeholders. 
There are many categories of fire risk analysis that might be used in this application; however, these 
vary widely in complexity. Thus this thesis will discuss quantitative and qualitative fire risk assessment 
methods in general before proposing a more specific fire risk assessment framework that is suitable for 
evaluating alternative solutions for heritage rehabilitation projects in Canada.  
2.6.1 Fire Risk Assessment and Management 
 Fire Risk Assessment (FRA) is a process that characterizes the risk associated with fire. A 
typical analysis addresses the fire scenarios of concern, their probability, and their potential 
consequences [40]. Such an approach mirrors the fact that fires can occur anywhere, at any time, and 
that building and fire codes try to manage the risks to a tolerable level of performance [41].  The 
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probability and potential consequences of the multiple fire scenarios can then be studied and addressed 
so that the three basic questions:  ‘what can happen?’, ‘how likely is that to happen?’ and ‘what are the 
consequences?’ can be answered [41].  In a building regulatory framework, FRAs can be used in the 
design stage to demonstrate adequacy of an existing facility, demonstrate adequacy of an alternative 
design and demonstrate improvement in facility fire protection [40]. When FRA is applied to alternative 
solutions in heritage buildings, the risks and risk management strategies should consider the positive 
effects that building maintenance might have, as well as what effects proactive activities undertaken by 
occupants have on preventing fires and managing the impact of fire. If included, however, these actions 
should then also be reviewed regularly to ensure that the actions being taken are effective with any 
"lessons learned" during the process applied to development of longer term policy or procedure. For the 
purpose of this thesis, it will be assumed that maintenance and proactive actions undertaken are 
effective and reviewed regularly since such actions are mandated under other federal government 
regulations such as the NFC, Canada Labour Code - Canada Health and Safety Regulations Part II, and 
Treasury Board Fire Protection Standard.    
 Before beginning an FRA, the stakeholders who have an interest in fire safety, whether related 
to financial, personnel safety, public safety, or regulatory compliance, should be identified and 
assembled early in the project in order to define the problem and objectives, choose the category of fire 
risk assessment to be conducted, and establish any acceptance criteria. For heritage rehabilitation 
projects, the stakeholders can include regulators, building owners, building operators, occupants of the 
building, emergency responders, members of the community, investors, design and construction teams, 
as well as those who are preparing the FRA itself. The purpose of the FRA might be to identify methods 
of lowering the risk of fire in an existing building, or to identify methods of providing a level of fire 
risk deemed acceptable in a renovated building. Many methods, including what-if analyses, risk 
matrices, risk indexes, fire safety concepts trees, actuarial/loss statistics analyses, stand-alone event tree 
analyses, enclosure fire models for selected fire scenarios, combined event tree - fire models, and 
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computational models that incorporate probability, consequences and cost data in an integrated manner, 
are available for use in an FRA. Heritage projects can utilize any of these fire risk assessment methods 
depending on the level of sophistication needed for analyzing a particular alternative solution [40].  
 Once the stakeholders have been assembled, with the problem and objectives of the fire risk 
assessment established, it is time to go into more depth in order to choose the category of fire risk 
assessment and establish the acceptance criteria. This begins with clarifying the exposed targets and fire 
stimuli that affect fire risk. Exposed targets at risk may include people (occupants, employees, general 
public, emergency responders), property (structures, systems, components of the built environment), 
and mission (heritage preservation, business continuity). The fire stimuli which affect the targets may 
include heat (radiant flame, convective gases), smoke (obscuration, impact on respiration), and gases 
(toxicity). The transport phenomena that bring the fire stimuli into contact with the exposed targets need 
to be clarified in order to understand the effects and impact of the fire [40]. Finally, acceptance criteria 
can be developed based on specifications taken from prescriptive regulations, or determined from 
performance regulations, from other agreed-to criteria or from any standards and guides which produce 
a quantitative or a comparative value of risk [40].  Different approaches taken throughout the process 
will lead to either qualitative or quantitative assessment approaches as described further in the 
following two sections. 
2.6.2 Quantitative Fire Risk Assessment  
 Quantitative fire risk assessment involves identification of fire scenarios and their likelihood, 
and quantification of the consequences of those scenarios [33]. Quantitative fire risk assessments are 
useful as they provide a sense of proportion to a certain risk and can account for the effects of any risk 
reduction actions taken [33]. In a quantitative FRA approach, after all the preliminary planning work 
described in 2.6.1 is completed, the next step is to identify all the hazards that may impact the heritage 
building being studied. Potential hazards can include fire ignition sources, and potential building code 
deficiencies such as impeded egress, lack of fire stops, damaged fire separations, incomplete sprinkler 
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and fire alarm system coverage. Other hazards can come from fire load quantity and arrangement, and 
potential lapses in operations and maintenance in fire safety planning, fire emergency organization,   
maintenance quality and housekeeping standards. All the identified hazards need to be considered for 
the site and when evaluating the alternative solution. The personnel responsible for identifying fire 
hazards must have a general knowledge of combustion, fire safety, the characteristics of various fire 
protection systems, and familiarity with the operational aspects of the space [43].  
 After the hazards are identified, the task of determining fire scenarios and their likelihood of 
occurring as well as the resulting consequences need to be completed. Fire risk can be calculated as the 
sum of the expected losses incurred from a fire scenario that is applicable to a fire protection strategy as 
shown in Equation 1.  
 
Equation 1           
   
 
Where Pi is the likelihood of scenario i, Ci is the consequence for scenario i. While it is well known that 
risk calculation is person dependent, the resulting risk assessment provides information that can help 
focus attention on important aspects of fire safety decision making [33]. In the context of a quantitative 
fire risk assessment, determination of the likelihood of particular fire scenarios occurring, such as 
cooking fires or fires in which cigarettes are the ignition source, is based on statistical data [43]. A fire 
scenario can then be modelled as a timed sequence of events after an ignition. How a fire develops 
depends on fuel quantity, fuel arrangement, characteristics of the built environment, and the 
performance of various fire protection measures. Since there can be infinite diversity in the possible 
combinations of fire scenarios, and the resources to analyze the fire scenarios are finite, it is necessary 
to structure the wide range of fire scenarios into a manageable number of scenario clusters for 
evaluation [43].  
 Once the clusters are established, event trees are used to visually represent scenario events and 
consequences that can occur in a system. Each consequence (Ci) and the contributing sequence of 
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events that must occur leading up to the consequence must be identified in the event tree.  For example, 
consider a simple heritage building that is 2 storeys high and 200 m
2
 in building area. The building 
occupants employ a combination of hazard mediation actions such as good housekeeping, proper 
handling and storage of dangerous goods in accordance with the Canada Labour Code Part II and NFC, 
and daily walkthroughs to reduce ignition sources. The building also incorporates a sprinkler system 
and fire alarm system in order to protect, and thus reduce the fire hazard, to the occupants. The hazard 
mediation activities, fire alarm system and sprinkler system supersede the requirements in the NBC and 
NFC however, on closer examination the fire separations in the building are found to provide only 2/3 
of the required fire resistance ratings required in the acceptable solution.  
 Figure 2 shows a simple example of an event tree that explores the consequences of a fire 
incident in the above building and the interactions between the fire alarm system and evacuation of 
building occupants. Using the event tree, two outcomes of hazard mediation activities such as good 
housekeeping, or eliminating ignition sources, are evaluated. The two possible outcomes of these 
mediation activities is either no fire or a fire occurring. No further analysis is needed in situations where 
hazard mediation is effective and no fire occurs. If hazard mediation fails, then we have a fire incident 
and the effect of the fire alarm system on evacuation can be studied. If the fire alarm is effective, the 
fire alarm system will detect the products of combustion in the early stages and the resultant alarm will 
notify occupants, providing them the time and chance to evacuate early. If the fire alarm system 
malfunctions, there are two anticipated outcomes, the first is occupants can detect the fire using other 
fire cues and evacuate or the second is that there is no evacuation. Evacuation can result in either safe 
evacuation or injury or death. No evacuation results in only injury or death.  
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Figure 2 - Event Tree for Hazard Mediation and Fire Alarm System Failure 
 Figure 3 shows a different event tree that tracks the consequences of failure of fire suppression 
strategies after fire ignition to illustrate a case when hazard mediation activities fail. In this event tree, 
fire extinguishers are considered, which are required by the NFC and easy to implement. The sprinkler 
system and its effects are also included to show the impact that a sprinkler system would have in terms 
of saving the building in the event of fire.   
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Figure 3 - Event Tree Showing Consequences to the Building When Fire Suppression Strategic 
Fails 
 Probability data based on fire statistics must be available so that the information can be used in 
event trees such as the above to determine the probability (P) of an event based on the outcomes of each 
event that is included in the chronological sequence of events leading up to it. Both the success and/or 
failure of each system component is included in the sequence. By analyzing all possible outcomes, the 
percentage of outcomes that lead to the desired result can be determined [33]. Determining fire event, 
human behaviour and equipment failure frequencies and probabilities should be done by an experienced 
fire risk assessment team. The people on the team need to be able to determine failure frequencies and 
probabilities based on generic industry wide data and make any required variations or adjustments to 
those data in order to reflect a specific example being studied [33].   
 Rigorous quantitative fire risk assessments require a large amount of effort, as well as historical 
data, statistical distributions, knowledge and experience.  The type of detailed information required for 
such an analysis is rarely collected, making determination of absolute risk difficult [44]. A relative risk 
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approach is often adopted instead, where the risk of a subject building is calculated and the risk of a 
similar building designed in accordance with the prescriptive code is also calculated before comparing 
the two. Relative risk evaluation is widely used throughout the world because the public is generally 
satisfied with the safety achieved by current regulations, and the buildings designed to current 
regulations are convenient benchmarks of the risk levels which must be achieved by an alternative 
solution [44]. 
 One of the main advantages of quantitative fire risk assessments is that the event trees are easy 
to draw once the sequence of events is established. Event trees are also easy to understand and, when 
the necessary values are available, probabilities can be computed from the event trees [33]. There are 
several disadvantages to using quantitative fire risk assessments, however. It is difficult to identify all 
consequences in an event tree and the event tree can become very large [33]. Few countries collect fire 
incident data that can be used to describe detailed scenarios and their likelihood of occurrence [42]. The 
expertise needed by individuals to carry out and evaluate a quantitative fire risk assessment is high, 
requiring a lot of knowledge and experience working with fire science and generic industry wide data to 
determine probabilities and frequencies of events [33]. The information used in risk estimation may 
have significant uncertainties that can arise from errors incurred during needed simplifications of the 
problem, from the statistics on which the frequencies of occurrence or probabilities are derived, from 
the estimates of reliability of the fire protection systems and from the calculation methods used [43]. 
The computational burden required in conducting a full quantitative assessment also discourages its use 
[44]. Acceptance by the fire community for use of quantitative fire risk assessment is not progressing at 
a rate that will aid in closing current knowledge gaps or make this type of assessment a popular tool. 
This is largely due to lack of education and technology transfer to designers and code officials on the 
use, usefulness and proper validation of the models and methods [42].  
 Based on the above brief overview of quantitative fire risk assessment through a review of its 
strengths and weaknesses, a quantitative fire risk assessment framework is not suitable for use in 
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heritage buildings in Canada at this time. The event trees that need to be developed to identify 
consequences and the data needed to determine frequencies and probabilities of fire events and 
consequences are complicated and require data as well as knowledgeable and experienced personnel to 
carry out and review the fire risk assessment. Thus, methods by which to conduct qualitative fire risk 
assessment will be discussed next to determine their suitability for use in fire safety design for Canadian 
heritage building rehabilitation projects. In particular, of many of these tools available, the fire safety 
concepts tree, which is a qualitative fire risk assessment method, will be investigated here for use. 
2.6.3 Qualitative Analysis Using a Fire Safety Concepts Tree 
 As mentioned in the previous section, the fire protection community in Canada lacks the data 
and expertise at this point in time to make quantitative fire risk assessment a popular design tool for fire 
protection design [42]. Qualitative fire risk assessments may be more suitable for the current fire 
protection environment in Canada as their focus is on demonstrating how an alternative design satisfies 
the applicable functional and objective statements.  
  The fire safety concepts tree is a qualitative fire risk assessment tool that examines the 
interrelations of fire protection features and their effect on achieving specific fire safety goals and 
objectives. As such, it has elements that match well with the intent of an objective design method. 
Figures 4 and 5 show a reproduction of the fire safety concepts tree from NFPA 550 [19].  These 
indicate that the fire safety concept tree is based on 2 primary fire safety objectives: "To Prevent Fire 
Ignition" and "To Manage Fire Impact". Each of the branches proposes a distinct path through which to 
analyze the potential impact of fire safety designs and strategies.  
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Figure 4 - Fire Safety Concept Tree - Prevent Fire Ignition
Legend: 
 OR 
  AND 
 
 
Control 
heat energy 
sources 
Control 
source fuel 
interaction 
Control 
Fuel 
Eliminate 
Fuel 
Eliminate 
heat-energy 
sources 
Control 
heat energy 
sources 
Control 
heat energy 
source 
transport 
Control 
heat energy 
transfer 
process 
Control 
fuel 
transport 
Fire Safety Objective 
Prevent Fire Ignition 
Manage 
Fire Impact 
Manage 
Exposed 
Manage 
Fire 
Eliminate 
Fuel 
Provide 
separation 
Provide 
Barrier 
Control 
conduction 
Control 
convection 
Control 
radiation 
Provide 
separation 
Provide 
Barrier 
Control fuel 
properties 
Control fuel 
environment 
31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 - Fire Safety Concept Tree - Manage Fire Impact
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Logic gates are used in each path to show hierarchical relationships amongst fire safety concepts.  "OR" 
gates are used to indicate that concepts below a certain point will cause or have as an outcome the 
concepts above, and "AND" gates are used to indicate that all the concepts below the gate are needed to 
achieve the concept above the gate.   
 For example, consider a two storey heritage office building that is 120 m
2
 in building area, with 
the two storeys connected by an open staircase; the building is equipped with a full fire alarm system. The 
process for using the tree begins with defining the fire safety objective [19]. The objective of this analysis 
is to determine whether a fire alarm system provides an equivalent level of fire safety to the building and 
occupants as is achieved by having proper fire separations between the first and second storeys as 
designated under the NBC.  
 Using the NBC, the code prescribes that in buildings having a building area greater than 100 m
2
, 
the stair connecting the two storeys must be enclosed within a fire rated exit stair shaft. The function 
behind this requirement is to retard the effects of fire on emergency egress facilities. The objective behind 
this provision is to limit the probability that, as a result of the design or construction of the building, a 
person in or adjacent to the building will be exposed to an unacceptable risk of injury due to fire. 
Unacceptable risks addressed in the Code are those caused due to persons being delayed in, or impeded 
from moving to, a safe place during a fire emergency. On the other hand, the installation of a full fire 
alarm system exceeds the minimum code requirement for a building of this size. The functional statement 
behind the system is "to notify persons, in a timely manner, of the need to take action in an emergency”. 
The objective behind a fire alarm system is to limit the probability that a person in, or adjacent to, the 
building will be exposed to an unacceptable risk of injury due to fire. The risks of injury due to fire are 
the same as the above in this case which is risk caused by persons being delayed in or impeded from 
moving to a safe place during an fire emergency [14].    
 The first step in using the tree to examine the intent of installing a fire alarm system against the 
code requirements, then, is to assess the lowest elements in the tree and estimate the extent to which each 
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element is present as a fire protection feature. A four point scale such as the following may be used (1) 
nonexistent, (2) below standard, (3) standard, and (4) above standard. The process is to proceed up the 
tree and qualify each output on the basis of the quality of the inputs and the logic gates that connect them. 
Where the lowest level elements are inputs to an "or" gate, the value of the output will be at least as high 
as the highest valued input.  Where the lowest level elements are inputs to an "and" gate, the quality of the 
output should be limited to that of the least-valued input [19].  
 The fire safety concepts tree can now be used to assess the impact of the lack of fire protection 
around the open staircase. The lack of protection of an egress route stairway results in "route 
completeness" and "protected path" that are identified as being below standard. Working up the tree to the 
first OR gate, these two below standard conditions result in below standard "provide movement means". 
Working up the tree another level is another OR gate where "move exposed" is below standard. The next 
level up is another OR gate where "safeguard exposed" is below standard. The next level up is another 
OR gate where "limit amount exposed" becomes below standard, and the final level up is an AND gate 
which also results in "manage exposed" being below standard.  
 In comparison, the fire safety concepts tree can now be used to assess the same stairwell with the 
fire alarm system installed. The inclusion of a fire alarm system in this building results in "detect need", 
"signal need", and "provide instruction" all being above standard. The next level up is an AND gate and 
since all three inputs are above average, "cause movement of exposed" is also above average. The next 
level up is "move exposed" which is another AND gate which requires "provide movement means" and 
"provide safe destination" to at least be to standard in order for "move exposed" to be at least to standard. 
This is where a qualitative analysis done using the fire safety concept tree can be useful to formulate an 
argument that the stairwell with a fire alarm system exceeds the minimum code requirement. Also, since 
the fire alarm system is an automatic system, it will provide early detection to building occupants of a fire 
and thus allow for the stairway to be used to evacuate building occupants earlier, before the products of 
fire make the exit pathway untenable. If this argument is accepted, then all the inputs for the AND gate 
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leading into "provide movement means" can be considered to be standard. Assuming that the stair is 
constructed of solid wood with the underside covered with plaster or gypsum and the floor plans are set 
up in such a way to maximize fire compartmentation within the floor area, it could also be argued that all 
the inputs for "provide safe destination" have also been met satisfactorily resulting in a standard level of 
safety. With "cause movement of exposed", "provide movement means" and "provide safe destination" all 
having a standard level of safety, the AND gate for "move exposed" will also be to standard. Going up 
one level is an OR gate for "safe guard exposed" which also has a standard level and finally, the OR gate 
for "manage exposed" is also at standard.  
 In this case, since the heritage office building will be designed and constructed with the added 
fire alarm system and since traditional construction methods were used, an argument could be made, via 
assessment with the fire safety concepts tree, that the deficiency caused by the exit stair not being 
enclosed in a fire rated exit stair shaft has been compensated for by the fire alarm system and the way the 
building is built. 
 As can be deduced from the example above, the advantages of the fire safety concepts tree as 
applied to fire protection in heritage buildings are that 
 the fire safety concepts tree is a qualitative guide and easy to use assessment tool; 
 it allows alternative solutions and combinations of fire safety measures such as construction 
materials, combustibility of materials, fire protection devices, fire detection devices, and 
characteristics of occupants to be evaluated singularly or as a whole in order to identify 
redundancies and gaps in a design; 
 it provides an overall structure with which to analyze the potential impact of fire protection 
strategies, identify gaps and areas of redundancy in fire protection strategies;  
 the concepts tree is a tool that fire protection engineers can use to communicate fire protection 
concepts to stakeholders when a design is being evaluated; 
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 it can be used in the analysis of a design and can also be used to study other fire protection codes 
and standards to determine if a minimum acceptable level of safety is achieved when complying 
with the code [19]; and 
 it can establish the relative importance of various components of a fire protection strategy [45]. 
Despite the above advantages, however, several disadvantages with using the Fire Safety Concepts Tree 
also exist. They are:  
 the structure of the tree does not adequately consider multiple interactions between fire safety 
concepts because concepts at the same level in the tree that affect each other cannot be portrayed;   
 the temporal aspect of fire development is not represented in the tree. The logic gates stipulate 
that avoidance of fire casualties can be accomplished by enduring a fire or escaping it. To escape 
means to move faster than the fire and its products of combustion. An attempt to explain this 
relationship was directly stated in the example above but there was no mechanism within the tree 
to demonstrate the importance of this to the defined scenario; 
 it cannot deal simultaneously with multiple objectives; and 
 the fire safety concepts and scenarios being analyzed by the tree do not consider probabilities of 
occurrence. As such, the fire safety concepts tree can be described as being more abstract than 
other fault tree analyses that incorporate probabilities of occurrence [19]. 
 Use of the fire safety concepts tree as an approach to managing fire safety in heritage buildings 
would require focus on either prevention of fire ignition or management of fire impact. Some of the most 
common actions that can be taken to prevent fire ignition are to eliminate the improper use of temporary 
light fixtures, excessive use of extension cords, use of space heaters or heat guns, smoking, and use of 
open flames [46]. Even if all these fire prevention actions are taken, it is impractical to expect that these 
measures will be 100% effective [43]. With preventing fire ignition not 100% effective, the approach 
would turn to managing fire impact. Following the layout of the tree, this can be satisfied by either 
‘Managing the Fire’ or ‘Managing the Exposed’. Managing fire through use of fire protection systems 
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that limit fire spread, contain fires or incorporate firefighting equipment in heritage buildings will further 
reduce the risks and consequences of fires [46]. Managing the exposed, on the other hand, requires a 
strategy that either ‘Limits Amount Exposed’ or ‘Safeguards Exposed’. It is difficult to ‘Limit Amount 
Exposed’ as that would require restricting the number of people or amount of contents in a space which 
may be impractical when dealing with heritage buildings since many are used as museums. ‘Safeguarding 
the Exposed’ is the most common tactic used in building projects and most prescriptive buildings codes 
and regulations try to achieve this objective. Potential measures that can be used towards this end include 
use of fire alarm systems, egress systems, fire-resistant elements, fire suppression systems, smoke 
management systems, fire safety plans, fire emergency organization, emergency lighting, exit signs, and 
voice communication systems [43].   
 Based on the assessment above, then, the Fire Safety Concepts Tree, while very useful, appears 
best suited to evaluate designs that utilize alternative solutions that are trying to achieve a limited number 
of objectives.  In scenarios where multiple objectives must be achieved, multiple fire safety concepts tree 
analyses will need to be done resulting in a heavy administrative burden for the designer and reviewer. 
The temporal nature of fire events and how certain fire protection strategies are most effective for early 
detection and early warning to occupants so they can evacuate are not adequately captured in the tree. 
Similarly, the probability of a fire occurring, as well as differing probability of different types of fires 
occurring, is not considered by the tree. Probability is an important factor however, and one that should be 
considered in fire safety analysis of heritage buildings, since the incremental contribution of various fire 
protection strategies can impact the overall effectiveness of an alternative solution [19].  
 The concept of relative risk was introduced in this section and the previous section where the risk 
of a subject building is compared against a similar building that is compliant with the prescriptive code. In 
cases where an alternative solution is used, applying the principle of relative risk may be useful in 
focusing the review of an alternative solution towards identification of potential deficiencies in design and 
assessing whether the alternative solution has addressed the deficiency; however, it falls short in terms of 
37 
 
facilitating evaluation based on the relative probabilities amongst multiple possible scenarios or paths of 
fire development. Therefore, use of a fire risk index, which is a semi-quantitative assessment tool for 
comparison of relative fire risk, will be studied in this context in the following section.    
2.6.4 Semi-Quantitative Fire Risk Assessment with Fire Risk Indexing 
 Fire Risk Indexing (FRI) is a sub-set of fire risk assessment that links fire science, fire safety and 
safety culture. Fire safety decisions are often made under conditions where data are sparse and uncertain 
such that probabilities are difficult, if not impossible, to define. In these situations, FRI can provide a cost 
effective means of risk evaluation that is useful and valid [47]. When FRI is used to study a heritage 
building, its design and proposed fire safety features focus on specific building safety parameters. Each 
building safety parameter, such as fire separations, building size, type of fire alarm to be used, and type of 
sprinkler system to be used, is evaluated and then assigned its own risk index, a numerical value that is 
based on the building and site conditions and the proposed design. The fire safety solutions for the 
proposed design are thus evaluated using professional judgement, experience, latest knowledge in fire 
safety science and prevailing regulations. The values in a risk index for each parameter can be either 
positive or negative as appropriate to reflect that the value represents the relative risk for that building 
safety parameter. The scores for each building safety parameter that is applicable to an analysis are then 
summed to achieve a single value representing the overall building safety risk. In order to determine a 
relative ranking of risk for different design solutions, the overall building safety risk value of a subject 
building can be compared against the overall building safety risk values from the baseline building that 
complies with the prescriptive requirements of the governing code [48].   
 Table 1 shows an example of a fire risk index for the building safety parameter of building height 
with indices referenced to building heights allowed for a particular building area under the prevailing 
code [49].  
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Table 1 - Building Safety Parameter Number of Stories [49] 
Number of Storeys Numerical value (per storey) 
Each storey above the maximum number of storeys allowed -5 
Complies with prevailing code 0 
Each storey below the maximum number of storeys +5 (maximum value, +10) 
 
When considering a heritage building that is 2 storeys high with a building area of 200 m
2
 and used 
primarily as an office, working through Table 1 would result in a score of +5 for this building safety 
parameter. This is because the NBC currently allows an office building with a building area of 200 m
2 
to 
have a maximum height of 3 storeys [14]. Had this building been 3 storeys tall with the same building 
height and occupancy type, working through Table 1 would have resulted in a value of 0 for this fire 
safety parameter. The difference in value of the index between an office building that is 2 storeys versus 3 
storeys in height reflects the fact that a building that is 2 storeys tall would be relatively safer in the event 
of a fire than a 3 storey building. As can be seen in the above example, the goal of FRI is not to work 
towards an optimal design of fire protection solution. Rather, the goal is to utilize various methods of 
analyzing and scoring fire hazards and fire protection and life safety system attributes to produce an 
estimate of relative fire risk of at least two solutions under evaluation. FRI has been shown to be 
sufficient for demonstrating that an alternative solution is as safe as, if not safer than a comparable 
prescriptive solution [50].   
 One example where FRI method has been applied to evaluate heritage buildings and determine 
their relative safety is in Wisconsin where the Building Evaluation Method from Chapter ILHR 70 of the 
Wisconsin Administrative Code is used. This method assesses the relative effectiveness of different 
designs of fire protection measures in heritage buildings by comparing the building characteristics in the 
heritage building of interest against what is required by the prevailing building code. The Wisconsin 
Administrative Code Chapter ILHR 70 Historic Building Code has identified 17 building safety 
parameters that should be used to evaluate a qualified historic building. They are Number of Storeys, 
Building Area, Building Setback, Attic Compartmentalization, Firestopping, Mixed Occupancies, 
Vertical Openings, HVAC Systems, Smoke Detection, Fire Alarms, Smoke Control, Exit Capacity, Dead 
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ends, Maximum Travel, Emergency Lighting, Elevator Control, and Sprinklers. Further, each parameter 
has its own risk index, where positive and negative values are assigned to building conditions that fall 
within the scope of that parameter. Based on actual site conditions and the proposed design, a score is 
determined for each specific building parameter depending on whether the situation exceeds or fails to 
comply with the requirements of the prevailing prescriptive code [49]. In general, the relative risk is 
determined by evaluating the building characteristics for the heritage building against a fully prescriptive 
code compliant building. If a building characteristic in the heritage building has less protection than what 
is required by the prevailing code, a negative value is assigned to that building parameter. Alternately, if a 
building characteristic in the heritage building exceeds what is required in the prevailing code, a positive 
number is assigned. Once all the applicable building characteristics have been assigned a value and those 
values have been summed together, an overall positive value means the heritage building is compliant 
with the prevailing codes and a negative number means the building does not provide an equivalent level 
of fire protection as that specified in the codes [50], in which case additional fire safety measures would 
have to be implemented.  
 The main advantages of using a fire risk indexing method are that it is easy to use and it considers 
a heritage building holistically by considering the status of different building elements within the building 
as a whole in order to determine the relative risk of the building. The method also entails a systematic 
review process that allows for a degree of certainty and consistency with respect to design approvals [50].  
There are several disadvantages to fire risk indexing. It is criticised for being a qualitative, and potentially 
subjective, measure of fire safety in which the relationship between the indices and statistical data on fires 
are not clearly linked. The indices are specified by experts, however the process of specification is often 
not documented. It is difficult to understand why a specific value is assigned to the building safety 
parameter and whether or not it can be changed [47].  There are also concerns revolving around the fact 
that the application of a predefined building attribute ranking system may miss important fire protection 
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concerns and does not include information for specific situations.  Potentially important factors that may 
not be included are  
1. Occupant characteristics, such as whether occupants are awake and alert, and familiar with 
evacuation from the building. These occupant characteristics affect building evacuation and hazard 
remediation;  
2. Fire dynamics related to the expected type of fires that will occur in the building being studied;  
3. Fire statistics and the likelihood of fires occurring in the heritage building; and 
4. Determination of potential deficiencies since the performance of the heritage building is evaluated as 
a whole, rather than against a set of specific design features.  
 From the brief description of the tools above for semi-quantitative fire risk assessment above, fire 
risk indexing will be investigated further in this thesis. Despite any potential limitations, it is a 
framework that is effective at comparing relative risk of various design solutions, easy to use and the 
qualitative nature of this framework will provide the flexibility to create additional fire risk indices to 
address important fire protection concerns as they arise for project specific situations.  
2.6.5 Best method to evaluate alternative solutions 
 The brief overview of quantitative fire risk assessments, Subsection 2.6.2, showed that it is not 
ideal for evaluating alternative solutions in heritage rehabilitation projects in Canada due to limited 
statistical data available for determining the likelihood of fire scenarios occurring and quantification of 
the consequences of the fire scenarios. The fire protection community has not widely accepted 
quantitative fire risk assessments due to lack of education and technology transfer to provide necessary 
data to educate designers and code officials on the use and usefulness of quantitative fire risk assessment 
methods.  The Fire Safety Concepts Tree, a qualitative fire risk assessment method, was easier to use but 
is also not ideal for use in alternative solutions where multiple objective and function statements need to 
be met. Fire risk indexing, a semi-quantitative method, appears most suitable for use in heritage 
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rehabilitation applications since it is easy to use, follows a systematic review process that allows for a 
degree of certainty for approval, and considers a building holistically.  
 The fire risk indexing method described in the Wisconsin Administrative Code Chapter Industry, 
Labor and Human Resources (ILHR) 70 Historic Building Code is a logical starting point for this 
research since it has been in effect in some form or another since 1955 [51]. The Wisconsin 
Administrative Code Chapter ILHR 70 was selected in this thesis over the more recent Wisconsin 
Administrative Code - Department of Commerce Chapter Comm 70 Historic Buildings for further 
investigation because ILHR 70 can be applied to a wider variety of occupancy types in heritage 
rehabilitation projects [49]. Several municipalities in Wisconsin continue to adopt both these codes when 
working with heritage buildings [52]. It is postulated here that the disadvantages identified above in 
Subsection 2.6.4 can be addressed by creating additional fire risk indices to deal with any additional fire 
safety parameters of concern in Canadian heritage rehabilitation projects.  
 In this light, it will first be explored whether the Wisconsin Administrative Code Chapter ILHR 
70 Historic Building Code in its present form is suitable for use in a Canadian context. Case studies will 
then be undertaken to further evaluate and develop a new fire risk assessment method, based on fire risk 
indices inspired by the Wisconsin Administrative Code, for Canadian heritage buildings projects. Based 
on results, recommendations will be made on any changes that would enhance the methodology for use in 
this country, and a final modified framework for use for heritage rehabilitation projects in Canada will be 
presented.   
 
2.7 Solution - Fire Protection Framework using Fire Risk Indexing 
 The flexible fire protection framework for heritage rehabilitation projects proposed in this thesis 
utilizes fire risk indexing to evaluate alternative solutions. The analysis of existing codes, design 
frameworks and analysis methods outlined above has found fire risk indexing easy to use and its holistic 
approach to building evaluation appears to lend itself well to application within the existing Canadian fire 
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protection and heritage protection frameworks. The objective-based nature of the governing building and 
fire code allows for alternative solutions in building design and the systemic review process based on fire 
risk indexing allows for some degree of certainty for design approval as fire risk indexing is effective for 
comparing and communicating relative risk across solution options. Also, fire risk indices can be updated, 
amended, and created based on the latest information available in order to facilitate on-going 
improvement of the analysis framework for assessment of alternative fire safety solutions.   
 To summarize then, the final overall fire protection framework must first establish the overall 
project objective, and clearly specify the heritage value and character of the building in order to determine 
what aspects of the building need to be protected.  The method for determining the relative risk of the 
subject building against an alternative solution(s) must be established and demonstrated in order to verify 
its veracity going forward as an acceptable fire protection framework. For this, a subject building must be 
compared to a theoretical code compliant building of similar occupancy, height and building area. By 
comparing the existing heritage building against the theoretical building of similar occupancy, building 
height and size that is fully compliant with the NBC, potential deficiencies in the heritage building will be 
identified whilst carrying out the building code review. The functional and objective statements behind 
the code provisions for any non-compliances will then form the basis for development of an alternative 
solution that fully satisfies the functional and objective statements. This will be accomplished by use, 
and/or adaptation as necessary, of fire risk indices included in the Wisconsin Administrative Code 
Chapter ILHR 70 Historic Building Code based on fire science, experience, and available statistical data 
of fire occurrence. Additional fire risk indices for additional fire safety parameters that should be 
considered when evaluating an alternative solution will be created as necessary to provide a more 
accurate evaluation of alternative solutions using the new fire risk index approach proposed below.  
 The following chapter will elaborate on the steps taken in development of the new FRA 
framework for fire safety assessment during rehabilitation of heritage buildings. Specific topics in fire 
43 
 
science and fire statistics are discussed in order to update or create new fire risk indices to be used in the 
final version of the framework as well.  
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3 Methodology 
3.1 The Fire Protection Framework for Heritage Rehabilitation Projects in 
Canada  
 As stated in earlier chapters, heritage buildings are cultural resources in which the heritage value 
must be protected. Rehabilitating heritage buildings for modern uses will allow these types of buildings to 
be utilized and will provide owners with the resources needed to maintain and operate the building. The 
objective-based code format of the NBC and NFC provides the flexibility needed so that alternative fire 
safety solutions may be developed for, and utilized in these buildings. However, objective based codes do 
not provide specific guidance on how to evaluate whether an alternative fire safety solution satisfies the 
minimum requirements of the code [25]. In order to address this concern, fire risk indexing based on the 
Wisconsin Administrative Code Chapter ILHR 70 Historic Building Code [49] was chosen as the best 
method to evaluate relative fire risk between an acceptable design solution and an alternative design 
solution. From this starting point, a new FRA framework is developed for fire safety management of 
Canadian heritage building rehabilitation projects. Case studies are then employed to demonstrate that the 
final framework is flexible and consistent for use. 
 In general, the proposed framework combines heritage feature identification, definition of design 
objectives, building code analysis, development of alternative solutions and fire risk indexing as follows: 
1. Describe the base building characteristics and summarize the heritage value of the building. 
2. Create a design brief that states the objectives of the heritage rehabilitation project. 
3. Conduct a building and fire code analysis of the proposed design of the heritage building and a 
theoretical building that complies with the acceptable solutions based on the objective based codes.  
4. List all deficiencies that the heritage building has with respect to the acceptable solutions including 
how they are related to all objective and functional statements. 
5. Describe the basis behind the alternative solution. 
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6. Use fire risk indices to compare the fire safety design for the rehabilitated heritage building and the 
theoretical acceptable design solution building. Develop new fire risk indices when necessary and 
when clearly supported by fire safety science or statistics.    
The following sections of this chapter outline the key sections of this framework in turn, with discussion 
of the main elements and major considerations to be addressed at each stage of the analysis. 
3.1.1 Describe Base Building and Determine Heritage Value    
 The first step in a heritage rehabilitation project is to describe the base building in terms of 
building height in storeys, building area (building footprint), building materials, fire protection systems 
and exiting provisions. Once the building is known, the heritage value of the building needs to be 
determined based on the official heritage character statement for the building.  Pertinent information must 
be summarized as it relates to aspects of the building which are important from the perspective of heritage 
preservation. This phase is very important so that all of the project stakeholders understand what the 
heritage preservation objectives of the project are. Through establishing what can and cannot be altered in 
a heritage building, the designer can begin working on a design that can balance heritage protection and 
fire safety.  
3.1.2 Design Brief 
 Next, a design brief is created that states all of the objectives of the heritage rehabilitation project.  
The existing condition of the building may be elaborated on further to establish the initial conditions of 
the rehabilitation project prior to describing how the building will be used going forward. Any heritage 
character and features that need to be protected, as identified from the heritage character statement above, 
must also be stated in the design brief.  
3.1.3 Building and Fire Code Analysis 
 The third step is to undertake a building code analysis, and where necessary a fire code analysis, 
of the rehabilitated heritage building and a code compliant building of similar size, occupancy type and 
construction type that complies with the acceptable solution under the NBC. A building and fire code 
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analysis is done by working through a building code data sheet or building code matrix similar to one that 
typically can be found on construction drawings. Table 2 shows the building code data sheet that will be 
used to compare a fully acceptable solution (ie. code compliant building) and the heritage building being 
studied. It is based on the building code data sheet that was used by Fire Protection Services Labour 
Program, Human Resources and Skills Development Canada [53]. Comparison between the code 
compliant building and heritage building is done this way to make it easier to communicate amongst 
stakeholders, as well as easier to compare relative risk while at the same time reducing the number of fire 
risk indices that need to be used out of the 17 building safety parameters from the Wisconsin 
Administrative Code Chapter ILHR 70 Historic Building Code. 
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Table 2 - Modified Building Code Data Sheet for comparing Code Compliant Building and 
Heritage Building 
 Code Compliant 
Building 
Heritage Building Functional and 
Objective 
Statements 
Attributed to 
Code Provision 
Year of Original Construction    
Major Occupancy 
Classification(s) 
   
Governing Code Part    
Fire Resistance rating of floor 
assemblies (hrs) 
   
Building Area (m2)    
Building Height (Storeys)    
Cross-over Floors    
High Building (see NBC Article 
3.2.6) 
   
Interconnected floor space    
Mezzanines    
Sprinklers    
Building Faces No. of Streets (for 
fire department access) 
   
Type of Construction    
Fire Resistance Rating of Roof 
Assembly 
   
Total Building Occupant Load    
Fire Alarm System    
Voice Communication     
Fire Alarm System Monitoring    
Standpipe & Hose     
Emergency Power    
Smoke Control Measures    
Fire Pumps    
Maglocks    
Special Extinguishing Systems    
Water Supply    
Spatial Separations    
 
Knowing the year of construction, building size, occupancy type and building height provides sufficient 
information to begin determining the applicable fire protection provisions such as fire resistance ratings, 
fire alarm system requirements, sprinkler requirements and construction type. The following list 
elaborates on each row of the Modified Building Code Data Sheet:   
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 The year of construction refers to when the building was built and gives the designer and reviewer 
insight into which building code was applied at the time of construction.  
 The occupancy classification refers to how the building will be used by the occupants. Occupancy 
classification will be done using the nomenclature in the NBC.  
 Governing code part refers to whether the fire protection requirements in Part 3 or Part 9 of the 
NBC are to be applied in a particular project. This is determined by knowing the occupancy 
classification, building area (building footprint), and building height (in storeys). 
 The fire resistance rating of floor assemblies refers to the minimum fire resistance rating required 
by the NBC to separate different floors into separate fire rated compartments. The required 
minimum fire resistance rating is determined by the building height, building area, construction 
type, occupancy type, and sprinkler system status.    
 The building area refers to the building foot print area and is measured in square meters. 
 The building height refers to the number of storeys the building has above grade [14].  
 A cross-over floor is a designated floor in a building where occupants in an exit stairwell can re-
enter the floor and proceed to another exit stairwell. There cannot be more than 4 storeys separating 
cross-over floors and the top floor or second to top must also be a cross over floor [54].  
 High buildings are defined by the NBC based on building height and occupant load. The building 
height in this case is the distance measured between grade and the floor of the top storey. High 
buildings require additional smoke control, fire alarm system monitoring, voice communication, 
sprinkler system, elevator, emergency power and venting requirements [14]. 
 Interconnected floor spaces means superimposed floor areas or parts of floor areas in which floor 
assemblies that are required to be fire separations are penetrated by openings that are not provided 
with closures. The NBC has specific prescriptive conditions where interconnected floor spaces are 
permitted [14].  
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 Mezzanines are intermediate floor assemblies between floor and ceiling of any room or storey and 
include an interior balcony. The NBC has prescriptive conditions on when mezzanines are 
permitted and the maximum allowable size a mezzanine is permitted to be before additional fire 
protection requirements are mandatory such as proper fire resistance rating of floor assemblies and 
fire separated exit enclosures.  
 Sprinkler refers to whether the NBC requires a sprinkler system in the building. This requirement is 
determined by building height, building area, and occupancy type.  
 The "Building faces number of streets" refers to the number of streets the building has direct access 
to. The number of streets a building faces implies that the fire department has multiple ways to 
fight a fire incident in the building. The number of streets a building faces will impact the 
maximum building area permitted for a given occupancy type.  
 Type of construction refers to whether or not a degree of fire safety has been attained by the use of 
non-combustible materials for structural members and other building assemblies. A non-
combustible material is defined in the NBC as a material that meets the acceptance criteria of 
CAN/ULC-S114, "Test for Determination of Non-combustibility in Building Materials" [14].  
 The fire resistance of roof assembly refers to the fire resistance rating of the barrier between the top 
floor and the roof. 
 Total occupant load refers to the maximum number of people that can safely occupy the subject 
building. It is determined by occupancy type and floor area or exit width [14].   
 Fire alarm system refers to whether fire alarm system requirements in the NBC apply in this 
project. All applicable fire alarm system requirements are to be implemented.  
 Voice communication system refers to whether the NBC requirement for additional communication 
functions are required in the fire alarm system. Voice communication in this case allows for two 
way communication between the central alarm and control facility or mechanical control centre, 
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and each floor. The central alarm and control facility will also have the ability to control 
loudspeakers so that messages can be transmitted to all parts of the building.  
 Fire alarm system monitoring refers to whether the NBC requirement for the fire alarm system to 
be monitored is applicable for a project. Fire alarm system monitoring is a separate function to the 
fire alarm system and it can be delivered by having fire alarm signals transmitted directly to the fire 
department or an accredited third party fire alarm signal receiving centre.  
 The standpipe and hose system refers to whether a standpipe and hose system is required in the 
building. A standpipe and hose system is defined as “An arrangement of piping, valves, hose 
connections and allied equipment installed in a building or structure, with the hose connections 
located in such a manner that water can be discharged in streams through attached hose and 
nozzles, for the purposes of extinguishing a fire, thereby protecting a building or structure and its 
contents in addition to protecting the occupants. This is accomplished by means of connections to 
water supply systems or by means of pump tanks and other equipment necessary to provide an 
adequate supply of water to the hose connections" [55]. The NBC prescribes when a standpipe and 
hose system is required for a proposed project.  
 Emergency power refers to the minimum time a back-up power supply must be capable of 
supplying power for building life safety systems. The NBC specifies the minimum time the back-
up power supply must be rated for and which life safety systems need to be powered by the back-
up power supply. Emergency power can be supplied from batteries or emergency generators.  
 Smoke control measures refer to whether the NBC requires this capability in the subject building. 
Smoke control measures refer to engineered systems that can be used singly or in combination to 
modify smoke movement [56].  
 Fire pumps refer to specifically designed and listed mechanical pumps that provide adequate 
pressure and water supply to the water-based fire suppression systems in the building. Whether this 
is required by the NBC in the subject building should be identified in the building code data sheet.  
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 Mag locks refer to whether electromagnetic locks will be used in the building. The NBC has 
specific requirements that accompany electromagnetic locks such as fire alarm system 
requirements, door hardware and door operation requirements.  
 Special extinguishing systems refer to whether special fire suppression systems that are not 
sprinklers will be installed in the building. These types of systems are specified where water based 
system may damage the contents within a space, such as in server rooms and art galleries.  
 Water supply refers to whether the building is provided with adequate water supply to facilitate 
firefighting needs. The NBC specifies what water supply will be required in a specific situation.  
 Spatial separations refers to the distance between the subject building and an adjacent building, as 
fire from a neighbouring building can affect the subject building and vice versa. The NBC 
requirements ensure that there is a minimum distance between adjacent fire compartments to 
minimize the risk of fire spreading from one building to another. Distances vary depending on 
whether a fire separation with the required fire resistance rating is present and whether openings 
within the fire separation are protected or not [14].   
 With this information filled in for the subject building, the building code data sheet captures the 
basic information that is relevant to designers and AHJs. It also provides a systematic manner by which to 
document those building code requirements that are applicable and must be implemented for each design 
to comply with the appropriate code or set of codes in force at the time of rehabilitation.  
3.1.4 Tracking Deficiencies 
 The "acceptable solutions" derived in the NBC and NFC at the time of the rehabilitation project 
are to be used when filling out the "Code Compliant Building" column in Table 2. This establishes the 
baseline against which the relative risk comparison is conducted. The analysis of the heritage building 
will be done by noting the actual building conditions and characteristics that exist. It must be emphasized 
that the information recorded in Table 2 does not provide a comprehensive list of deficiencies that may 
arise in a building code review. Additional fire safety deficiencies not covered by the building code data 
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sheet above must also be identified and recorded so that the stakeholders are aware of all deficiencies that 
require attention in the building. Table 3 shows one example of a second table that should be used to track 
all the fire protection deficiencies that exist in the building being studied. In this Table, each non-
conformance to the acceptable solution is summarized and entered, then the code provision reference is 
recorded along with the corresponding functional and objective statements attributed to that code 
provision which for ease of later use and communication can be expanded in full. With the deficiencies 
summarized and connected to the corresponding code provisions and matching functional and objective 
statements, the designer will know what the alternative solution must address in order to obtain approval 
from the AHJ.  
Table 3 - Sample table to track fire protection deficiencies 
Item Non-
Conformance 
Code 
Requirements 
Functional and Objective Statements Attributed to Code 
Provision 
1 
Exit doors 
swing in.  
9.9.6.5 - Except 
for doors 
serving a single 
dwelling unit, 
exit doors that 
are required to 
swing, shall 
swing in the 
direction of exit 
travel.  
[F10-OS3.7] 
F10 - To facilitate the timely movement of persons to a 
safe place in an emergency.  
OS3.7 - An objective of this Code is to limit the 
probability that, as a result of design or construction of the 
building, a person in or adjacent to the building will be 
exposed to an unacceptable risk of injury due to hazards. 
The risks of injury due to hazards addressed in this Code 
are those caused by persons being delayed in or impeded 
from moving to a safe place during an emergency.   
   
3.1.5 Alternative Solution 
 Protection of heritage features of a building is often the primary reason why simple compliance 
with the acceptable solution outlined in the objective-based codes is not possible. Therefore, once the 
deficiencies are identified the designer will develop an alternative solution, explain the rationale behind 
the proposed solution(s), acknowledge the functional and objective statements that have been identified as 
part of the existing deficiencies, and explain how the alternative solution addresses the functional and 
objective statements. All assumptions and idealizations for the alternative solution must also be clearly 
stated so that the AHJ can understand the basis of design. As in the example with the open staircase 
discussed in Subsection 2.6.3, alternative solutions may include incorporating fire protection systems that 
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exceed the minimum requirements of the acceptable solution.  After the alternative solution is designed, 
its conformance with the acceptable (prescriptive) code solution is analyzed using the new fire risk index 
which is outlined in the following section.  
3.1.6 Analyze the Alternative Solution by Applying Fire Risk Indexing  
 The final stage of evaluating the alternative solution for the heritage rehabilitation project, 
therefore, is to use the fire risk indices to determine its final score as it relates to a risk index for the 
comparable code compliant building. For this, the indices from the building safety parameters of the 
Building Evaluation Method of the Wisconsin Administrative Code Chapter ILHR 70 Historic Building 
Code are first applied. Following this and where applicable, any amendments to the Wisconsin fire risk 
indices are developed based on additional building safety parameters and used to fully evaluate the 
alternative solution for the heritage rehabilitation project as will be discussed in Section 3.2 below. 
 For the initial analysis, Table 4 shows the full Building Evaluation Table from the Wisconsin 
Administrative Code Chapter ILHR 70 that would be used to evaluate an alternative solution from the 
point of view of fire safety, means of egress and general safety. Each empty cell in the Table would be 
populated with the value of index applicable to the level of compliance associated with the corresponding 
attribute for the heritage building, and the total compared to the value obtained for the same analysis 
applied to the compliant reference building.   
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Table 4 - Building Evaluation Table from the Wisconsin Administrative Code Chapter ILHR 70 
[49].  
Safety Parameters Fire 
Safety 
Means of 
Egress 
General 
Safety 
Comments 
1. Number of Storeys     
2. Building Area     
3. Building Setback  N/A   
4. Attic Compartmentalization  N/A   
5. Firestopping  N/A   
6. Mixed Occupancies  N/A   
7. Vertical Openings     
8. HVAC Systems     
9. Smoke Detection     
10. Fire Alarm System     
11. Smoke Control N/A    
12. Exit Capacity N/A    
13. Dead Ends N/A    
14. Maximum Travel Distance N/A    
15. Emergency Power N/A    
16. Elevator Control     
17. Sprinklers     
 
 In this thesis, not all 17 fire risk indices will be used when summing up the table. Instead, only 
fire risk indices that are associated with addressing instances of non-conformance between acceptable and 
alternative solutions will be recorded in the Table above. This approach is used because there is no 
difference in value of the fire risk index between the code compliant and actual building in areas where 
the building exactly complies with the acceptable solution specified in the prevailing code. This approach 
is also adopted because it identifies positive features (credits) but perhaps more importantly isolates and 
highlights the fire safety deficiencies and captures the impact that proposed alternative solutions have on 
the overall fire safety of the rehabilitated building. By summing the scores from all the applicable fire risk 
indices related to the deficiencies and credits related to the alternative solution, stakeholders can see and 
compare what impact deficiencies have on the overall building and whether the alternative solution has 
addressed them or not. If the summation in the Table above has a value greater than or equal to zero, the 
heritage building with the alternative solution could be deemed to provide an equivalent level of safety 
and protection as the code compliant building. A higher magnitude of the final value does not necessarily 
mean the building is significantly safer, instead, what the Table above shows is whether the alternative 
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solution, as applied in addressing the deficiency results in a relative risk that is equivalent to that in a 
building that complies with the acceptable solution.  
 It is expected that each alternative solution for each heritage rehabilitation project may need to 
utilize a different set of fire risk indices based on site specific conditions, availability of statistics and 
experience of the designer. Thus it is important that as a framework such as that described above is 
adopted and used, the decisions made and conclusions on the validity of the fire risk indices and 
assessment methodology should be documented in order to improve the proposed method over the longer 
term as well.    
 It was also recognized at this point in development of the proposed fire risk assessment 
framework that, in addition to the building safety parameters included in the Wisconsin Administrative 
Code Chapter ILHR 70, additional parameters with associated fire risk indices might need to be 
developed due to the unique nature of many heritage building rehabilitation projects.  These indices may 
be taken from concepts based in fire science, they may relate to human behaviour in fire, or they may be 
derived from fire statistics depending on the information that is available. Use of such information may 
also require modification of the existing 17 fire safety parameters from the Wisconsin Administrative 
Code Chapter ILHR 70 Historic Building Code.  In addition to documenting the above decisions then, 
central documentation pertaining to development of any new or modified fire risk indices would also be 
extremely helpful in establishing and refining fire risk indices for the new fire risk assessment framework 
for Canadian heritage rehabilitation projects proposed above.   
3.2 Considerations for Fire Risk Indexing 
 A new fire risk assessment system and methodology for heritage rehabilitation projects has been 
established as described in Section 3.1. Preliminary investigations into use of the method, showed that for 
certain cases, the full spectrum of fire safety considerations was not explicitly accounted for in the 
existing Wisconsin indices suggesting that the method could be further improved through the creation of 
new fire risk indices that might relate to specific rehabilitation projects. The important additional 
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considerations can be broadly grouped into categories related to occupant activities, fire dynamics, fire 
resistance ratings, occupancy separations, exiting capacity and fire alarm systems. The background for, 
and development of proposed new indices related to each of these categories are discussed in the sections 
below. 
3.2.1 Development of Occupant Activities Risk Index  
 The Building Evaluation Method of the Wisconsin Administrative Code Chapter ILHR 70 
Historic Building Code does not include any information or risk indices related to the activities of the 
occupants in a heritage building after it is rehabilitated. Yet, it is well known that there are direct relations 
between the activities of building occupants and use of the building with the likelihood and impacts of 
fires [16]. For example, the day-to-day activities of the occupants may directly affect the probability of 
fires occurring. Fire safety plans and training, and thus occupant actions during a fire, may reduce the 
impact of the fire and increase the probability of safe evacuation by building occupants. Therefore, a fire 
risk index that takes into consideration key aspects of occupant activity and fire safety planning was 
developed for inclusion in the overall fire risk assessment framework. Development of this index was 
twofold - one portion was based on fire statistics related to occupant activities within a structure and the 
other on the level of fire safety planning and training as related to occupant evacuation. Background for 
development of these form the subject of next three sections, leading to a final section in which the 
overall risk index is outlined.  
3.2.1.1 Fire Statistics 
 There is no question that specific activities that are, or are not undertaken by occupants in a 
building may impact the probability of a fire occurring on that site [16]. There are also inherent 
assumptions within the code as to how occupants will ‘normally’ function within a space. For example, 
the NBC and NFC do not deal with fire hazards that can be encountered in day to day building operation 
due to poor process control or housekeeping. Instead, the NFC generally focuses on fire hazards related to 
specific functions in larger commercial and industrial operations such as indoor and outdoor storage; the 
storage, handling, use and processing of flammable and combustible liquids; specific processes and 
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operations that involve a risk from explosion, or high flammability zones or related conditions that create 
a particular hazard to life safety [14]. Once a building is occupied, there are no provisions in either the 
NBC or NFC that explicitly prevent occupants from cooking, smoking, using candles, or using space 
heaters in a building. Finally, it is implicitly assumed across the legislation that all occupants and building 
owners will comply with all applicable warrantees, codes and legislation in terms of maintaining fire 
protection devices, equipment and systems as well as with respect to how dangerous goods are handled 
and stored if they are used on the premises.  
 As a first stage in development and use of an appropriate fire risk index to account for the 
potential impacts (positive or negative) of occupant actions on building fire safety, applicable fire 
statistics for the intended building type and use must be found and analyzed. These can then be used to 
estimate the type(s) of fires that can potentially occur within a certain space, the likelihood that each of 
these types of fire might occur and the severity of loss and damage (consequence) should they occur. 
While such statistics will vary from province to province in Canada, the buildings being studied in the 
analyses and case studies related to this thesis are all located in Ontario. Thus, fire statistics available 
from the Office of the Fire Marshal and Emergency Management (OFMEM) in Ontario are outlined 
below and used in the following discussion. From 2011 to 2015, there were 36,508 structure fires which 
resulted in injury, fatality or dollar loss as reported to the OFMEM in the province of Ontario [57]. Table 
5 shows the distribution of these fires across the different property classes. In addition, Table 6 lists the 
different types of ignition sources reported, and the percentage of fire initiated by each ignition source 
from 2011 to 2015. 
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Table 5 - Loss Fires Property Class: Structure only [57] 
Property Class Percentage distribution of 
structure loss fires in Ontario 
from 2011-2015 
Group A - Assembly Occupancies 4 % 
Group B - Care and Detention Occupancies 1 % 
Group C - Residential Occupancies 73 % 
Group D - Business and Personal Services 
Occupancies 
3 % 
Group E - Mercantile Occupancies 4 % 
Group F -Industrial Occupancies 7 % 
Properties not classified by the OBC 8% 
 
Table 6 - Structure fires: Ignition Source [57] 
Ignition Source Percentage distribution of Ignition Sources in 
Structure Fires in Ontario 
Arson/Vandalism 9 % 
Cooking  18 % 
Miscellaneous (exposure fires, natural causes, 
chemical reactions) 
11 % 
Heating/cooling 8 % 
Electrical distribution equipment – wiring 9 % 
Cigarettes 7 % 
Appliances 5 % 
Other open flame tools (excluding matches, 
lighters) 
3 % 
Other electrical or mechanical 4 % 
Candles 2 % 
Lighting (excluding candles) 2 %  
Matches or lighters 1%  
Processing equipment 1 % 
Undetermined 20%  
 
 Each type of ignition source listed in Table 6 can be cross-correlated with the property classes in 
which fires took place. This was done for the fire statistics registered for 2015. It was found that: 91% of 
the fires that were ignited by cooking equipment occurred in residential occupancies, as did 67% of the 
fires that were ignited by electrical distribution equipment, 82% of fires that were ignited by heating 
equipment, 89% of fires that were ignited by lit smoking materials (cigarettes, cigars, pipes, excluding 
matches or lighters), 82% of fires that were ignited by appliances, and 97% of fires that were ignited by 
candles [57]. 
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 Clearly, the majority of fires occurred in residential occupancies and thus the majority of the 
common fire ignition sources are related to the fires in residential occupancies as well [4]. On the other 
hand, the majority of heritage buildings being studied in this thesis are used as Group A: Assembly and 
Group D: Business and Personal Services occupancies [4]. For these building categories, the incidence of 
structure fires with loss was much lower than that in residences - only 4% and 3% of all fires respectively. 
Further, it is reasonable to extrapolate that the probability of fire occurring in heritage buildings is 
significantly lower than these statistics indicate since common ignition sources are minimized. In this 
thesis, heritage facilities are non-smoking, contain minimal to no cooking equipment, and have properly 
installed and maintained building HVAC systems so space heaters do not need to be used [59].  
 To investigate this further, the risk and probability of fires occurring in office and assembly type 
occupancies in Government of Canada occupied spaces were researched in more detail. It was found that 
the potential for ignition and fire was indeed reduced in these occupancies through policies and activities 
that are targeted to address and mitigate 76% of the common ignition sources in these buildings types, as 
listed in the statistics above. For example,  
1. The 9% probability and impacts from fires caused by arson and vandalism is reduced in federal 
heritage buildings since they are monitored by a security system or fire alarm system. Even if a fire 
was started, the fire situation will be detected and the fire department will respond quickly limiting 
the damage the fire can cause. With the building being occupied, the exterior of the building is 
maintained and better lit making the heritage building a less attractive target for vandalism and arson 
than many other structures [58].  
2. The majority of federal work places do not contain cooking equipment like stovetops, but instead are 
typically equipped with a microwave and fridge [59]. This mitigates the potential for the 18% of fires 
that are normally ignited by cooking equipment and cause damage to a building, however, since 
microwaves and fridges are both electrical equipment (see point 7 below) this risk of fire would not 
be fully eliminated.  
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3. The 11% of fires caused by exposure to fires in neighbouring structures or fires due to natural causes 
can be greatly reduced if heritage buildings are located in the middle of a park where the grass is 
properly maintained and there are no buildings close enough to pose an exposure protection risk. In 
urban settings, the situation is clearly different but a building can be protected from exposure risks 
with fire walls or other means.   
4. The 8% of fires caused by heating and cooling systems may be mitigated since Heating, Ventilation 
and Air Conditioning (HVAC) systems in heritage buildings are specifically designed to support the 
occupancy type, occupant load and expected operations. It is also expected that the heating and 
cooling systems are professionally managed in federal buildings alleviating uncertainty that could 
otherwise be associated with their state of maintenance and repair.  
5. The 9 % of fires caused by electrical wiring and distribution can be effectively mitigated when 
wiring is upgraded to the most recent standards under the Canadian Electrical Code and the electrical 
system is designed to accommodate the proposed use of the building. This upgrading and proper 
design of wiring should reduce the probability of specific circuits being overloaded. The probability 
of an electrical fire is further reduced if regular visual safety inspections are carried out since these 
would quickly identify and correct hazardous conditions such as overloaded electrical outlets, 
extension cords used as permanent wiring, and "daisy-chaining" power strips to power appliances 
and equipment beyond the original electrical design for the building; 
6. The 7% of fires caused by cigarettes is effectively eliminated in public buildings since most public 
spaces are now mandated as smoke free environment.  
7. The 7% of fires caused by appliances and lighting is lessened by the policy of the Government of 
Canada to only procure appliances and equipment that have been listed and labelled by an accredited 
certification organization such as ULC. 
8. The 7% of fires caused by open flames, candles, matches and lighters are mitigated as these are not 
permitted in an office occupancy except under exceptional circumstances such as birthday cakes and 
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smudging ceremonies for First Nations clients. Under those circumstances, the open fire sources 
(candles, etc) are monitored closely so that risk of ignition of surrounding materials is minimized. 
 This analysis of current fire statistics in Ontario coupled with knowledge of primary building 
functions and existing policies for Canadian federal heritage buildings, point towards creation of a new 
fire risk index to account for how existing measures might mitigate the risk of fire. As appropriate, then, 
these factors could be included in the overall fire risk index methodology for assessment of fire safety 
design for heritage buildings. Before defining the final proposed occupant activity index further, several 
other considerations related to occupant activity also merit discussion.  
3.2.1.2 Fire Safety Planning and Evacuation 
 Another consideration important in evaluation of occupant activity as related to alternative fire 
safety solutions in heritage buildings relates to the existence of fire safety organization and planning 
measures for many public spaces and their impact on occupant evacuation in a fire situation. It is known 
that there is significant room to use good fire safety planning and fire emergency organization to enhance 
fire safety in an occupied space [60]; however, this aspect of a fire safety design is generally not 
recognized as pertinent in a code-based solution. This is most probably because there can be widely 
varying degrees of implementation of a fire safety plan, although, perhaps equally, it could be argued that 
if credit were given to good planning and execution, implementation would be more consistent as well. At 
the present time, one can assume the minimum - that fire safety plans will describe the procedures to be 
followed in a fire emergency according to guidance contained in the NFC as to the following: 
 What types of occupancies are required to have a fire safety plan,  
 The role of supervisory staff in providing instruction to building occupants, assist vulnerable 
persons with movement to an area of safety, initiate smoke control or fire emergency systems, and 
facilitate fire department access, 
 Emergency procedures to follow in event of a fire 
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 Assemble floor plans, diagrams showing the type, location, and operation of the building 
emergency system, and shut off valves and switches for building utilities as documents within the 
plan, 
 Establish the frequency of fire drills, 
 Control of fire hazards in the building, and 
 Provision of alternative measures for the safety of occupants during any shutdown of fire protection 
equipment or system [15]. 
 In contrast to practice in many organizations, in work spaces that are federally regulated the NFC 
and the Canada Labour Code (CLC) Part II - Health and Safety Regulations prescribe how fire safety 
planning is to be implemented through their incorporation into the Treasury Board Standard for Fire 
Safety Planning and Emergency Organization - Chapter 3-1. This standard establishes the minimum 
requirements for fire safety plans including the organization of designated staff for fire emergency 
purposes, designation of people who are responsible for fire safety planning in Government of Canada 
workplaces, and how the planning should be initiated and implemented [60]. One aspect is a very detailed 
description of members of the fire emergency organization for each space and their roles and 
responsibilities such as floor wardens and monitors for persons with mobility impairments. Another 
unique aspect of the Treasury Board Standard is the section mandating regular inspections of the work 
space to reduce fire hazards. Typically carried out by members of the fire emergency organization, these 
proactive actions can reduce the chance of fires starting or increase the chance that engineered systems, 
such as fire doors, can work as designed. Since these measures exist and are well documented for federal 
government buildings in Canada, it needs to be assessed whether and how they could be accounted for in 
the overall fire risk index methodology via an occupant activity risk index as well.  
3.2.1.3 Evacuation Time and Occupant Factors Affecting Evacuation 
 In addition to having a fire safety plan and emergency organization in place, any factors which 
directly impact evacuation time constitute further important considerations in determining the level of fire 
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safety in an occupied space [61] and could therefore also be included in any new occupant activity index. 
One way this can be done is via the general procedures used in calculating evacuation time. Determining 
evacuation time starts at what is commonly referred to as Required Safe Egress Time (RSET). This is 
calculated by adding the following time intervals together:  
1. Detection Time - the time between fire ignition and the first detection of the fire by a device or an 
individual.  
2. Alarm Time - the time between the detection of the fire and the time at which an alarm signal is 
activated or notification takes place.  
3. Pre-movement Time - the time it takes a fire alarm signal to be perceived and understood as 
indicating that there is a fire emergency and evacuation begins.  
4. Movement Time - the time when evacuation starts and extending until the time when all occupants 
reach a place of safety [62].  
 In the present analysis, the positive and negative impacts of installed systems on detection time 
and alarm time will not be discussed since they arise during later discussion of the fire indices that are 
directly associated with those systems. Movement time is also not considered here; it remains unchanged 
between a code compliant and any other fire safety solution, since it begins at the time when an 
evacuation starts and extends to the time when all occupants reach a place of safety [62].  Therefore, pre-
movement time is of most importance with respect to assessment of potential occupant factors and actions 
that could affect safe egress in the event of a fire. This is of particular interest in this work since pre-
movement times are known to vary amongst different occupants and in different situations [63], but also 
because measures can be implemented to reduce pre-movement times during occupant evacuation as 
discussed below [63].  
 Studies have shown that there is some delay between perception of fire cues and evacuation and 
that there are several factors that affect pre-movement time for building occupants. For example, pre-
movement times are longest when recognition of a fire event relies on occupants understanding fire cues 
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such as smelling something burning or seeing smoke. Such cues are very ambiguous, and tends to slow 
perception of fire since they prompt an investigation response rather than a move towards evacuation of 
the space. On the other hand, a fire alarm is effective at alerting people that something might be 
happening although it is conversely known that depending on occupant training, and the history of alarms 
in a given establishment, fire alarms may sometimes be ignored for a period of time until occupants are 
cued in some other manner. This is particularly true for people who are committed to a task, since they 
tend to take a longer time to turn their attention toward an unexpected situation, particularly if the cues 
are not direct and meaningful [61]. Obtaining a warning delivered directly by others appears to be 
perceived as a better indication that there is an actual problem. For example, messages delivered through 
a voice communication system or directly by staff seem to be the signals that are taken most seriously by 
occupants as indicating a requirement to promptly leave the area. Thus, a good fire safety plan and a 
trained fire emergency team can facilitate quicker response and evacuation of building occupants, as well 
as earlier notification of the fire department, in the event of a fire [61].  
 Following identification of a fire event, many factors impact occupant behaviour and response. 
One of these relates to building characteristics. Occupants need time to gather information on their 
surroundings, building layout, and wayfinding prior to processing them and devising a plan of action [61]. 
Therefore, building occupants who are familiar with a building and emergency procedures are more likely 
to start evacuation rapidly [63]. Similarly, visual access to general activity within a space allows building 
occupants to observe the behaviour of others and more quickly interpret fire cues. Activation of visual 
signal devices and signs directing occupants to the nearest and alternate exits similarly reduce the time 
required to respond and take action in the event of fire. Thus level of familiarity with a building, visual 
access, and installation of good signage could also be taken into account in assessing overall level of fire 
risk related to occupant activity in heritage buildings.   
 As noted above, training of both staff and potentially also occupants is critical to a fast occupant 
response. Effective fire emergency planning requires organization and training of staff that is tailored 
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directly to the necessary evacuation procedures for each building. It must also involve sufficient numbers 
of trained personnel to execute their responsibilities in terms of prompting and facilitating evacuation of 
building occupants. Implementing such measures is of paramount importance because the speed with 
which occupants will respond to the fire alarm or other fire cues is largely dependent on their status in the 
building and the behaviour and instruction of staff [61]. This has always been recognized as being of 
critical importance in public buildings such as museums, malls, passenger terminals, and campuses where 
occupants are unlikely to be trained for evacuation and are reliant on being instructed on what actions to 
take [63]. In these situations as well, it is usually recognized that building occupants may have some 
physical, perceptual, or intellectual limitations, which may extend their response time to begin 
evacuation. The proportion of occupants with limitations is normally estimated and managed as part of an 
effective fire safety management plan. This would generally be the case for federal heritage buildings as 
well [61]. 
 From the discussion in the sections above, it is evident that occupant activities and fire risk are 
related in several key areas. First, any actions taken to lower the probability of occurrence of fire 
incidents that go above and beyond the minimum requirements will make a building relatively safer than 
one in which only the minimum requirements in the codes were met. Secondly, pre-movement time in a 
fire situation can be reduced by having a well designed fire safety plan and occupants well organized and 
trained on specific actions to take in a fire emergency. Practicing evacuation will reduce pre-movement 
time, as occupants who are familiar with a building and emergency procedures are more likely to start 
evacuation quickly [63]. Finally, spaces that are designed with clear wayfinding and maximum visual 
access to activities of other building occupants will also improve egress time in event of an emergency. A 
fire risk index that considers these proactive steps to improve fire safety and reduce evacuation time will 
be proposed in the following subsection and tested in subsequent case studies to determine if it is 
appropriate for inclusion as a fire risk index in the present methodology for assessment of fire risk in 
heritage buildings.     
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3.2.1.4 Occupant Activities Risk Index 
 In this section, a fire risk index is developed to account for the many measures that can be taken 
by building occupants to reduce the probability of fires occurring, to reduce the impact fires should one 
occur, and/or to increase the probability of safe evacuation by building occupants during a fire. Table 7 
shows the proposed new fire risk index for Occupant Activities. The rationale behind this fire risk index is 
centred on existing policies for fire safety management in Canadian Government buildings, including 
heritage buildings. The intent of adding this index into the overall analysis framework is to capture the 
positive effects on fire safety that result from proactive policies towards eliminating the most common 
fire ignition sources, from actions taken to eliminate fire hazards and from policies, training and actions 
that facilitate quicker evacuation in the event of a fire. The values of each was chosen to mirror the 
approximate percentage of fires attributed to certain ignition categories based on the statistical analysis 
outlined in Section 3.2.1.1. Therefore, since 14 % of fires were caused by cigarettes and open flames and 
another 18% by cooking, scores of 0.14 and 0.18 were assigned as indices related to fires caused by open 
flames (including cigarettes) and cooking respectively.  
 In federal work spaces, heating and cooling is managed by the building automation system. Use 
of individual space heaters is prohibited except for instances of duty to accommodate requests for medical 
reasons. In instances where individual space heaters are warranted, the employer provides an appropriate 
space heater that is listed and labelled by an accredited certification organization. While this potential 
ignition source is generally eliminated or tightly monitored, a score of 0.1 was assigned to indicate that 
there is still some small potential risk of fire due to use of space heaters.  
 Several aspects of the modest benefits to fire prevention and evacuation from a fire emergency 
organization that is well trained and building occupants who know what to do in an emergency have been 
captured in the remaining index values based on results from various evacuation studies [61]. Federal 
heritage buildings will have a fire emergency organization that includes personnel trained to facilitate 
evacuation and eliminate fire hazards, as well as oftentimes occupants trained in emergency procedures 
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and evacuation, so scores of 0.1, 0.15 and 0.15 have been applied respectively for each of these categories 
of occupant ‘activity’.  
 Finally, the positive effects to timely evacuation when building occupants are awake and alert, 
and familiar with the building, have also been recognized and been assigned a value of 0.1 for each 
action. Table 7 shows the new Occupant Activities risk index.   
Table 7 - Occupant Activities Risk Index  
Occupant Activities Risk Index (Cumulative) Numerical Value 
No smoking and no open flames 0.14 
No cooking  0.18 
Use of space heaters and heat generating 
appliances tightly controlled 
0.1 
Fire emergency organization trained to 
identify and remediate fire hazards 
0.1 
Fire emergency organization facilitates 
emergency evacuation 
0.15 
Occupants trained in emergency procedure 
and evacuation 
0.15 
Awake and alert 0.1 
Familiar with the building 0.1 
 
 The values for each occupant action is assigned a small value so that any and all actions taken by 
occupants to enhance fire safety within a heritage building are cumulative. Taken together they will not 
compensate for serious deficiencies that might be discovered during a building code analysis. Instead, 
they will have to be coupled with other fire safety design features and actions to generate the alternative 
solutions needed in order to fully compensate for potential deficiencies in particular heritage buildings.  
3.2.2 Fire Dynamics 
 Recent advances that have taken place in fire science lead to another set of factors that can 
potentially be considered in proposing updates to existing fire risk indices or creation of new fire risk 
indices to be used in assessment of fire safety of heritage buildings. Fire dynamics is the study of how a 
fire is expected to burn, grow and spread in a building leading to various theories that are available for 
fire protection engineers to use in the design and evaluation of alternative solutions. Having an overall 
understanding of fire behaviour and recent progress in this area will allow the designer to assess the types 
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of fires that might occur within a structure, as well as to develop and evaluate strategies to slow the 
growth, and thus regard the spread, of fires.  
3.2.2.1 Design Fire  
 One of the key components of modeling a fire is defining an appropriate ‘design fire’ on which to 
base the potential fire scenarios of interest and against which to optimize the final fire safety system 
design for that building. In simplest terms, design fires can be one of three main types: smouldering fires, 
flaming fires or fully developed (post flashover) fires. Which of these types of fire is determined to be 
most likely for a given building will definitely affect any assumptions about the details of fire growth and 
development and thus is inherently linked to the strategies chosen in design of the building fire safety 
systems. Despite the importance of the ‘design fire’ in performance based design, the Building Evaluation 
Method of the Wisconsin Administrative Code Chapter ILHR 70 Historic Building Code does not include 
any information by which to distinguish relative risk in relation to the anticipated types of fires that might 
be encountered in a heritage building. To address this, it is proposed here to develop a new risk index for 
Expected Fire Type and to include that index in the overall fire risk assessment framework being 
developed here for heritage buildings. This is based on fundamental concepts of fire dynamics, as 
discussed below. 
  Oxygen, heat and fuel are the three necessary components to sustain a fire, which is a chemical 
reaction that occurs when fuel is exposed to enough heat that fuel vapour is produced and mixed with 
enough air to maintain a flame. The chemical reaction between the fuel and air provides the necessary 
heat to maintain the fire [64]. In a structure, the fire can interact with a compartment in different ways, but 
for the purposes of this thesis, a 2-layer model of compartment fire development is assumed. In this 
model, the situation is idealized such that it is assumed that a hot gas layer forms near the ceiling that 
descends with time as the fire plume gases continue to flow upwards. Near the floor, is a cool lower layer 
of predominantly fresh air. The model further assumes that the compositions of each of these layers is 
uniform with a sharp demarcation between the hot upper layer and the air in the lower part of the 
compartment. Transfer between the two layers occurs via the fire plume [65].  
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 Examining a fire further, compartment fires generally go through 4 stages: 
1. Fire plume/ceiling jet stage - where air is mixed with the fuel that is released from the fuel surface, 
enters the flame region and burns. The energy released increases the temperature of the combustion 
products or smoke and reduces the density so that it rises above the surrounding air in a fire plume. 
Air continues to mix into the fire plume causing the temperature and smoke concentration to 
decrease while the volume of smoke increases with increasing height. When the plume reaches the 
ceiling it turns and spreads out radially beneath the ceiling as a thin layer known as a ceiling jet.  
2. Enclosure smoke filling stage - where smoke begins to accumulate underneath the ceiling and after 
the ceiling jet reaches the compartment boundary, it turns downward. Smoke is injected into the 
developing smoke layer through the fire plume and the smoke layer interface will descend until there 
is an opening for smoke to escape or the smoke layer reaches the floor.   
3. Pre-flashover vented stage - where the hot smoke layer descends to an elevation that it reaches 
openings in the compartment walls and the compartment is vented. Smoke flows from the 
compartment into the adjacent space and air flows into the room with a balanced flow rate.  
4. Post flashover vented stage - where the smoke layer reaches a temperature sufficient to cause the 
radiant ignition of exposed combustible surfaces within the compartment. This is typically achieved 
when the smoke layer reaches 600 ˚C [66].  
Figure 6 schematically illustrates the time history of a fuel limited fire, which is often shown as a 
representative fire development curve. 
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Figure 6 - Traditional Fire Development Curve of temperature over time [67] 
 Stages 1 to 3 characterize the ignition and growth stages of the fire. Stage 4 is the full developed 
portion of the curve. As the fuel is then consumed, the fire runs out of new fuel to sustain the combustion 
process and the fire begins to decay [67]. Despite the utility of this curve to discuss general principles of 
fire development, it must be cautioned that this is an idealized picture of the evolution of a well ventilated 
fire, ie. a fire for which there is always sufficient air available that the fire development remains limited 
by the availability of fuel vapour (rather than availability of air) throughout its life.  
 The NBC presumes there is only one fire at any given time in a structure or compartment [14] and 
the appropriate design fire behaves in accordance with the "Standard Fire" curve [68] which was 
developed for fire resistance testing (Section 3.2.2.2 below) and is illustrated as the blue curve in Figure 7 
[72]. Although having a different curve than that shown in Figure 6 above, the standard fire curve is again 
based on how a fire would behave in a room if there is sufficient fuel and ventilation that its development 
was not restricted by availability of air [72]. In reality, fires are affected by fuel load and orientation, 
room geometry and ventilation meaning that the time-temperature curve of an actual fire may be quite 
different from either of the above mentioned fire curves. Development of more simplified curves is 
necessary for fire safety design however, because of the almost infinite variability due to changes in fuel 
supply, compartment ventilation and interior finishes. As a result, current prescriptive fire protection 
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practices generally do not account very well for realistic thermal effects due to fire, but instead attempt to 
err on the side of defining a conservative design fire which may lead to inefficient, uneconomical, and 
even sometimes inadequate, design solutions [69].  
 One example of a fire that does not follow either of the simplified time-temperature fire curves is 
shown in Figure 7 as the smouldering fire curve. After ignition, fires may smoulder for a period of time 
before developing into a flaming stage [70]. Smouldering fires begin with a slow, low-temperature, and 
flameless combustion process where oxygen attacks the surface of a solid fuel such as coal, wood, cotton, 
polymers, and cellulose. Smouldering fires can begin on their own through self-oxidation processes or can 
be initiated by specific heat sources like discarded cigarettes or overheated wiring. The oxidation 
produces smoke (including common gaseous combustion produces) and generally small amounts of heat 
leading an initial period of low temperature increase. As smouldering continues unchecked, flames will 
begin to appear and a flaming fire can start. If the fire progresses, it may eventually follow a time-
temperature curve with a shape similar to the green curve in Figure 7 [71].   
 In other fire situations there may be abundant fuel that can ignite and form fuel vapours quickly 
(for example, a flammable liquid fire). This will result in a fast flaming fire and thus potentially shortens 
the time to flashover [42]. A time-temperature development curve for this so-called "fast flaming fire" is 
also plotted against the standard fire and smouldering fire in Figure 7 from initiation until they approach 
the fully developed stage. 
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Figure 7 - Comparison of Time Temperature Curves: Fast Flaming, Standard and Smouldering 
Fire Curves 
 The probability of a fire reaching flashover and the time it takes for flashover to occur varies. In 
Canada, statistics suggest that 24% of all office fires reach flashover and become fully developed fires, 54 
% are flaming fires that do not reach flashover and the remaining 22% are smouldering fires that do not 
reach the flaming stage [42]. Consideration should also be given in the fire risk index to the rate of 
injuries and death from smouldering and fast flaming fires however, fire statistics information is not 
captured in this way [57]. Fire type information can be inferred from the causes of fire, such as fires 
caused by smoking might be assumed to be smouldering fires however, since the rate of injury and death 
from smouldering and fast flaming fires are presently unavailable, it will not be considered in the fire risk 
index and it is recommended that the AHJ begin keeping track of fire cause, resultant fire type and 
correlate that to incidents of injuries and death.   
 Estimating how a fire will develop and grow in a particular heritage building can be a significant 
factor in assessing the overall fire safety of the structure since the probability of occurrence of different 
types of fires can have a bearing on how quickly the fire is detected, how much time there is for safe 
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evacuation, the possible extent of property damage and loss, and whether firefighting efforts are likely to 
be effective. With this in mind, a new risk index for expected fire type is proposed to capture differences 
in overall fire safety of a site depending on the type of fire that is expected and how it affects the 
buildings and occupants inside. Since smouldering fires will generally lead to extended times for escape 
(albeit with the rider that light smoke might accumulate in a space even before the fire is detected), a 
limiting value of 1 for scenarios with expected smouldering fires and -1 for expected fast flaming fires 
were assigned to the index. Further than this, it will be up to the designer to explain the rationale behind a 
particular choice of index value, and for the AHJ to accept the premise as well. Table 8 shows the new 
Expected Fire Type Fire risk index.  
Table 8 - Expected Fire Type Risk Index 
Fire Type Numerical Value 
Smouldering Fire  1 
Standard Fire  0 
Fast Flaming Fire  -1 
 
3.2.2.2 Fire Resistance Rating 
 Once the type of fire is determined, attention becomes focussed towards assessment of the fire 
resistance ratings for separations within the building. In general, fire separations are used to retard the 
effects (spread) of fire away from the area of fire origin. More specifically, one objective of specifying 
and using fire separations in a building is to limit the probability that, as a result of the design or 
construction of the building, a person in or adjacent to the building will be exposed to an unacceptable 
risk of injury due to fire. The types of unacceptable outcomes addressed in the Code are those related to 
persons being delayed in, or impeded from, moving to a safe place during a fire emergency [14]. Another 
objective is to limit the probability that, as a result of its design or construction, the building will be 
exposed to an unacceptable risk of damage due to fire. Closely linked is a third objective of limiting the 
probability that, as a result of the design or construction of the building, a person in or adjacent to the 
building will be exposed to an unacceptable risk of injury due to fire. The risks of injury due to fire 
74 
 
addressed in the Code for these situations are those caused by a fire or explosion impacting areas beyond 
its point of origin, or collapse of physical elements due to a fire or explosion [14]. 
 Sometimes, the heritage character of the building prevents the construction or upgrading of fire 
separations to those required by the current edition of the Code. In these situations, other solutions must 
be considered to compartmentalize the building or to retard the effects of fire on emergency egress or on 
areas beyond the point of origin, whilst also slowing down the failure or collapse of any building 
elements or assemblies during the fire [14]. A modified index based on that outlined in the Wisconsin 
Administrative Code Chapter ILHR 70 Historic Building Code is proposed to account for the impact of 
different fire compartment separation measures that might be employed in an alternative design needed to 
preserve the heritage character of a building. 
 In general, the fire resistance ratings of fire separations are used to assess whether there are 
acceptable fire separation measures included in the design of a building. These are determined by 
subjecting a proposed assembly to the standard fire test described in 3.2.2. In these tests, a sample of the 
assembly is constructed in a lab, and, using large propane burners, uniformly subjected to the time profile 
of temperatures defined by the standard fire. The assembly is evaluated on how long it can continue to 
support a specified design load, prevent the ignition of cotton waste placed on the unexposed surface, or 
prevent through transmission of heat such that the average unexposed surface temperatures does not rise 
by more than 121 °C above the initial temperature or by 163 °C at any one thermocouple on that side 
[73]. The time that the assembly can withstand the rigors of the test corresponds to the fire resistance 
rating of the assembly. Fire resistance ratings start at 20 minutes, then progress to 45 minutes, 1 hour, 1.5 
hours, 2 hours, 3 hours and 4 hours [14]. As an alternative to testing, the fire resistance of assemblies can 
also be determined by obtaining appropriate values of test ratings from the literature, or from 
manufacturers, or they can be calculated by assuming 1 dimensional heat transfer and using simple heat 
transfer calculations to estimate the temperatures within the exposed assemblies [74]. 
 Depending on the type of fire that is expected in a building, it is possible that existing assemblies, 
although not specifically rated for the fire resistance required under the Code, can achieve an effective 
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fire resistance rating equivalent to the time required in the acceptable solution. In this case, building 
occupants and fire fighters are still afforded sufficient time to evacuate and fight the fire, respectively, and 
the intent of the Code would be satisfied. There are a number of methods by which to do this. For 
example, existing floors and ceilings that are of plaster construction, rather than gypsum, can have a 
modified 30 minute fire resistance rating [75]. These plaster assemblies can further be fortified with 
intumescent paint to provide added protection on the plaster surface and the assembly. With similar 
intent, intumescent paint can be applied to existing heritage doors to increase their fire resistance rating to 
30 minutes without the requirement to add new, non-heritage material to the panels of the door [76]. On 
both the doors and plaster, when activated by heat or fire, the intumescent paint forms a dense carbon char 
that shields the substrate from the effects of the fire thus extending the time that the separation will hold 
its integrity in a fire [76]. When integrity of separating doors are of concern, adding door closers to keep 
all doors closed will also delay fires from spreading from the area of origin into other sections of the 
building, again effectively increasing the achievable fire separation time. 
 Considering that one code objective under fire separation is related to preventing the chance that 
persons will be delayed in, or impeded from, moving to a safe place, another option that can be employed 
to extend the time available for egress is the use of draft stops.  These can be used to limit the probability 
that smoke and heat from a fire in a storey adjacent to a floor opening will migrate into the interconnected 
floor space, potentially bypassing sprinklers and smoke detectors without actuating them. For example, 
incorporating draft stops that are 500 mm deep (measured from the ceiling down to the underside of the 
draft stop) at each floor level within an interconnected floor space, immediately adjacent to and 
surrounding the openings can limit the effect and severity of fire, while at the same time be instrumented 
with sensors that will notify persons and emergency responders in a timely manner of the need to take 
action in an emergency [14]. Thus, draft stops used in conjunction with a fire alarm system can promptly 
notify persons of a fire situation and thus facilitate initiation of evacuation and emergency response very 
quickly as well [14].  
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 With the many options available to apply alternative measures to prevent fire and combustion 
products from spreading beyond the area of origin, and thus affecting people and structural elements 
outside the fire compartment, it is proposed that consideration be given to account for such measures 
within the overall fire risk indexing calculation. To accomplish this, a new Fire Ratings of Assemblies 
risk index is being proposed and shown in Table 9. Due to the connection of some elements, such as draft 
stops, to fire separations around vertical openings, the index values proposed in this section are based on 
the "Vertical Openings" risk index from the Wisconsin Administrative Code Chapter ILHR 70 Historic 
Building Code which is also retained and will be used in this methodology to specifically cover openings 
in those vertical assemblies such as stairway exits, elevator shafts, and other shafts that are required to 
have fire resistance ratings. The new Fire Resistance Rating of Assemblies risk index will then be used to 
capture, for example, the impacts on the overall fire safety of the building due to measures such as the use 
of draft stops, consideration of documented values for fire resistance ratings for plaster protected floor, 
wall and roof assemblies or protection of existing doors with intumescent paint and application of door 
closers to compartmentalize the full space into smaller, better protected fire compartments.  
Table 9 - Fire Rating of Assemblies Risk Index 
Fire Rating of Assemblies Risk Index Numerical Value 
Fire rated assembly provides 2hr below required protection level - 2 
 Fire rated assembly provides 1hr below required protection level - 1 
Fire rated assembly provides 0.75hr below required protection level - 0.75 
Fire rated assembly provides 0.5 hr below required protection level - 0.5 
Fire rated assembly provides 0.25hr (15 mins) below required 
protection level 
- 0.25 
Complies with code 0 
Draft stops used to retard flow of combustion products and extend 
usability of egress routes (per opening)  
0.25 
Use intumescent paint and door closers on existing wood doors to 
compartmentalize rooms from rest of building  
0.25 
Total Fire Rating of Assemblies Score  
 
 In the Vertical Openings risk index, a score of 0 was originally assigned for a situation that 
"complies with the prevailing code" so that is retained in the Fire Ratings of Assemblies index as listed in 
Table 9. A score of -1 was assigned for the assembly that provides a fire resistance rating that is 1 hour 
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less than that specified for the required protection level. Linear interpolation was used to determine values 
of -2 for a fire rated assembly that provides 2 hours below the required level of protection, -0.75 for fire 
separation that provides 0.75 hour below required protection level, and -0.25 for those providing 0.25 
hours below the required protection level. Credits for actions taken to lengthen the time taken for smoke 
to spread from one portion of a structure to another and/or to extend the fire resistance rating of existing 
assemblies are also proposed. Draft stops and intumescent paints are two strategies that can delay fire and 
combustion products from spreading beyond the area of origin, provide compartmentation for earlier fire 
detection, and delay making other areas of the building untenable. A credit of 0.25 was added for 
including draft stops around each opening in a horizontal opening that did not otherwise meet the fire 
separation requirements under the code. The NBC requirement to install smoke detectors in the vicinity of 
draft stops must also be complied with in order for a credit of 0.25 to be applied to a given draft stop. 
Another score of 0.25 was applied for application of intumescent paint on doors with door closers that 
maximize fire protection for the closure in a vertical fire separations. Use of either of these measures will 
need to be discussed with the AHJ in order for a score of 0.25 to be added to the overall fire risk index for 
the building.  
 The final value for the Fire Rating of Assemblies risk index will be the sum of values for the fire 
separations to be used in the alternative solution plus any other mitigation measures that are instituted in 
the project. This fire risk index is slightly different than some of the others as the total score for the index 
needs to be calculated before including it as the entry for the new Fire Ratings of Assemblies risk index in 
the overall fire risk indexing framework assessment. It is intended that this index could be used to 
evaluate the additional fire protection measures taken to compensate for existing openings between floors 
and corridors each time there is a fire separation that falls outside the Vertical Openings and Separation of 
Occupancies risk indices.  
3.2.2.3 Occupancy Separations 
 The Occupancy Separations risk index from the Wisconsin Administrative Code Chapter ILHR 
70 Historic Building Code that is shown below in Table 10 must also be revised to account for fire 
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resistance rates of separations that are commonly encountered in heritage buildings. In particular, it must 
be extended to ensure that fire separations that provide fire resistance ratings of between only 3/4 hour 
and 0 hour are captured in the final overall fire risk framework for heritage buildings.  
Table 10 – Occupancy Separations Risk Index 
Occupancy Separations  Numerical 
Value 
No separation provided, but required -5 
Provided, but 2-hours less than required -4 
Provided, but 1-hour less than required -2 
Complies with prevailing code for fire resistive ratings 
or no separation is required (where a 3 hour required 
and a 4 hour is provided, the value shall be 0.) 
0 
Provided and 1 or more hours greater than required  +2 
 
From the basis provided in Table 10, values were linearly interpolated to produce numerical values for 
situations where a fire resistance rating is provided but it is 0.75 hour, 0.5 hour and 0.25 hour less than 
required. The changes are summarized in the Revised Occupancy Separations fire risk index shown in 
Table 11.  
Table 11 - Revised Occupancy Separations Risk Index 
Occupancy Separations  Numerical Value 
No separation provided, but required -5 
Provided, but 2-hours less than required -4 
Provided, but 1-hour less than required -2 
Provided, but 0.75-hour less than required -1.5 
Provided, but 0.5-hour less than required -1 
Provided, but 0.25-hour less than required -0.50 
Complies with prevailing code for fire resistive 
ratings or no separation is required (where a 3 
hour required and a 4 hour is provided, the 
value shall be 0.) 
0 
Provided and 1 or more hours greater than 
required  
+2 
 
3.2.2.4 Exit Capacity Risk Index 
 Exiting considerations need to be accounted for when evaluating any proposed alternative 
solutions. Certain concerns arising from the spread of fire and spoke from the place of origin and thereby 
generally affecting times for egress have been addressed in the previous section, through development of 
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the new Fire Rating of Assemblies and revision of the existing Occupancy Separations risk indices. There 
are a series of other considerations directly related to exit flow and capacity during egress that can be 
particularly important in the case of heritage buildings. For example, the exit doors in a heritage building 
sometimes do not swing in the direction of exit travel which is immediately in contravention of the 
acceptable code solution because this situation can negatively impact the timely movement of, and thus 
increases the risk of injury to, persons in an emergency [14]. In addition to incorrect door swing, both 
handrail and guardrail heights may be lower than the minimum standard necessary to meet current 
accessibility requirements. There may also be landings missing at the top or bottom of stairs, either of 
which increases the risk of injury to persons as a result of tripping, slipping, or falling and does not 
facilitate the timely movement of persons to a safe place in an emergency [14]. Due to these real 
considerations related to heritage buildings and their link to the Exit Capacity risk index in the Wisconsin 
Administrative Code Chapter ILHR 70 Historic Building Code, it was determined that this index should 
be amended to capture these additional egress considerations in the overall fire risk assessment 
framework being developed. Table 12 shows the existing Exit Capacity risk index while Table 13 shows 
the Revised Exit Capacity risk index. .  
Table 12 – Exit Capacity Risk Index 
Exit Capacity Numerical Value (per exit) 
Complies with prevailing code 0 
Horizontal exits are provided in addition to the required exits (no 
more than one-half the exits may be horizontal exits.) 
+2 
Exits to grade or enclosed stairs exceed the minimum number of 
exits (exits shall be at least 20 feet apart.) 
+3 
Eliminate a fire escape exit and provide a code complying 
enclosed stairway exit serving 3 or more levels 
+5 
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Table 13 - Revised Exit Capacity Risk Index 
Revised Exit Capacity Number value 
(per exit) 
Occupant load exceeds 60 and exit door does not swing in direction of exit travel -2 
Occupant load is 60 or less and exit door does not swing in direction of exit travel -1 
Delay in egress from each instance of non-compliance for handrail height, guard rail 
height and landing dimensions. 
-0.5 
Complies with prevailing code 0 
1 more exterior exit than required by Code (exits shall be at least 6.1 m apart) +0.5 
Horizontal exits are provided in addition to required exits (no more than one-half the 
exits may be horizontal exits) 
+2 
Exits to grade or enclosed stairs exceed the minimum number of exits (exits shall be at 
least 6.1m apart) 
+3 
Eliminate a fire escape exit and provide a code complying enclosed stairway exit 
serving 3 or more levels 
+5 
TOTAL Score for applicable criteria  
 
 In the revised index, additional factors have been added for the swing on the exit door, the 
allowed occupant load coupled to the swing on the exit door, the handrail height and whether or not there 
are additional exterior exit doors. In the first case, if the exit door does not swing in the direction of exit 
travel, the index was assigned a value of -1 in recognition of the deficiency and its potential to impede 
egress and increase potential for injury in the event of a fire. A worse score of -2 was assigned if the 
occupant load for the building is expected to exceed 60 people. This is because rooms containing more 
than 60 people are required by Code to have all egress doors swinging in the direction of exit travel. A 
score of -0.5 is given to every instance where there is a non-compliant handrail height, guard rail height or 
for landing dimensions that are smaller than the minimum required under the current Code as these 
deficiencies increase the risk of tripping, slipping or falling during egress and may also delay timely 
movement of persons to a safe place in the event of an emergency. Additional exterior exits from a 
building were considered to assist in the timely movement of persons to a place of safety during an 
emergency so a score of +0.5 was assigned for each additional exit over the minimum specified in the 
Code. The final value for the Revised Exit Capacity risk index will be the sum of values for the existing 
exit conditions and deficiencies coupled to those for any additional beneficial exit conditions that might 
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exist. Thus, the total score for this index again needs to be calculated before inserting the value for the 
overall Exit Capacity index into the total fire risk framework.   
3.2.2.5 Fire Alarms Risk Indices  
 The Fire Alarms risk index from the Wisconsin Administrative Code Chapter ILHR 70 Historic 
Building Code cannot be applied as defined in Canada because the fire alarm system requirements in 
Canada are different than those in the United States. In Canada, the NBC and CAN/ULC-S524 Standard 
for the Installation of Fire Alarm Systems specifies when a fire alarm system is required, which devices 
are required and where those devices are to be installed.  Table 14 shows the original Fire Alarms risk 
index from the Wisconsin Administrative Code Chapter ILHR 70 Historic Building Code.  
Table 14  - Fire Alarms Risk Index 
Fire Alarms Numerical 
Value 
Manual fire alarm system required but not provided -5 
Manual fire alarm system required and provided but does not comply with acceptable 
solution 
-2 
Complies with acceptable solution 0 
Manual fire alarm system provided but not required (Note: If a numerical value of +5 is 
taken under the smoke detection fire risk index, the numerical value for this section is 0) 
+1 
Manual fire alarm system provided with voice communication system (Note: Voice alarm 
and public address system shall be activated from a location which is occupied by an 
employee during all periods of building occupancy) 
+3 
Central control station (Note: The central control station must comply with 
S.ILHR52.01(2)(f);  and Fire department may require systems to be interconnected with the 
fire department) 
+4 
Central control station and interconnected to a remote control station which is permanently 
monitored  (Note: The central control station must comply with S.ILHR52.01(2)(f);  and 
Fire department may require systems to be interconnected with the fire department) 
+5 
 
Table 15 shows the Revised Fire Alarms risk index amended for application in Canada.  
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Table 15 - Revised Fire Alarms Risk Index 
Revised Fire Alarms Numerical 
Value 
Fire alarm system required but not provided -5 
Fire alarm system required and provided but does not comply with acceptable solution -2 
Complies with acceptable solution 0 
Fire alarm system provided but not required (Note: If a numerical value of +5 is taken 
under the smoke detection fire risk index, the numerical value for this section is 0) 
+1 
Fire alarm system provided with voice communication system that complies with the NBC +3 
Fire alarm system includes a central alarm and control facility and automatic signals to fire 
department when not required 
+4 
Fire alarm system provided with automatic signals to fire department and interconnected 
with a monitoring company that is permanently monitored when not required  
+5 
 
 In the revised index, the numerical values remain the same as in the original index but the 
explanation for each item was amended to address two main differences in requirements. The Fire Alarms 
risk index in the Wisconsin Code permits a "manual fire alarm system" which is a fire alarm system 
consisting of manual pull stations and notification devices [77].  In contrast, the NBC requires a fire alarm 
system to have more features like fire detectors, smoke detectors, and an annunciator system [14] which is 
a more robust fire alarm system than a "manual fire alarm system". Therefore, to adjust the original index 
to accommodate Canadian requirements, the numerical values for the presence of a fire alarm system 
were kept the same but the fire alarm system requirements were adjusted to conform with language and 
requirements used in the NBC. 
 The central control station used in the Wisconsin Fire Alarms risk index is equivalent to a fire 
alarm system command and control facility in Canada [78] since the central control system for fire 
department operations has to be provided in a location approved by the fire department and the location 
may contain a voice communication system panel, fire detection and alarm system panels, status 
indicators and controls for elevators, smoke venting and air handling systems, controls for unlocking 
stairway doors, a public telephone, sprinkler valve and water flow detectors, and standby power controls. 
In addition, all fire alarm and water flow signals have to be transmitted directly to the systems indicated 
in s. ILHR 52.01 (2) (d) 3 [78] as they would in an equivalent Canadian fire alarm system command and 
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control facility. As a result, the wording is changed in the revised Fire Alarms index here but the intent of 
the systems is very similar so the risk index values have been retained. 
 The Smoke Detection risk index from the Wisconsin Administrative Code Chapter ILHR 70 
Historic Building Code is intended to be used together with the Fire Alarms risk index therefore is also 
had to be revised to align with Canadian practice. Table 16 shows the Smoke Detection risk index found 
in Chapter ILHR 70.  
Table 16 - Smoke Detection Risk Index 
Smoke Detection Numerical 
Value 
Complies with prevailing code 0 
Elevator lobby only and not required by chs. ILHR 50-64 +1 
HVAC return only and not required by chs. ILHR 50-64 +2 
HVAC return and elevator lobby and not required by chs. ILHR 50-64 +3 
All corridors, in addition to those required by the code, including elevator lobbies +4 
 Total space with interconnection of smoke detectors and building fire alarm system not 
required by chs. ILHR 50-64 
+5 
 
For this index, the NBC covers the same areas as areas covered under the ILHR sections 50-64 so the 
references and descriptions were directly modified to align with the NBC in the Revised Smoke Detection 
risk index presented in Table 17.  
Table 17 - Revised Smoke Detection Risk Index 
Smoke Detection Numerical 
Value 
Complies with prevailing code 0 
Elevator lobby only and not required by the NBC +1 
HVAC return only and not required by the NBC +2 
HVAC return and elevator lobby and not required by the NBC +3 
All corridors, in addition to those required by the NBC, including elevator lobbies +4 
Total space with interconnection of smoke detectors and building fire alarm system not 
required by NBC 
+5 
 
In closing, it should be noted that the above two indices have to be used with care since the values in one 
are inherently linked to the values in the other. For example, if a numerical value of +5 is taken under the 
Revised Smoke Detection risk index, the numerical value for the Revised Fire Alarm risk index is 0 [49] 
so that the same system is not included more than once in the analysis.   
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3.3 Fire Risk Assessment using Fire Risk Indexing 
 Once the deficiencies existing in the heritage building are identified and important elements in the 
proposed alternative solution that compensate for the deficiencies are scored using the applicable fire risk 
indices identified in the sections above, the numerical values are entered into the columns and rows of the 
Fire Risk Indexing Table shown in Table 18 below. In this way, the full fire risk assessment is completed 
for each proposed fire safety solution for the heritage building under study.  
Table 18 - Fire Risk Indexing Table 
Safety Parameters Fire 
Safety 
Means 
of 
Egress 
General 
Safety  
Comments 
1. Number of Stories     
2. Building Area     
3. Building Setback  N/A   
4.  Attic Compartmentalization  N/A   
5. Firestopping  N/A   
6. Revised Occupancy 
Separations  
 N/A   
7. Vertical Openings     
8. HVAC Systems     
9. Revised Smoke Detection     
10. Revised Fire Alarms     
11. Smoke Control N/A    
12. Revised Exit Capacity N/A    
13. Dead ends N/A    
14. Maximum travel distance N/A    
15. Emergency Power N/A    
16. Elevator Control     
17. Sprinklers     
18. Fire Rating of Assemblies     
19. Fire Type Risk Index     
20. Occupant Activities Risk 
Index 
    
TOTAL Safety Score     
 
 Table 18 includes the 17 building parameters with any revisions that are used in the Wisconsin 
Administrative Code fire risk index method plus the additional proposed fire risk indices of Fire Ratings 
of Assemblies, Fire Type, and Occupant Activities. The revised fire risk indices for parameters 6, 9, 10 
and 12 plus the new parameters for 18, 19, and 20, highlighted in yellow, will be used to determine the 
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numerical values for each parameter that will be used to calculate the final Safety Score. The items 
categorized as N/A are parameters that the Wisconsin Administrative Code deemed to have no impact on 
fire safety, if N/A is in column 1, or on means of egress when N/A in column 2. When using the Table to 
evaluate the case studies in section 4, certain cells may be assigned a "null" designation to indicate that 
the safety parameter in the heritage building being studied is the same as that in the code compliant 
building. After all of the individual values are entered into the Table, the entries in each column will be 
summed to calculate the final score for each solution for a given building. A value greater than or equal to 
0 can be interpreted to mean that the alternative solution provides an equivalent level of protection as the 
acceptable solution under the existing Code. A negative value means the alternative solution does not 
provide an equivalent level of protection as an acceptable solution under the existing code. In no case, 
however, should the magnitude of the total safety score be interpreted as a determination of relative safety 
of the alternative solution beyond determining whether or not it demonstrates an equivalent level of safety 
as a code compliant building.  
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4 Case Studies 
 In this Chapter, the fire protection framework proposed in Chapter 3 using FRA with fire risk 
indexing will be applied to case studies involving heritage buildings that will be rehabilitated for new use 
in order to validate the framework and identify any gaps. The case studies will be based on existing 
heritage buildings where the building height, area, and current occupancy use will be described. The 
corresponding Heritage Character Statement will be used to establish the important features of the 
building that need to be protected. The design brief will describe the rehabilitation objective for the 
heritage building before undertaking a building code analysis and proposing an alternative solution. 
Observations on the effectiveness and usability of the framework as well as recommendations for 
improving the framework will be summarized in Chapter 5.  
4.1 Case Study 1  
 The first case study will apply the full fire protection framework to develop and evaluate the 
alternative solutions for a heritage building intended for use as a small office. The evaluation of the 
necessary alternative fire safety design solution will use the fire risk indices from the 17 building safety 
parameters listed in the Wisconsin Administrative Code Chapter ILHR 70 Historic Building Code 
together with the other fire risk indices proposed in Chapter 3. The heritage building being studied was 
constructed in the 1890s and designed in the Second Empire Style characterized by a mansard roof and 
central pavilion [79] as shown in Figure 8.  
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Figure 8 - Example of Second Empire Style Building with Central Pavilion and Mansard Roof 
 The building is built with red sandstone from the local area. It is currently 3 storeys tall with a 
basement. The attic, which is the 3rd storey, and the basement are currently set up for occupancy. The 
building area (or building foot print) is 108 m
2
, so that it has 216 m
2
 of floor area over the 2 main floors. 
Inside, it is currently used as a combination of museum and office occupancy; however, it is to be 
renovated for exclusively office use. Given this brief introduction to the case, the following sections 
describe the various steps taken in completing a fire risk assessment using the overall framework and 
indexing methods proposed in Chapter 3. 
4.1.1 Heritage Character Statement  
 As stated in the methodology section, the heritage character statement must be determined and 
expressed so that features that are important for the building are established. The heritage character 
statement can be found on the Canadian Register of Canada's Historic Places (www.historicplaces.ca) and 
is reiterated here.  
 The heritage statement for the building in case study 1 is as follows: The building is an example 
of the late second empire style that was popular in Canada in the 1870s and 1880s. The building is 
characterized by a mansard roof and central pavilion. The sandstone is laid in random courses and has 
limestone quoins, window and door surrounds. The building is part of a complex of buildings in a public 
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park that were built in the same era and the integrity of the relationship between the various buildings and 
landscape has remained unchanged since they were constructed.  
 In summary, any renovations to the building must preserve the exterior appearance of the 
building. This restriction will also limit how the interior of the building can be utilized as the exterior 
original details, such as windows and doors for example, should be maintained.  
4.1.2 Design Brief 
 The objective of this project is to renovate the current building to provide office space for 14 
staff. The building is presently used as a museum on the main floor, offices on the 2nd floor and attic, and 
storage and building services in the basement. The redesigned building will be used entirely for office 
space, with the first floor consisting of a staff room with lockers, kitchenette, 2 private offices, 6 
workstations, a barrier free washroom, and collaboration space. The second floor will have 2 private 
offices, 2 semi-private offices, a boardroom, 3 workstations, and administrative space for photocopying 
and printing. The attic will be closed off making the building a 2 storey building. The basement will 
continue to be used for building services, a LAN room, and general storage. The first and second floors 
are served by a central stair case and at the top and bottom of the stairs is a hallway with doors that lead 
into the office areas. Figure 9 shows an example of how the hallway on the first floor interacts with the 
stairs and the doors that open into the different office and support spaces.  
 
Figure 9 - Relation between open staircase, hallway and offices 
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 Protecting the interior layout, finishes and materials while undertaking the building renovations is 
also a key objective. What this means practically is that the open stair case connecting the 1st and 2nd 
floor must preserved, and any detailing in the wood and plaster finishes on the walls and ceilings must be 
preserved and protected as much as possible. By way of example, Figure 10 shows some of the interior 
finishes that should be preserved. As an alternative, construction of new exit stairs, fire escapes and 
exterior ramps may impact the exterior appearance of the building which again is not allowed under the 
heritage statement provided. 
 
Figure 10 - Photo of Ornate Wood Railing in Open Central Stair Case for Case Study 1. 
 
 Other existing site conditions which should be noted in relation to fire safety solutions are that the 
basement has two exits, and that the attic is separated from the first and second floor by a fire separation 
but is accessed by an open stair case. In addition, the building has a fully functional fire alarm system that 
is monitored by a monitoring company. This fire alarm system exceeds the fire protection requirements of 
the NBC and will be retained in the new office space. 
With this background in hand, the next step is to undertake a thorough NBC and fire analysis in order to 
determine how the fire safety aspects of the heritage building compare against a theoretical building that 
complies with the current acceptable solution of the NBC for small office buildings. 
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4.1.3 Building Code and Fire Code Analysis 
 Based on the information provided above, a detailed building code analysis can be done to 
determine how well the existing building compares against the acceptable provisions of the building code 
and fire code. A summary of the building code requirements and the condition of the existing building are 
recorded in Table 19. The proposed use of the building as an office means that the building will have a 
Group D occupancy according to the National Building Code of Canada [14].  Starting with the building 
size, building height and occupancy type, the corresponding requirements in the NBC and NFC can be 
entered into Table 19 in the column titled “Code Compliant Building”.  The characteristics of the existing 
building are entered in the “Heritage Building” column and compared with those for the code compliant 
building. For the rows where the heritage building does not provide the same level of protection as the 
code compliant building, references to the applicable functional and objective statements are also 
recorded [14].  
Table 19 - Building Code Analysis for Case Study 1 
 Code Compliant Building Heritage Building Functional and 
Objective 
Statements 
Attributed to 
Code Provision 
Year of Original 
Construction 
2016 1896 N/A 
Major Occupancy 
Classification(s) 
Group D - Business and 
personal services 
occupancies 
Group D N/A 
Governing Code Part Part 9 [14] Part 9 N/A 
Fire Resistance rating of 
floor assemblies (hrs) 
45 minutes [14] 
 
45 minutes in floor 
assembly separating 
basement and first 
floor.   
30 Minutes between 
1st and 2nd floor 
[F03-OS1.2] 
[F04-OS1.2, 
OS1.3] 
[F03-OP1.2] 
[F04-OP1.2, 
OP1.3] 
Building Area (m
2
) Max 100m
2
, limited by 
interconnected floor space 
[14] 
108 F05-OS1.5 [14] 
Building Height (Storeys) Max 2, limited by 
interconnected floor space 
[14]  
2 F05-OS1.5 [14] 
Cross-over Floors No cross-over floor in 
building 
No crossover floor in 
building 
N/A 
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High Building (see NBC 
Article 3.2.6) 
N/A N/A  
Interconnected floor space Interconnected floor space 
permitted between 1st and 
2nd floor [14] 
Interconnected floor 
space existing between 
1st and 2nd floor. 
F05-OS1.5 [14] 
Mezzanines N/A N/A N/A 
Sprinklers Not required Not required N/A 
Building Faces No. of 
Streets (for fire department 
access) 
3 3 N/A 
Type of Construction Combustible with a 45 
minute fire resistance rating 
permitted [14] 
Combustible with a 30 
minute fire resistance 
rating for roof 
assembly.  
F05-OS1.5 [14] 
Fire Resistance Rating of 
Roof Assembly  
45 minutes [14] 30 minutes [F03-OS1.2] 
[F04-OS1.2, 
OS1.3] 
[F03-OP1.2] 
[F04-OP1.2, 
OP1.3] 
Total Building Occupant 
Load 
Max allowed persons 23 Intended number of 
persons 14 
 
Fire Alarm System Not required Installed  
Voice Communication  Not required Not installed  
Fire Alarm System 
Monitoring 
Not required Installed  
Standpipe & Hose  Not required Not installed  
Emergency Power 30 minute battery 30 minute battery  
Smoke Control Measures Not required None installed  
Fire Pumps Not required None installed  
Maglocks Not required None installed  
Special Extinguishing 
Systems 
Not required None Installed  
Water Supply Adequate Adequate  
Spatial Separations Adequate Adequate  
 
 Table 19 shows that for the most part the heritage building complies with the acceptable solution 
as prescribed by the NBC [14]. From the occupancy type, building area and building height, this building 
is governed by Part 9 of the NBC [14]. A building of this size, height and occupancy type is permitted to 
be built with combustible construction provided that the structural elements, floor assemblies and roof 
assemblies are protected and have a minimum fire resistance rating of 45 minutes. An indication of N/A 
in the building code matrix means that the specific building item is not present in the building and the 
corresponding requirements in the prevailing code will not be considered. An indication of "not required" 
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means that specific item is not required by the prevailing code for the historic building being studied. A 
"none installed" was assigned to items that are not required by the code and not present in the heritage 
building. The total occupant load is calculated using the total floor area and dividing it by the area per 
person that corresponds with the occupancy type in table 3.1.17.1 in the NBC. The comment of 
"Adequate" means the specific items comply with the prevailing code. In this case, the water supply is 
coming from a municipal main so it is "adequate" and the spatial separation is also "adequate" since the 
building is sufficiently far away from other buildings on the property that it is essentially a standalone 
building. 
 The fire alarm system and monitoring of the fire alarm system exceeds the minimum 
requirements of the code. A building of this size and occupancy type is also required to have an 
emergency power supply that can operate emergency lights and exit signs for a minimum of 30 minutes. 
The heritage building has this.  
 There are six deficiencies identified on Table 19, all related to separation of different 
compartments. These can be grouped into interconnected floor space, fire resistance rating of floor 
separations and fire resistance rating of the roof assembly. The first deficiency relates to the existing 
interconnected floor space between the first and second floors. Table 9.9.4.7 of the NBC states that a 
building that has a building area less than 200 m
2
 and less than 25 m travel distance to an exit is permitted 
to be served by one exit provided that exit is in its own fire rated enclosure.  The exit stair is not in a 
separate fire rated enclosure; thus the open staircase is not in compliance because the existing building 
area exceeds by 8m
2
 the maximum building area permitted in the code. The functional and objective 
statements behind the provision for limiting the floor area to 100m
2
 are FS5-OS1.5. The other 
deficiencies identified in the Table both relate to fire resistance ratings of separations. In both cases, the 
floor assembly separating the first and second floor and the roof assembly are fire separations constructed 
of wood beams protected by plaster that will provide a minimum fire resistance rating of only 30 minutes 
[75] instead of the 45 minute rating that is required under the current code [14]. The functional and 
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objective statements behind the fire resistance rating of the fire separations for the floor and roof 
assemblies are F03-OS1.2, F04-OS1.2, OS1.3, F03-OP1.2, and F04-OP1.2, OP1.3 [14].  
 A fire protection engineering survey was also conducted to further assess code compliance of the 
heritage building. This consisted of a visual inspection of the heritage building to evaluate overall 
compliance and identify any deficiencies in the building. There were several additional deficiencies that 
were not captured by the building code data sheet that must be considered as part of the overall evaluation 
of the building and any alternative solutions.  These additional deficiencies plus the deficiencies identified 
in the building code data sheet are captured in Table 20 below along with the specific code provisions and 
functional and objective statements attributed to the code provisions [14].  These were not recorded 
directly in the building code data sheet because the building code data sheet organizes, summarizes and 
presents critical building code compliance data that forms the basis for design of a building [80].  
Table 20  - Summary of non-conformances and objectives and functional statements behind the 
prescriptive code provision  
Non-
Conformance Code Requirements 
Functional and Objective Statements Attributed to 
Code Provision 
1) Stair not 
constructed as exit 
stair,  
2) the area 
occupied by the 
suite is greater 
than 100m
2
 per 
storey. 
3) Fire separation 
of the floor 
assembly has a 
fire resistance 
rating less than 45 
minutes. 
 
9.9.4.7(1)(e) - Where a 
suite of Group D or E 
occupancy is located partly 
on the first storey and 
partly on the second storey, 
stairways serving the 
second storey of that suite 
need not be constructed as 
exit stairs provided, 
c) the area occupied by the 
suite is not greater than 100 
m2 per storey,  
e) the floor assemblies have 
a fire-resistance rating of 
not less than 45 minutes or 
are of non-combustible 
construction.    
[F05-OS1.5] - Items 1-3 has the same functional 
and objective statements for Sentence 9.9.4.7(1) 
 
F05 - To retard the effects of fire on emergency 
egress facilities.  
OS1.5 - An objective of this code is to limit the 
probability that, as a result of the design or 
construction of the building, a person in or adjacent 
to the building will be exposed to an unacceptable 
risk of injury due to fire addressed in this Code are 
those caused by persons being delayed in or 
impeded from moving to a safe place during a fire 
emergency.  
4) Fire separation 
of the roof 
assembly, and  
5) fire separation 
of floor assembly 
must have a 
minimum fire 
9.10.8.1 - The fire 
resistance rating of floors 
and roofs shall conform to 
Table 9.10.8.1 (45 min fire 
resistance rating of roof 
assembly and floor 
assembly).  
[F03-OS1.2] [F04-OS1.2, OS1.3] and  
[F03-OP1.2] [F04-OP1.2, OP1.3] - Item 4-5 has 
the same functional and objective statements for 
Article 9.10.8.1. 
 
F03 - To retard the effects of fire on areas beyond 
its point of origin.  
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resistance rating 
of 45 minutes. 
F04 - To retard failure or collapse due to the effects 
of fire.  
 
OS1 Fire Safety - An objective of this Code is to 
limit the probability that, as a result of the design or 
construction of the building, a person in or adjacent 
to the building will be exposed to an unacceptable 
risk of injury due to fire. The risks of injury due to 
fire addressed in this Code are those caused by   
OS1.2 - fire or explosion impacting areas beyond its 
point of origin 
OS1.3 - collapse of physical elements due to a fire 
or explosion.  
 
OP1 Fire Protection of the Buildings - An objective 
of this Code is to limit the probability that, as a 
result of its design or construction, the building will 
be exposed to an unacceptable risk of damage due 
to fire. The risks of damage due to fire addressed in 
this Code are those caused by  
OP1.2 - fire or explosion impact areas beyond its 
point of origin.   
OP1.3 - collapse of physical elements due to a fire 
or explosion.  
 
6) Exit doors do 
not swing in 
direction of exit 
travel.  
9.9.6.5(1) - Except for 
doors serving a single 
dwelling unit, exit doors 
that are required to swing, 
shall swing in the direction 
of exit travel.  
[F10-OS3.7] 
F10 - To facilitate the timely movement of persons 
to a safe place in an emergency.  
OS3.7 - An objective of this Code is to limit the 
probability That, as a result of design or 
construction of the building, a person in or adjacent 
to the building will be exposed to an unacceptable 
risk of injury due to hazards. The risks of injury due 
to hazards addressed in this Code are those caused 
by persons being delayed in or impeded from 
moving to a safe place during an emergency.   
7) No landing at 
the top of the 
basement stairs.  
9.8.6.2(1)(a) - A landing 
shall be provided at the top 
and bottom of each flight of 
interior and exterior stairs.  
[F30-OS3.1] [F10-OS3.7] 
F30 - To minimize the risk of injury  to persons as a 
result of tripping, slipping, falling, contact, 
drowning or collision.  
OS3.1 - An objective of this Code is to limit the 
probability that, as a result of design or construction 
of the building, a person in or adjacent to the 
building will be exposed to an unacceptable risk of 
injury due to hazards. The risks of injury due to 
hazards addressed in this Code are those caused by 
tripping, slipping, falling, contact, drowning or 
collision.  
F10 - To facilitate the timely movement of persons 
to a safe place in an emergency.  
OS3.7 - An objective of this Code is to limit the 
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probability that, as a result of design or construction 
of the building, a person in or adjacent to the 
building will be exposed to an unacceptable risk of 
injury due to hazards. The risks of injury due to 
hazards addressed in this Code are those caused by 
persons being delayed in or impeded from moving 
to a safe place during an emergency.   
8) Handrails at 
740 mm, guards at 
800 mm 
 9.8.7.4(2) - The height of 
handrails on stairs shall be 
not less than 800 mm and 
not more than 965mm.  
9.8.7.4(3) - Where guards 
are required, handrails 
required on landings shall 
be not more than 1070 mm 
in height.  
[F30-OS3.1] [F10-OS3.7] 
F30 - To minimize the risk of injury to persons as a 
result of tripping, slipping, falling, contact, 
drowning or collision.  
OS3.1 - An objective of this Code is to limit the 
probability that, as a result of design or construction 
of the building, a person in or adjacent to the 
building will be exposed to an unacceptable risk of 
injury due to hazards. The risks of injury due to 
hazards addressed in this Code are those caused by 
tripping, slipping, falling, contact, drowning or 
collision.  
F10 - To facilitate the timely movement of persons 
to a safe place in an emergency.  
OS3.7 - An objective of this Code is to limit the 
probability that, as a result of design or construction 
of the building, a person in or adjacent to the 
building will be exposed to an unacceptable risk of 
injury due to hazards. The risks of injury due to 
hazards addressed in this Code are those caused by 
persons being delayed in or impeded from moving 
to a safe place during an emergency.   
 
 Table 20 summarizes all the deficiencies identified in the heritage building in terms of non-
compliance with the acceptable solution of the NBC and NFC. The objective and functional statements 
attributed to the code provision are listed in the third column of the Table. Items 1 through 3 in the Table  
outline three site conditions relating to the interconnected stairway in the building that do not comply 
with the code. This constitutes a potentially significant fire safety concern since not meeting the three 
conditions means that should a fire start in the building, fire and combustion products can impede egress. 
Fire and smoke obstructing the only stairwell from the second floor will negatively affect the timely 
egress of occupants from the facility.  
 Items 4 and 5 deal with the situation that the fire resistance ratings of the roof and floor assembly 
demonstrate less than the 45 minutes required by the code. Fire separations with fire resistance ratings 
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less than the minimum required in an acceptable solution could fail in their intent to prevent fires from 
spreading beyond the point of origin and also to delay collapse of assemblies from the effects of fire.  
 The remainder of the items listed in the Table deal in one way or another with the timely 
movement of people in the event of a fire. Item 6 captures that the exit doors swing inwards rather than in 
the direction of exit travel. This condition is contrary to the requirements in the acceptable solution and 
the functional and objective statements explain that the situation can impede timely movement of people 
to safety. Item 7 captures the reality that there is no landing at the top of the stairs leading from the 
basement to the main floor.  This situation presents a tripping hazard and would negatively impact the 
timely movement of people to safety. Finally, Item 8 identifies the height of the handrails are only 740 
mm and the guards only 800 mm high which is shorter than what is specified in the acceptable solution. 
Proper handrail and guardrail heights again facilitate movement of people and reduce the risk of tripping 
when people are moving to an area of safety.  
 Clearly several important, additional deficiencies were identified during the fire protection 
engineering survey on this heritage building, as listed in Table 20.  Conducting the survey in conjunction 
with a more standard Building Code Analysis therefore form two critical steps in the proposed risk 
assessment framework, since they facilitate cross-checking that all pertinent, code-related building 
features are being accounted for before proceeding with the next steps in the process: generation of the 
alternative design and fire risk indexing. 
4.1.4 Case Study 1 - Alternative Solution 
 An alternative solution is needed in this building to protect the heritage character of the building 
while at the same time making the building usable from a fire protection and life safety standpoint. With 
the deficiencies in the existing heritage building clearly identified and information gathered on how these 
deficiencies impact the building and building occupants in the event of fire, an alternative solution can be 
developed to directly address the shortfalls in the base building design. In summary, these shortfalls, as 
identified in Table 20, relate to keeping exits usable in an emergency, reducing situations that delay 
timely movement of people to exits, delaying fires from spreading beyond the point of origin, and 
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protecting the building from structural failure. The alternative solution will need to demonstrate how 
these deficiencies have been addressed.  
 On the other side of things, there are some features in the heritage building that are not required 
by the code but can be used to advantage in an alternative solution. In particular, the existing fire alarm 
system, which is not required for an acceptable solution, will remain operational and additional smoke 
detectors will be installed on each floor, as well as in the vicinity of draft stops which are proposed (see 
below) as an added element in the design as well. The presence of the fire alarm system and increased 
smoke detector coverage is expected to provide early detection of smoke and products of combustion, 
hence signal the existence of a fire, initiate an alarm and evacuation of building occupants, and notify the 
fire department early in a fire event. This level of protection is superior to the minimum requirement in 
the code-compliant building where a fire alarm system is not required to protect the building. Due to the 
presence of the fire alarm system in the building, a fire risk index value to account for this should be 
included in the overall fire risk analysis.  
 Due to the deficiencies identified with fire separation in the heritage building, the alternative fire 
safety design needs to include solutions to retard the effects of fire on areas beyond the fire origin and on 
the egress routes in the building. The potential for impacts of fire outside the room of origin and on egress 
routes can be lessened by subdividing the first and second floors, which consist of private offices, meeting 
rooms, and open offices, into smaller fire compartments in order to delay the spread of fire to other areas 
in the building. This will be done by using intumescent paint on existing doors to enhance the fire 
resistance rating of the doors currently leading from the office space into the hallway serving the stairs. 
Door closers will also be used to keep these doors in the closed and latched position when they are not 
being used. Adding draft stops around the interconnected stairwell and additional smoke detectors will 
facilitate early smoke detection as the ceiling jet is stopped by the draft stops [66] and delay the 
movement of smoke into the egress routes. The smoke detectors will also notify building occupants of a 
fire while the egress routes are still clear. Finally, the fire department will be notified earlier giving the 
fire department more time to intervene in firefighting and rescue of building occupants.  
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 The existing wall, ceiling and roof assemblies are constructed of wood with plaster covering and 
there is some literature that attributes a 30 minute fire resistance rating to these assemblies when protected 
with plaster [75]. The acceptable solution treats a fire separation that does not provide a 45 minute fire 
resistance rating as non-compliant and does not consider whether the fire separation provides a fire 
resistance of 45 minutes or 0 minutes. The 30 minute fire resistance rating although less than what is 
required, is better than no fire resistance rating at all. This can be dealt with using the Fire Rating of 
Assemblies risk index from Table 9 which will capture the deficiency but add credit for the positive 
measures taken to retard the effects of fire. Thus, this risk index should definitely be applied during the 
fire risk assessment stage of the analysis. 
 Several additional factors are anticipated to play large roles in the fire safety of this heritage 
building. As noted above, the building is constructed with plaster walls and ceilings which are non-
flammable. Flammables inside the building include wood panels, paper files and books, all of which 
consist of cellulosic fibres which tend to produce slower growing fires relative to polymer based materials 
or smouldering fires [81]. In addition, the designer will specify that carpets, office equipment and 
furniture be treated with a fire retardant finish. In the unlikely event of a fire, since these materials will be 
more difficult to ignite, they are anticipated to contribute to slower fire growth compared to a standard or 
fast flaming fire. As a result, the Fire Type risk index will be used as part of the fire risk assessment.    
 A Government of Canada department will occupy the space and comply with Treasury Board 
Standard for Fire Safety Planning and Emergency Organization Chapter 3-1. As discussed in Section 3.2, 
the standard exceeds the requirements for fire safety planning and fire emergency organization found in 
the NFC and Canada Labour Code (CLC).  Under the Standard for an office space, the occupants are 
expected to be familiar with the building, awake and alert, and they should be familiar with emergency 
procedures for the building. Regular visual inspections and elimination of hazards reduce the risk of 
ignition and fire.  Restrictions on smoking, on use of additional heaters without authorization and on 
cooking further reduce risk of fire as common ignition sources are eliminated or tightly managed. Finally, 
electrical wiring will be upgraded to meet the current edition of the Canadian Electrical Code which also 
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reduces the risk of ignition from old or poorly maintained electrical wiring. Since all of these measures 
are specific to the people who will occupy the space and their actions, the combined impact should be 
accounted for by using the Occupant's Activity risk index outlined in Table 7.  
4.1.5 Case Study 1 - Fire Risk Assessment Using Fire Risk Indices  
 The final fire risk assessment to evaluate the adequacy of the elements incorporated into the 
alternative solution will be done by first finding values related to:  
1. deficiencies captured on Table 20 and the level to which they are addressed in the acceptable 
solution, and 
2. strengths discussed in Section 4.1.4 and level to which they enhance fire safety in the building.  
 The values from each risk index will be determined using the 17 building safety parameters from 
the Wisconsin Administrative Code Chapter ILHR 70 Historic Building Code, including the revised fire 
risk indices presented in Section 3.2 and appropriate values for any new fire risk indices that are 
necessary to capture the full extent of fire safety deficiencies and rectification measures that are in the 
building. As a final step, these values will be combined to determine the overall fire risk index for the 
heritage building including all fire safety measures contained in the alternative solution outlined in 
Section 4.1.4. 
4.1.5.1 Vertical Openings Fire Risk Index 
 One fire risk index assessed for this heritage building relates to the open staircase. Under the 
NBC, a building that has an area less than 200 m
2
 and less than 25 m travel distance to an exit is 
permitted to be served by one exit provided it is in its own fire rated enclosure. The central stair is a 
heritage feature that cannot be enclosed in a fire rated enclosure, therefore it is accounted for in the fire 
risk assessment using the Vertical Openings risk index in the Wisconsin Administrative Code Chapter 
ILHR 70 Historic Building Code [49]. Table 21 shows the allowed values for this fire risk index with the 
recorded score of -3 for a non-enclosed opening highlighted.  
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Table 21 - Case Study 1: Vertical Openings Risk Index 
Vertical Openings  Numerical Value per shaft or opening 
No enclosure -3 
Enclosure with no rating -2 
Enclosure provided but 1-hour below the 
required protection level 
-1 
Complies with prevailing code 0 
1-hour required, but 2-hour provided +1 
 
4.1.5.2 Fire Alarm Related Risk Indices 
 When an alternative solution includes a fire alarm system, the decision on whether to apply the 
Revised Smoke Detection risk index and Revised Fire Alarm risk index in the overall fire risk analysis 
must be determined. Designing a fire alarm system that exceeds the minimum code requirements may 
offset some underlying code deficiency in the building.  The decision must begin first with the Revised 
Smoke Detection risk index because as explained earlier in 3.2.2.5, when a numerical value of +5 is taken 
under the Smoke Detection risk index, the numerical value for the Fire Alarms risk index is 0 [49]. The 
code does not require a fire alarm system to be installed in this building and the existing fire alarm system 
exceeds the minimum requirements of the code and includes an annunciator near the main entrance, heat 
detectors and smoke detectors are installed in areas prescribed by the NBC as if a fire alarm system was 
required. Additional smoke detectors will be installed as part of the alternative solution throughout the 
interconnected floor space and in the vicinity of draft stops. The fire alarm system is currently monitored 
by a fire alarm system monitoring company and the fire department is automatically notified in the event 
of a fire alarm. Table 22 shows the Revised Smoke Detection risk index that will be used and the resultant 
numerical value of +5 assigned in this case.  
Table 22 - Case Study 1: Revised Smoke Detection Risk Index 
Smoke Detection Numerical 
Value 
Complies with prevailing code 0 
Elevator lobby only and not required by the NBC +1 
HVAC return only and not required by the NBC +2 
HVAC return and elevator lobby and not required by the NBC +3 
All corridors, in addition to those required by the NBC, including elevator lobbies +4 
 Total space with interconnection of smoke detectors and building fire alarm system not 
required by NBC 
+5 
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A score of +5 is recorded for the alternative solution and will be used in the fire risk assessment with fire 
risk indexing. There is no need to consider the Revised Fire Alarm risk index because of the +5 score in 
the Revised Smoke Detection risk index.  
4.1.5.3 Fire Rating of Assemblies Risk Index 
 The Fire Ratings of Assemblies risk index shown in Table 23 below captures key elements of the 
alternative solutions including the use of draft stops, application of literature values for fire resistance 
ratings for plaster protected floor, wall and roof assemblies and the additional measures undertaken to 
protect the existing doors with intumescent paint and apply door closers to compartmentalize the space 
into smaller fire compartments. While a deficit is recorded due to the less than minimum fire rated 
assemblies in the building, it is offset by the positive impacts of the draft stops and intumescent paint in 
terms of overall fire safety in the building.  
Table 23 - Case Study 1: Fire Rating of Assemblies Risk Index 
Fire Rating of Assemblies Risk Index Numerical Value 
Fire rated assembly provides 2hr below 
required protection level 
- 2 
 Considers how Fire rated assembly provides 
1hr below required protection level 
- 1 
Fire rated assembly provides 0.75hr below 
required protection level 
- 0.75 
Fire rated assembly provides 0.5 hr below 
required protection level 
- 0.5 
Fire rated assembly provides 0.25hr (15 mins) 
below required protection level 
- 0.25 
Complies with code 0 
Draft stops used to retard flow of combustion 
products and extend usability of egress routes  
0.25 
Use intumescent paint and door closers on 
existing wood doors to compartmentalize 
rooms from rest of building  
0.25 
Total Fire Ratings of Assemblies Score 0.25 
4.1.5.4 Exit Capacity Risk Index 
 The occupant load in this building consists of 14 staff. It is not expected for the population in the 
building to ever exceed 60 persons. There is one exit door that does not swing in the direction of exit 
travel which must be kept to preserve the heritage nature of the building. The central stair has handrails 
and guardrails that are shorter than required for accessibility requirements. The potential delay in egress 
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from the landing at the top of the stairs from the basement must also be captured. Table 24 captures 
values for both deficits and positive fire safety measures through the Revised Exit Capacity risk index and 
highlights the features that need to be considered in the overall fire risk assessment.  
Table 24 - Case Study 1: Revised Exit Capacity Risk Index 
Revised Exit Capacity Number value 
(per exit) 
Occupant load exceeds 60 and exit door does not swing in direction of exit travel -2 
Occupant load is 60 or less and exit door does not swing in direction of exit travel -1 
Delay in egress from each instance of non-compliance for handrail height, guard rail 
height and landing dimensions. (x3) 
-0.5 
Complies with prevailing code 0 
1 more exterior exit than required by Code (exits shall be at least 6.1 m apart) +0.5 
Horizontal exits are provided in addition to required exits (no more than one-half the 
exits may be horizontal exits) 
+2 
Exits to grade or enclosed stairs exceed the minimum number of exits (exits shall be at 
least 6.1m apart) 
+3 
Eliminate a fire escape exit and provide a code complying enclosed stairway exit 
serving 3 or more levels 
+5 
TOTAL Score for applicable criteria -2 
 
4.1.5.5 Occupant Activities Risk Index 
 How the occupants will utilize the building was described in Section 4.1.4 and the characteristics 
of these occupants and the proactive actions they take reduces the chances of fire occurring and increases 
the chances that occupants can evacuate quickly. Table 25 below captures all the applicable points that 
can be applied based on the actions of the occupants and shows the final score that should be used to 
calculate the overall fire risk assessment with fire risk indexing score.   
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Table 25 - Case Study 1: New Occupant Activities Risk Index  
Occupant Activities Risk Index (Cumulative) Numerical Value 
No smoking and no open flames 0.14 
No cooking  0.18 
Use of space heaters and heat generating 
appliances tightly controlled 
0.1 
Fire emergency organization trained to 
identify and remediate fire hazards 
0.1 
Fire emergency organization facilitates 
emergency evacuation 
0.15 
Occupants trained in emergency procedure 
and evacuation 
0.15 
Awake and alert 0.1 
Familiar with the building 0.1 
TOTAL Occupant Activities Score 1.02  
 
4.1.5.6 Fire Type Risk Index 
 The fire type expected in this building is a slower fire growth based on the materials, and 
operations described in the design brief. Table 26 shows the Expected Fire Type risk index with the 
numerical value identified that will be used in the final fire risk analysis.  
Table 26 - Case Study 1: Expected Fire Type Risk Index 
Fire Type Numerical Value 
Smouldering Fire  1 
Standard Fire  0 
Fast Flaming Fire  -1 
 
4.1.5.7 Fire Risk Assessment with Fire Risk Indexing for Case Study 1 
 The fire risk analysis with fire risk indexing will combine all the applicable fire risk indices from 
Case Study 1 to determine if the alternative solution is at least equivalent to and potentially relatively 
safer than a building that complies with the acceptable solution.  Table 27 shows the final fire risk 
assessment for case study 1. 
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Table 27 - Fire Risk Assessment for Case Study 1 
Safety Parameters Fire 
Safety 
Means 
of 
Egress 
General 
Safety  
Comments 
1. Number of Stories null Null Null Same for heritage and code compliant 
building 
2. Building Area null Null Null Same for heritage and code compliant 
building 
3. Building Setback null N/A Null Same for heritage and code compliant 
building 
4.  Attic Compartmentalization Null N/A Null Same for heritage and code compliant 
building 
5. Firestopping Null N/A Null Same for heritage and code compliant 
building 
6. Revised Occupancy 
Separations 
N/A N/A N/A Group D occupancy 
7. Vertical Openings -3 -3 -3 From Table 21 
8. HVAC Systems Null Null Null Same for heritage and code compliant 
building 
9. Revised Smoke Detection +5 +5 +5 From table 22 
10. Revised Fire Alarms 0 0 0 From table 22 
11. Smoke Control N/A N/A N/A No smoke control 
12. Revised Exit Capacity N/A -2 -2 From Table 24 
13. Dead ends N/A Null Null Same for heritage and code compliant 
building 
14. Maximum travel distance N/A Null Null Same for heritage and code compliant 
building 
15. Emergency Power N/A Null Null Same for heritage and code compliant 
building 
16. Elevator Control Null Null Null No elevators in building 
17. Sprinklers Null Null Null No sprinklers in building 
18. Fire Rating of Assemblies 0.25 0.25 0.25  
19. Fire Type Risk Index 1 1 1  
20. Occupant Activities Risk 
Index 
1.02 1.02 1.02  
TOTAL Safety Score 4.27 4.27 4.27  
 
Table 27 shows that the alternative solution of using draft stops around the central exit stairs to extend the 
time the exit stair can be used rather than leaving it unchanged, door closers on all doors to enhance 
compartmentation in the building, a fully functional fire alarm system with additional smoke detector 
coverage, an effectively trained fire emergency organization and the space being used as an office 
occupancy relatively provides at lease an equivalent, and potentially a higher level of safety than a 
building and occupant practices that meet the minimum requirements of the NBC and NFC.  
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4.2 Case Study 2  
 The second case study that was undertaken in this research involves assessment of a building 
built in 1915. This is a 2 storey, 814 m
2
 building with a basement. The building is constructed with a 
mixture of combustible and noncombustible construction and is fully sprinklered on the 2nd floor and in 
the basement and partially sprinklered on the 1st floor. There is an interconnected floor space between the 
1st and 2nd floor. The building is currently occupied by a single tenant and used as an office. The fire 
protection framework proposed in Chapter 3 will be used to develop and evaluate an alternative solution 
for the building based on the desire by the owner to change to overall function of the building.  
4.2.1 Heritage Character Statement 
 The building is built in Beaux Arts style with symmetry and balance of the exterior carried 
through into the public spaces in the interior. The architectural significance of this building is that it has 
remained largely unaltered through time and also serves as a landmark in its town. The heritage value of 
the building is defined by the two-storey composition of the main entrance façade and the symmetrical 
composition with a monumental portico over the entrance flanked by colonnaded porches as shown in 
Figure 11.  
 
Figure 11 - Example of Beaux Arts Style Building 
 The main level interior has a carefully orchestrated sequence of spaces highlighted by a central 
court with a large stained-glass dome shown in Figure 12.  
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Figure 12 - Stained Glass Dome 
 
4.2.2 Design Brief 
 The objective of this project is to rehabilitate the building so that it can accommodate two tenants 
and comply with the NBC and NFC. In this case, the owner would like to reduce the allocation of office 
space to the existing occupant and make room on half of the second floor for a college that consists of a 
classroom and college administrative offices. The rehabilitation work will be done inside the building; 
since this is a heritage building, any work has to be sympathetic to the original design. This means that 
the following character defining elements need to be maintained: 
1. the original layout, original trim and detail on the second floor should be retained,  
2. the grand marble staircase with heavy oak handrail that connects the two levels should be preserved 
and remain lit by the large stain-glass window that is part of the stairs (not the stained glass dome), 
3. the balanced disposition of spaces around the central axis of the building should be preserved, and  
4. any necessary changes should be enhanced by use of marble, bronze, oak and ornate plaster work 
[82]. 
Every effort should be taken to maintain, recover and restore the original design, respectively.  
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4.2.3 Building Code and Fire Code Analysis 
 Based on the information provided, a building code and fire code analysis was done. A summary 
of the building code requirements and the condition of the existing building are recorded in Table 28.  
Table 28 - Building Code Analysis for Case Study 2 
 Code compliant 
Building 
Heritage Building Functional and 
Objective 
statements 
Year of Original Construction 2016 1915 N/A 
Major Occupancy 
Classification(s) 
Group A2 and D Group A2 and D N/A 
Governing Code Part Part 3 Part 3  
Fire Resistance rating of floor 
assemblies (hrs) 
45 minutes 
3.2.2.25(2)(a) and (d) 
45 minutes separating 
basement from main 
floor. Alternative 
solution needed to 
separate first and 
second floor.  
[F03-OP1.2] 
[F04-OP1.2, 
OP1.3] 
[F03 -OS1.2]  
[F04-OS1.2, 
OS1.3] 
Building Area (m
2
) 814 814  
Building Height (Storeys) 2 2  
Cross-over Floors N/A N/A  
High Building (see NBC Article 
3.2.6) 
N/A N/A  
Interconnected floor space Not Permitted 
3.2.8.2(6)(d) 
Alternative solution 
needed to separate first 
and second floors.  
No functional 
and objective 
statements 
attributed to this 
requirement so 
use intent 
statement.   
Mezzanines N/A N/A  
Sprinklers Not required Partial system 
installed. 2nd floor and 
basement fully 
sprinklered. Main floor 
partially sprinklered 
(back staff area, 
enclosed offices, under 
the stained glass dome 
and grand staircase). 
Approx. 75% 
protected 
 
Facing No. of Streets 2 2  
Type of Construction Combustible 
construction permitted 
Mix of combustible 
and non combustible 
construction 
 
Roof Assembly 45 minutes  
3.2.2.25(2)(c) 
Unsure. Drywall and 
plaster ceiling present.  
[F04-OP1.3] 
[F04- OS1.3] 
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Total Building Occupant Load 195  
3.4.3.2.(1)(c) 
100  
Fire Alarm System Full fire alarm system 
required 
Full fire alarm system 
installed 
 
Voice Communication  Not required Not installed  
Fire Alarm System Monitoring Not required Yes  
Standpipe & Hose  Not required Not installed  
Emergency Power 30 minutes battery 30 minute battery  
Smoke Control Measures Not required N/A  
Fire Pumps Not required N/A  
Maglocks Permitted Installed  
Special Extinguishing Systems Not required N/A  
Water Supply Municipal Municipal   
Spatial Separations Adequate Adequate  
 
 The building code data sheet shows that the building is a large building that is covered by part 3 
of the NBC. The building code analysis shows that the majority of the building complies with, or exceeds, 
the requirements of the acceptable solutions under the NBC [14]. The partial sprinklering of the building, 
and monitoring of the fire alarm system by a fire alarm monitoring company exceed the requirements 
stipulated under the Code.  
 On the other hand, Table 28 shows the existing building has deficiencies in the fire separations. 
The fire resistance rating of the floor assembly between the 1st and second floor and the roof assembly do 
not provide the required 45 minutes fire resistance rating. The fire resistance rating of the floor assembly 
that separates the first and second storey is unknown due to presence of the non-fire rated stained glass 
dome that connects the two floors.  
 The roof assembly is a mixture of gypsum board and plaster and an assembly that includes plaster 
is not part of a recognized fire separation design that provides a minimum fire resistance rating of 45 
minutes. It is critical to maintain the ornate plaster finish from a heritage conservation standpoint, but 
there are no listed fire rated assemblies that incorporate plaster into their design. Therefore, this gap has to 
be considered in designing the final fire safety solution for the building. 
 As well as the building code survey outlined in Table 28 a fire protection engineering survey of 
the building was conducted. This consisted of a visual inspection of the building in order to evaluate the 
current condition and overall compliance of the building with the prevailing code and thereby identify any 
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deficiencies that may exist in the building. During the survey, the records for fire drills were available for 
review and an evacuation time of 90 s was noted from the previous fire drill and this information will be 
retained for future consideration. There were additional deficiencies captured during the fire protection 
engineering survey that were not captured on the building code data sheet. One relates to fire protection of 
one of the exit stairs. Buildings of this size are required to be served by 2 exits [14]. Figure 13 shows a 
picture of the top of the grand stair case that opens directly into the main floor and it is clear that it is not 
enclosed in a fire separation, as required under the Code. This open stair case does not limit fire spread 
beyond the main floor if a fire were to occur there, it can delay evacuation of building occupants and 
delay emergency responder access.   
 
Figure 13 - Top of Grand Stair Case 
 
The area above the grand stair case is protected by smoke detectors and concealed sprinkler heads in each 
coffered section as shown in Figure 13.  The height of the guard rail at the top of the stair has been raised 
to meet the minimum requirements of the NBC.  
 Table 29 below summarizes all the deficiencies so that they can be evaluated and used to generate 
alternative solutions that can fully address all the deficiencies. Functional and objective statements behind 
the associated code provisions for each deficiency are also recorded.   
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Table 29 - Case Study 2 Complete List of Deficiencies 
Non-
Conformance Code Requirements Functional and Objective Statements  
1) Fire separation 
of the floor 
assembly between 
the 1st and 2nd 
floor has a fire 
resistance rating 
of 30 minutes. 
3.2.2.25(2) (a) - The fire 
resistance rating of floors and 
roofs shall  have a minimum 
fire resistance rating of 45 
min  
[F03-OP1.2 and OS 1.2]: 
F03 - To retard the effects of fire on areas beyond 
its point of origin.  
OP1 Fire Protection of the Buildings - An 
objective of this Code is to limit the probability 
that, as a result of its design or construction, the 
building will be exposed to an unacceptable risk 
of damage due to fire. The risks of damage due to 
fire addressed in this Code are those caused by  
OP1.2 - fire or explosion impact areas beyond its 
point of origin.   
OS1 Fire Safety - An objective of this Code is to 
limit the probability that, as a result of the design 
or construction of the building, a person in or 
adjacent to the building will be exposed to an 
unacceptable risk of injury due to fire. The risks 
of injury due to fire addressed in this Code are 
those caused by   
OS1.2 - fire or explosion impacting areas beyond 
its point of origin 
[F04-OP1.2, OP 1.3 and OS 1.2, OP1.3]: 
F04 - To retard failure or collapse due to the 
effects of fire.  
OP1 Fire Protection of the Buildings - An 
objective of this Code is to limit the probability 
that, as a result of its design or construction, the 
building will be exposed to an unacceptable risk 
of damage due to fire. The risks of damage due to 
fire addressed in this Code are those caused by  
OP1.2 - fire or explosion impact areas beyond its 
point of origin.   
OP1.3 - collapse of physical elements due to a fire 
or explosion.  
OS1 Fire Safety - An objective of this Code is to 
limit the probability that, as a result of the design 
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or construction of the building, a person in or 
adjacent to the building will be exposed to an 
unacceptable risk of injury due to fire. The risks 
of injury due to fire addressed in this Code are 
those caused by   
OS1.2 - fire or explosion impacting areas beyond 
its point of origin 
OS1.3 - collapse of physical elements due to a fire 
or explosion.  
2) This building is 
not permitted to 
have an 
interconnected 
floor space.  Floor 
area is 814 m
2
. 
Maximum floor 
area in 
unsprinklered 
building is 
1000m
2
.  Since 
814 is more than 
one half of 1000 
the interconnected 
floor space is not 
in conformance 
with the code 
3.2.8.2(6)(d) - An 
interconnected floor space 
need not conform to the 
requirements of 3.2.8.3 to 
3.2.8.9 provided the building 
area is not more than one half 
the area permitted by 
subsection 3.2.2 
No functional and objective statements attributed 
to Sentence 6.  
To exempt certain interconnected floor spaces 
from the requirements of Sentence 3.2.8.1.(1) and 
Articles 3.2.8.3. to 3.2.8.9., which would 
otherwise require a vertical fire separation or 
certain fire protection measures, if: 
 the location and number of interconnected 
floors is limited, which will minimize: 
o vertical fire spread, and 
o delays in emergency responder access 
and evacuation of occupants, 
 the openings through the floor are used only 
for stairways, escalators or moving walks, or 
the interconnected floor space is sprinklered, 
which will minimize vertical fire spread, 
 the interconnected floor space contains only 
certain major occupancies, which will 
minimize fire risks, and 
 the building area is limited, which will 
minimize delays in emergency responder 
access and evacuation of occupants 
3) Fire separation 
of the roof 
assembly has a 
minimum fire 
resistance rating 
of 30 minutes. 
3.2.2.25(2)(c) Roof assembly 
shall have minimum fire 
resistance rating of 45 
minutes. 
However, 2nd floor is fully 
sprinklered and if the whole 
building was fully 
sprinklered, the roof would 
not need to be rated.  
[F03-OP1.2 and OS 1.2]: 
F03 - To retard the effects of fire on areas beyond 
its point of origin.  
OP1 Fire Protection of the Buildings - An 
objective of this Code is to limit the probability 
that, as a result of its design or construction, the 
building will be exposed to an unacceptable risk 
of damage due to fire. The risks of damage due to 
fire addressed in this Code are those caused by  
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OP1.2 - fire or explosion impact areas beyond its 
point of origin.   
OS1 Fire Safety - An objective of this Code is to 
limit the probability that, as a result of the design 
or construction of the building, a person in or 
adjacent to the building will be exposed to an 
unacceptable risk of injury due to fire. The risks 
of injury due to fire addressed in this Code are 
those caused by   
OS1.2 - fire or explosion impacting areas beyond 
its point of origin 
[F04-OP1.2, OP 1.3 and OS 1.2, OP1.3]: 
F04 - To retard failure or collapse due to the 
effects of fire.  
OP1 Fire Protection of the Buildings - An 
objective of this Code is to limit the probability 
that, as a result of its design or construction, the 
building will be exposed to an unacceptable risk 
of damage due to fire. The risks of damage due to 
fire addressed in this Code are those caused by  
OP1.2 - fire or explosion impact areas beyond its 
point of origin.   
OP1.3 - collapse of physical elements due to a fire 
or explosion.  
OS1 Fire Safety - An objective of this Code is to 
limit the probability that, as a result of the design 
or construction of the building, a person in or 
adjacent to the building will be exposed to an 
unacceptable risk of injury due to fire. The risks 
of injury due to fire addressed in this Code are 
those caused by   
OS1.2 - fire or explosion impacting areas beyond 
its point of origin 
OS1.3 - collapse of physical elements due to a fire 
or explosion.   
4) Grand stair 
near the main 
entrance is not 
3.4.4.1(1) Every exit shall be 
separated from the remainder 
of the building by a fire 
[F05-OS1.5] 
F05 - To retard the effects of fire on emergency 
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separated from the 
remainder of the 
building by a fire 
separation having 
a minimum fire 
resistance rating 
of 45 minutes.  
separation having a 
minimum fire resistance 
rating of 45 minutes.  
egress facilities.  
OS1 Fire Safety - An objective of this code is to 
limit the probability that, as a result of the design 
or construction of the building, a person in or 
adjacent to the building will be exposed to an 
unacceptable risk of injury due to fire. The risks 
of injury due to fire addressed in this Code are 
those caused by  
OS1.5 persons being delayed in or impeded from 
moving to a safe place during a fire emergency. 
[F06-OS1.5, OS1.2] 
F05 - To retard the effects of fire on emergency 
egress facilities.  
OS1 Fire Safety - An objective of this code is to 
limit the probability that, as a result of the design 
or construction of the building, a person in or 
adjacent to the building will be exposed to an 
unacceptable risk of injury due to fire. The risks 
of injury due to fire addressed in this Code are 
those caused by 
OS1.2 fire or explosion impacting areas beyond 
its point of origin 
OS1.5 persons being delayed in or impeded from 
moving to a safe place during a fire emergency. 
[F03-OS1.2] 
F03 - To retard the effects of fire on areas beyond 
its point of origin.  
OS1 Fire Safety - An objective of this code is to 
limit the probability that, as a result of the design 
or construction of the building, a person in or 
adjacent to the building will be exposed to an 
unacceptable risk of injury due to fire. The risks 
of injury due to fire addressed in this Code are 
those caused by 
OS1.2 fire or explosion impacting areas beyond 
its point of origin 
[F06, F03-OP1.2] 
F06 - To retard the effects of fire on facilities for 
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notification, suppression and emergency response. 
F03 - To retard the effects of fire on areas beyond 
its point of origin.  
OP1 Fire Protection of the Buildings - An 
objective of this Code is to limit the probability 
that, as a result of its design or construction, the 
building will be exposed to an unacceptable risk 
of damage due to fire. The risks of damage due to 
fire addressed in this Code are those caused by  
OP1.2 - fire or explosion impact areas beyond its 
point of origin.   
5) The assembly 
type occupancy 
should be 
separated from 
adjoining suites 
by a fire 
separation having 
a fire resistance 
rating of 45 
minutes.  
3.3.1.1.(1) Major 
occupancies should be 
separated from adjoining 
major occupancies by fire 
separations having fire 
resistance rating of 1 hour.  
[F03-OS1.2] 
F03 - To retard the effects of fire on areas beyond 
its point of origin.  
OS1 Fire Safety - An objective of this Code is to 
limit the probability that, as a result of the design 
or construction of the building, a person in or 
adjacent to the building will be exposed to an 
unacceptable risk of injury due to fire. The risks 
of injury due to fire addressed in this Code are 
those caused by   
OS1.2 - fire or explosion impacting areas beyond 
its point of origin 
[F03-OS3.4] 
F03 - To retard the effects of fire on areas beyond 
its point of origin 
OS3 Safety in Use - An objective of this Code is 
to limit the probability that, as a results of the 
design or construction of the building, a person in 
or adjacent to the building will be exposed to an 
unacceptable risk of injury due to hazards. The 
risks of injury due to hazards addressed in this 
code are those caused by 
OS3.4 exposure to hazardous substances.  
 
 Having a complete list of deficiencies for this heritage building allows the designer to quickly 
identify where any compensating measures must be included in an alternative solution to achieve code 
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compliance for the final overall design. Items 1, 3 and 5 deal with fire resistance ratings of the floor, roof 
and wall assemblies within the building. They are listed with the associated functional and objective 
statements which must be properly addressed in order for the final building to meet the criterion stipulated 
in the Code.  
 In contrast to fire resistance related deficiencies, item 2 deals with interconnection between floor 
spaces in the area around the stained glass dome. As shown in figure 14, there is an enclosed space 
around the dome where the second floor overlooks the top of the dome.  
 
Figure 14 - Overlooking the Stained Glass Dome From the 2nd Floor 
Windows run along 3 of the walls overlooking the stained glass dome, the fourth wall is the exterior wall. 
Each set of windows is mounted in plaster wall assembly rising 1100mm above the finished floor. The 
windows are in wooden frames with frosted glass panes and so the assembly is not a listed and labelled 
wall and window assembly. The north and north-east portion of the perimeter consist of wood stud walls 
with slab-to-slab lathe and plaster which is also not a listed and labelled fire separation or closure. In 
assessing the compliance of the existing construction an important interpretation relates to sentence 6 “An 
interconnected floor space need not conform to the requirements of 3.2.8.3 to 3.2.8.9 provided the 
building area is not more than one half the area permitted by subsection 3.2.2”; however, the NBC has not 
clearly attributed functional and objective statements for this sentence. In assessing this feature of the 
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building then, it is necessary to examine the intent(s) of this clause in the code. Here, the intent is to 
exempt certain interconnected floor spaces from the requirement for vertical fire separation or from 
certain fire protection requirements, provided that the building area, as well as the location and number of 
interconnected floors are limited, the openings through the floor are used only for stairways, escalators or 
moving walks, or that the interconnected floor space is sprinklered, or contains only occupancies with 
minimal risks. The objectives that would be aligned with this intent are to limit the vertical spread of fire, 
and minimize delay in the evacuation of occupants as well or emergency responder access.  
 Item 4, deals with the grand stair case in the building that is not housed in a fire rated enclosure. 
In this case, there is a requirement for two exits and those exit pathways must be protected so occupant 
evacuation is not delayed and emergency responders are not delayed in accessing the building when they 
respond to a fire emergency.  
 With the deficiencies identified and understood in context of the applicable code requirements, 
the next step in the process is to develop an alternative solution that brings the heritage building into 
compliance with current Code for the occupancy defined. The solution will need to contain strategies by 
which to address all the functional, objective and intent statements related to the deficiencies summarized 
in Table 29 in a fashion that brings the overall fire safety solution for the building at least to the level 
specified as the existing acceptable solution.   
4.2.4 Case Study 2 - Alternative Solution 
 The proposed alternative solution for this building must protect the heritage features of the 
building, while ensuring that all the deficiencies noted in Table 29 are addressed. First, there must be 
adequate fire separations between the college occupancy and the office occupancy. Any fire separations 
that do not meet the prescriptive requirements of the NBC for exits, floor and roof assemblies also need to 
be addressed so that if there is a fire, the building does not prematurely collapse, the fire does not spread 
beyond the point of origin and the exit pathways are kept tenable long enough that occupants can exit and 
fire fighters can enter the building to fight the fire.  
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 The first design decision is to continue to maintain the current sprinkler system and fire alarm 
system in the building. The 2nd floor and basement are fully sprinklered. Approximately 70 percent of the 
main floor is sprinklered as well, including areas underneath the stained glass dome, on the grand 
staircase, and in enclosed offices and staff areas. The only area on the main floor that is not covered by 
sprinklers is the open office directly underneath and adjacent to the perimeter of the glass dome. This area 
cannot be fitted with sprinklers because of the heritage value of the ornate plaster covering the ceilings. 
Since this feature has to be protected, ripping it apart to install plumbing and sprinkler heads is not an 
option. In addition to the sprinklers, the current fire alarm system affords another line of defence. It is 
designed to directly notify the fire department, through a fire signal and receiving centre, when an alarm 
signal has been initiated. This automatic fire department notification ensures that when there is an 
incident, the fire department response is as short as possible. The presence of the partial sprinkler system, 
fire alarm system monitoring and automatic fire department notification all exceed the NBC requirements 
for a building of this size, height and occupancy type. In the rare case of a fire within the building, the 
sprinkler system is expected to control the growth of the fire and perhaps extinguish it, while early 
notification greatly reduces response time for fire department personnel. Due to the presence of the above 
systems then, appropriate values will be entered into the related Wisconsin Sprinklers, and Revised 
Smoke Detection and Revised Fire Alarm risk indices as part of the overall fire risk assessment.   
 Due to general non-compliance of the grand staircase as an exit option and the fire separations in 
the building, other solutions need to be proposed that will retard the spread of fire to areas beyond the fire 
origin. An exit stair shaft that is separated from the remainder of the building by fire separations with a 
fire resistance rating of 45 minutes would be the normal configuration for exit in a building such as this. 
Since the grand staircase is a heritage feature of the building, however, enclosing it in an exit stair shaft is 
not an option so alternative measures are needed to ensure it can be used safely for exiting in a fire 
emergency. To facilitate this, additional smoke detectors should be installed throughout the main floor 
open office areas to improve smoke detection coverage and to initiate the fire alarm, notify the fire 
department, and warn people to begin evacuation as early as possible. It can be further protected by 
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having the fire emergency organization do regular inspections of the work place and mitigate fire hazards. 
Combustibles like brochures and bulletin boards in the vicinity of the staircase will be removed. This will 
reduce the amount of materials that can ignite in the area and make the grand stair case unusable in the 
event of fire. Wood finishes will be painted with clear intumescent paint which will further protect the 
wooden elements from the effects of fire. Finally, the grand stair case will continue to have smoke 
detector coverage at the top of the stairs and have sprinkler protection. The Fire Ratings of Assemblies 
risk index will be used in analyzing the alternative solution for this situation.  
 Draft stops with adjacent smoke detectors will be used to compartmentalize the transition area 
between the main floor and the grand staircase so that any smoke that might be generated in the office 
area during a fire is contained by the draft stop, after which a fire alarm is initiated, the fire department is 
notified and evacuation begins. The fire separation between the first and second floor also needs to be 
improved as the stained glass dome and glass windows on the second floor overlooking the top of the 
dome are not rated fire separations and the plaster floor assembly provides a fire resistance rating of only 
30 minutes. The top of the grand staircase is separated from the second storey by a fire separation that has 
a fire resistance rating of 45 minutes. The first step in addressing these latter issues is to use draft stops 
around the perimeter of the glass dome on the first storey, coupled with additional smoke detectors to 
detect any smoke that might become trapped in that area. The second location where draft stops and 
increased smoke detector coverage will improve the fire safety design is at the edge of the first floor 
ceiling before it opens up into the grand staircase. The floor assembly itself is made of ornate plaster 
covering the lathe and structural elements within.  Since this configuration does not have a listed rating, 
intumescent paint can be applied to the underside of the floor assembly to enhance the fire resistance of 
the overall finish. The use of intumescent paint can extend the fire resistance, providing 60 minutes of 
insulation, integrity and load-bearing depending on plaster thickness, and material underneath [83]. The 
area under the dome is sprinklered and the second floor is fully sprinklered thus lowering the risk that a 
fire that occurs under the dome would spread to the 2nd floor, since the sprinklers will go off and control 
the growth of the fire and possibly extinguish it. The full sprinkler coverage on the 2nd floor increases the 
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chances that a fire that starts on the second floor will be controlled and extinguished early, thus 
preventing the fire from spreading into the window enclosed area that overlooks the dome as well (Figure 
14).   
 The materials used in this building consist of plaster on the walls and ceilings which is non-
flammable and wood, paper files, and books made of cellulosic fibres that will tend to produce 
smouldering fires [81]. The alternative fire safety design includes protecting the wood with clear 
intumescent paint and the plaster with white intumescent paint. Furthermore, the specifications for 
carpets, furniture, and office equipment will call for fire retardant finish. These types of specifications 
will skew the expected type of fires towards smouldering fires. To address this, the Fire Type risk index 
will be used in the fire risk assessment of the overall design.   
 The building will be non-smoking in accordance with the Non-smokers' Health Act, and cooking 
will be curtailed in accordance with the fit-up standards that do not provide for cooking facilities on site 
[59]. Fire safety planning and the fire emergency organization will comply with Treasury Board Chapter 
3-1 Fire safety planning and fire emergency organization as was discussed in Section 3.2.1.2. Personnel in 
the fire emergency organization will facilitate evacuation of building occupants in an emergency, and will 
be trained in identifying fire hazards and mitigating them. They will also help train building occupants 
and provide direct instructions to them during an emergency so that building occupants will know what to 
do in case of a fire in the building. As this is a place of work, the occupants are expected to be awake and 
alert. The electrical wiring will be upgraded to meet the current edition of the Canadian Electrical Code 
and power will be provided appropriately to satisfy modern office and classroom usage. The use of space 
heaters will be strictly controlled on site as the base building HVAC system is designed to provide 
occupants a comfortable environment. Space heaters will only be permitted for use under a duty to 
accommodate. To account for the impact of these various factors on overall fire safety in the final 
building, the Occupant Activities risk index will be considered in the final fire risk assessment.  
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4.2.5 Case Study 2 - Fire Risk Assessment Using Fire Risk Indices 
 The overall fire risk assessment for this heritage rehabilitation project was done using the 
proposed alternative design, the deficiencies captured in Table 29 and applying the applicable 17 building 
safety parameters from the Wisconsin Administrative Code Chapter ILHR 70 Historic Building Code, 
supplemented by new fire risk indices required by the various unique aspects of this project. As a first 
step, the various fire ratings in the building are considered and summarized in Table 30 the Fire Ratings 
of Assemblies risk index with the items that need to be considered for the final risk assessment 
highlighted.  
Table 30 - Case Study 2: Fire Rating of Assemblies Risk Index 
Fire Rating of Assemblies Risk Index Numerical Value 
Fire rated assembly provides 2hr below 
required protection level 
- 2 
 Considers how Fire rated assembly provides 
1hr below required protection level 
- 1 
Fire rated assembly provides 0.75hr below 
required protection level 
- 0.75 
Fire rated assembly provides 0.5 hr below 
required protection level 
- 0.5 
Fire rated assembly provides 0.25hr (15 mins) 
below required protection level 
- 0.25 
Complies with code 0 
Draft stops used to retard flow of combustion 
products and extend usability of egress routes  
0.25 
Use intumescent paint and door closers on 
existing wood doors to compartmentalize 
rooms from rest of building  
0.25 
Total Fire Ratings of Assemblies Score -0.50 
  
 In this building, the interconnected floor space between the main and 2nd floor caused by the 
stained glass dome is the most prominent site condition that the alternative solution must address. Since 
the stained glass dome and frosted glass, wood frame wall assembly in Figure 14 are not a listed 
assembly, it is the most stringent to apply a score of -0.75 for the floor assembly. A credit of 0.25 is 
applied to acknowledge the draft stops around the openings in the floor assembly such as around the 
grand staircase and the stained glass dome which are intended to retard the movement of smoke along the 
ceiling and into other areas of the building. 
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 Table 31 shows the fire risk index for the grand stair case using the vertical openings risk index. 
Since the stair is not in a fire rated enclosure, this index has a high negative value.  
 
Table 31 – Case Study 2: Vertical Openings Fire Risk Index  
Vertical Openings  Numerical Value (per shaft or opening) 
No enclosure -3 
Enclosure with no rating -2 
Enclosure provided but 1-hour below the 
required protection level 
-1 
Complies with prevailing code 0 
1-hour required, but 2-hour provided  +1 
 
 The requirement to separate the college occupancy, which includes administrative offices and 
classrooms, from the larger office tenant with a fire separation having a fire resistance rating of 45 min 
also needs to be taken into account. Treating the existing plaster walls and wooden doors with 
intumescent paint will provide a modified fire resistance rating of 30 minutes which is 15 minutes less 
than what is required for an acceptable separation rating. The highlighted row in Table 32 captures this 
condition in the evaluation of the alternative solution.  
Table 32 – Case Study 2: Revised Occupancy Separations Risk Index 
Occupancy Separations  Numerical Value 
No separation provided, but required -5 
Provided, but 2-hours less than required -4 
Provided, but 1-hour less than required -2 
Provided, but 0.75-hour less than required -1.5 
Provided, but 0.5-hour less than required -1 
Provided, but 0.25-hour less than required -0.50 
Complies with prevailing code for fire resistive 
ratings or no separation is required (where a 3 
hour required and a 4 hour is provided, the 
value shall be 0.) 
0 
Provided and 1 or more hours greater than 
required  
+2 
 
 As initially stated in the alternative solution, the existing partial sprinkler system that protects the 
majority of the building will be maintained in the rehabilitated building. As well as the presence of the 
sprinkler system, the fire alarm system will be monitored by a fire alarm monitoring company and the fire 
department will be notified automatically when the fire alarm is initiated. Tables 33 and 34 show how the 
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sprinkler system, fire alarm monitoring and additional smoke detector will be accounted for in the final 
fire risk analysis. 
Table 33 – Case Study 2: Sprinklers Risk Index  
Sprinklers Numerical 
Value 
System required but not provided (if -5 was entered under sub. (2), numerical value is 0.) -5 
Existing sprinkler system is required but does not meet prevailing code (does not apply to 
partial systems.) 
-1 
Sprinkler system is not required and not provided 0 
Sprinkler system required and provided in accordance with the prevailing code 0 
Existing sprinkler system is not required and does not meet prevailing code (does not apply 
to partial systems.) 
+1 
Sprinklers provided in unseparated hazardous areas and exit passageways, but not required +3 
Partial sprinkler system is provided throughout at least 75% of the building, but not 
required 
+5 
If sprinkler system is required, and regular sprinkler heads are replaced with quick response 
heads 
+5 
Complete sprinkler system provided throughout entire building, but not required +7 
Complete sprinkler system complying with NFPA 13 for quick response heads is provided 
throughout the entire building, but not required (if -5 was entered under sub. (2), numerical 
value is +5.) 
+10 
 
Table 34 – Case Study 2: Revised Fire Alarms Risk Index  
Revised Fire Alarms Numerical 
Value 
Fire alarm system required but not provided -5 
Fire alarm system required and provided but does not comply with acceptable solution -2 
Complies with acceptable solution 0 
Fire alarm system provided but not required (Note: If a numerical value of +5 is taken 
under the smoke detection fire risk index, the numerical value for this section is 0) 
+1 
Fire alarm system provided with voice communication system that complies with the NBC +3 
Fire alarm system includes a central alarm and control facility and automatic signals to fire 
department when not required 
+4 
Fire alarm system provided with automatic signals to fire department and interconnected 
with a monitoring company that is permanently monitored when not required  
+5 
 
 How the occupants will utilize the building is an important consideration in the case of this 
building because their activities can either reduce or increase the potential for fires in the space. In 
addition, their preparation for, and practice of, fire drills and emergency procedures will affect timely 
evacuation. Since this office will be utilized by federal government tenants, the following items in Table 
35 the Occupants Activities risk index apply in this case.   
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Table 35 - Case Study 2: Occupant Activities Risk Index  
Occupant Activities Risk Index (Cumulative) Numerical Value 
No smoking and no open flames 0.14 
No cooking  0.18 
Use of space heaters and heat generating 
appliances tightly controlled 
0.1 
Fire emergency organization trained to 
identify and remediate fire hazards 
0.1 
Fire emergency organization facilitates 
emergency evacuation 
0.15 
Occupants trained in emergency procedure 
and evacuation 
0.15 
Awake and alert 0.1 
Familiar with the building 0.1 
TOTAL Occupant Activities Score 1.02  
 
 The fire type expected in this building is smouldering fire based on the materials and operations 
described in the design brief. Table 36 shows the Expected Fire Type risk index with the numerical value 
that will be used in the final fire risk analysis highlighted in yellow.  
 
Table 36 - Case Study 2: Expected Fire Type Risk Index  
Fire Type Numerical Value 
Smouldering Fire  1 
Standard Fire  0 
Fast Flaming Fire  -1 
 
 The fire risk analysis with fire risk indexing then combines all the applicable fire risk indices 
from Case Study 2 to determine if the proposed alternative solution is equivalent and relatively safer than 
a building that complies with the acceptable solution.  Table 37 shows the full fire risk assessment for 
Case Study 2. 
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Table 37 - Fire Risk Assessment for Case Study 2 
Safety Parameters Fire 
Safety 
Means 
of 
Egress 
General 
Safety  
Comments 
1. Number of Stories null Null Null Same for heritage and code compliant 
building 
2. Building Area null Null Null Same for heritage and code compliant 
building 
3. Building Setback null N/A Null Same for heritage and code compliant 
building 
4.  Attic Compartmentalization Null N/A Null Same for heritage and code compliant 
building 
5. Firestopping Null N/A Null Same for heritage and code compliant 
building 
6. Revised Occupancies 
Separation 
-0.5 -0.5 -0.5 From Table 32 
7. Vertical Openings -3 -3 -3 From Table 31 
8. HVAC Systems Null Null Null Same for heritage and code compliant 
building 
9. Revised Smoke Detection Null Null Null Additional smoke detector coverage 
does not affect value 
10. Revised Fire Alarms 5 5 5 From table 34 
11. Smoke Control N/A N/A N/A No smoke control 
12. Revised Exit Capacity Null Null Null Same for heritage and code compliant 
building 
13. Dead ends N/A Null Null Same for heritage and code compliant 
building 
14. Maximum travel distance N/A Null Null Same for heritage and code compliant 
building 
15. Emergency Power N/A Null Null Same for heritage and code compliant 
building 
16. Elevator Control Null Null Null No elevators in building 
17. Sprinklers 5 5 5 From Table 33 
18. Fire Rating of Assemblies -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 From Table 30 
19. Fire Type Risk Index 1 1 1 From Table 36 
20. Occupant Activities Risk 
Index 
1.02 1.02 1.02 From Table 35 
TOTAL Safety Score 8.02 8.02 8.02  
 
 Table 37 shows the importance of the sprinkler protection and resulting fire alarm monitoring and 
automatic fire department notification which were installed but exceed the requirements for a code 
compliant building of this occupancy type. Together, these compensate for the non-compliant site 
conditions that must remain to preserve the heritage features of this building. Fortifying the fire 
separations of the roof, floor and college wall assemblies provide adequate fire compartmentation to 
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facilitate timely evacuation of building occupants, and for the fire department to respond. Installation of 
draft stops to delay the spread of smoke along the ceiling, combined with smoke detector coverage near 
the draft stops, will provide for earlier warning of fire via quick initiation of the fire alarm system. An fire 
emergency organization effectively trained in hazard identification, mitigation and emergency procedures, 
as well as building occupants who are familiar with emergency procedures will make the working and 
utility spaces much safer. By use of the full fire risk assessment framework developed in this thesis, it can 
be shown that with the proposed alternative fire safety solution, the rehabilitated building is at least as 
safe as, and potentially even relatively safer than a building that simply complies with the minimum 
requirements specified in the Code.  
4.3 Case Study 3 
 The third case study is based on a historic building that was built in 1861 as shown in Figure 15. 
The building is 3 storeys tall with a building area of 216 m
2
 and has a total floor area of 501 m
2
 spread 
over three floors. The first two floors have a floor area of 216 m
2
 each as they include the solarium, 
shown in Figure 15 below, while the 3rd floor and the basement each have an area of 69 m
2
. The building 
is fully sprinklered and is has a full fire alarm system that monitors the sprinkler system. The fire alarm 
system itself sends a signal directly to the fire department when the fire alarm is initiated. The basement 
contains an electrical room, mechanical room, storage, laundry area, hot water closet, vault, library, and 
archive room.  In this case study, alternative solutions will be proposed and analyzed to upgrade the 
building so that the current usage of the building as a museum for the public and administrative offices for 
staff can continue. The fire protection framework proposed in Chapter 3 will be used to develop and 
evaluate the alternative solution.  
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Figure 15 - Combination of Utilitarian and Colonial Revival Style 
 
4.3.1 Heritage Character Statement 
 The building was originally designed as a utilitarian building but after a renovation in 1920 it was 
reworked according to the principles of the Colonial Revival style.  It is a brick building that is topped by 
a wood shingled, high-pitched, gable roof with dormers. The main entrance is defined by a projecting 
portico with classically inspired motifs in the wood detail. It is domestic in scale, with symmetrical 
elevations and a conventional centre hall plan. Quality construction and workmanship characterize the 
exterior and the interior. The building remains in its park-like setting that was created in the 1920s and is 
a highly visible part of the park and familiar as a museum and interpretation centre for visitors [84]. This 
building is recognized for its historical associations, architectural importance and for its environmental 
and local significance.  
4.3.2 Design Brief 
 In this hypothetical scenario, the building will be renovated from a residential dwelling unit to a 
building that houses a museum on the first floor and part of the 2nd floor, and a separate office space will 
occupy the part of the 2nd floor and the third floor. The two different occupancies, A2 for the museum 
and D for the office area, will be separated from each other by a fire separation having a minimum fire 
resistance rating of 1 hour. The museum space will be occupied by the public and museum staff while the 
office space is restricted to staff and guests who administer properties in the region, including this 
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building. The basement consists of service rooms and storage rooms for the building. The existing 
sprinkler system and fire alarm system will remain and be adapted to suit the final design of the space. A 
fire separation having a minimum fire resistance rating of 1 hour will separate the office space on the 2nd 
and 3rd floor from the rest of the building. 
 The building has several sets of stairs providing access to different areas of the building. In the 
museum area, there is currently one open central stair case that connects the first and second floors. Inside 
the office occupancy, there is another set of open stairs that connects the 3rd floor and the 2nd floor. The 
basement has two different sets of stairs that lead directly to the outside and does not require any changes. 
The 3rd floor is also served by a fire escape, as shown in Figure 16, that utilizes a window to go to the 
exterior of the building, then a catwalk that leads to a fire escape ladder that must be released so that its 
length extends to the ground level.  
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
Figure 16 - 3rd Floor Fire Escape (a) from inside 3rd floor; (b) travel along roof; (c) ladder that 
extends to the ground  
 
 The heritage character statement for the building identifies the main entrance, construction and 
craftsmanship of the interior and exterior of the building as heritage elements that make this building 
significant. The exterior of the building, especially the front of the building, should not be altered in order 
to preserve the heritage value of the main entrance. Preserving the interior layout and finishes as much as 
possible will help to preserve the heritage value of the interior. What this means practically speaking is 
enclosing an exit stair from the third floor to the main floor would impact the interior layout and finishes 
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which have been identified as having heritage value.  An alternative solution must be created that protects 
the heritage features of the building, while at the same time allowing the owner to utilize the building in 
the proposed new way.  
4.3.3 Building Code and Fire Code Analysis 
 Based on the information provided on the base building above and the intended new use of the 
building, there is sufficient information to fill out the building code analysis sheet for case Study 3. Table 
38 below contrasts the code requirements for a code compliant building against the features of this 
heritage building.  
Table 38 - Building code analysis for Case Study 3 [14] 
 Ideal Building Heritage Building Functional and 
Objective 
statements 
Year of Original Construction 2017 1861 N/A 
Major Occupancy 
Classification(s) 
A2 and D A2 and D N/A 
Governing Code Part Part 3 Part 3 N/A 
Fire Resistance rating of floor 
assemblies (hrs) 
1 hour  1 hour N/A 
Building Area (m2) 216 216 N/A 
Building Height (Storeys) 3 3 N/A 
Cross-over Floors No cross over floors in 
building 
No crossover floors 
in building 
N/A 
High Building (see NBC Article 
3.2.6) 
N/A N/A N/A 
Interconnected floor space Permitted between first 
storey and one above or 
below it ONLY.  
3.2.8.2.(6) 
Interconnected floor 
space between 1st 
and 2nd floor in the 
museum space.  
Interconnected floor 
space between the 
2nd floor and 3rd 
floor office space.  
[F02, F03-
OS1.2 and 
OP1.2] 
 
Mezzanines None present None present.   
Sprinklers Required 
3.2.2.24 
Installed  
Building Faces No. of Streets (for 
fire department access) 
1 1  
Type of Construction Non combustible 
3.2.2.24(2) 
Mix of combustible 
and non-combustible 
[F02 -OS1.2]  
[F02-OP1.2] 
Fire Resistance of Roof Assembly 1 hour 
3.2.2.24(2)(a) 
1 hour  
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Total Building Occupant Load    
Fire Alarm System Required 
3.2.4.1.(1) 
Installed  
Voice Communication  Not required Not installed  
Fire Alarm System Monitoring Required  
3.2.4.10(5) 
Monitored  
Standpipe & Hose  Not required Not installed  
Emergency Power 30 minutes 30 minutes  
Smoke Control Measures Not required Not installed  
Fire Pumps Not required Not installed  
Maglocks N/A N/A  
Special Extinguishing Systems N/A N/A  
Water Supply Municipal Municipal  
Spatial Separations N/A Not an issue because 
it is in the middle of 
a park where the 
grass is well 
groomed and 
watered.  
 
 
 Table 38 shows that this building is a Part 3 building as a result of the A2 Occupancy type. The 
majority of the building appears to comply with the NBC. It is not a high building and it is not required to 
have crossover floors. The building is fully sprinklered and connected to the fire alarm system. The fire 
alarm system is fully functional and monitored by the fire department. The roof assembly, main floor 
assembly and wall assembly separating the museum and office occupancies are all constructed as fire 
separations having a minimum fire resistance rating of 1 hour. The interconnected floor space between the 
main floor and 2nd floor is also allowed; however, the other interconnected floor space between the 2nd 
and 3rd floor inside the office occupancy is not permitted. The building is required to be constructed with 
non-combustible construction but has to remain a mix of combustible and non-combustible construction 
in order to preserve some of the key heritage features.  
 In addition to a building code analysis, a fire protection engineering survey was conducted. The 
survey consisted of a visual inspection of the building to evaluate the current condition and overall 
compliance of the building with the prevailing code and thereby identify additional deficiencies that may 
exist in the building. Two additional deficiencies were identified during the engineering survey that were 
not captured on the building code data sheet. The first deficiency is each floor level is required to have 
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access to two exits in accordance with Article 3.4.2.1(1) of the NBC. The second deficiency relates to fire 
escapes and the requirement that fire escapes must be of the stair type in accordance with Article 
3.4.7.2(1) [14].  
 Table 39 identifies and summarizes all the deficiencies in this building against the related code 
provision and the functional and objective statements attributed to that code provision. Alternative 
solutions will be developed and evaluated against the functional and objective statements attributed to the 
deficiencies in Table 39. 
Table 39 - Case Study 3: Complete List of Deficiency 
Non-
Conformance Code Requirements Functional and Objective Statements  
1) The 
interconnected 
floor space 
between the 2nd 
and 3rd floor 
office space 
3.2.8.2(6) - An 
interconnected floor space 
need not conform to the 
requirements of Articles 
3.2.8.3 to 3.2.8.9 provided  
a) the interconnected floor 
space consists of the first 
storey and the storey next 
above or below it, but not 
both, 
b) the openings through the 
floor are used only for 
stairways, escalators or 
moving walks or the 
interconnected floor space is 
sprinklered throughout,  
c) the interconnected floor 
space contains only  Group 
A, Division 1,2, or 3, Group 
D, Group E, or Group F 
Division 2 or 3 major 
occupancies, and  
d) the building area is not 
more than one half of the 
area permitted by subsection 
3.2.2  
[F02, F03-OP1.2 and OS 1.2]: 
F02- To limit the severity and effects of fire or 
explosions. 
F03 - To retard the effects of fire on areas beyond 
its point of origin.  
OP1 Fire Protection of the Buildings - An 
objective of this Code is to limit the probability 
that, as a result of its design or construction, the 
building will be exposed to an unacceptable risk 
of damage due to fire. The risks of damage due to 
fire addressed in this Code are those caused by  
OP1.2 - fire or explosion impact areas beyond its 
point of origin.   
OS1 Fire Safety - An objective of this Code is to 
limit the probability that, as a result of the design 
or construction of the building, a person in or 
adjacent to the building will be exposed to an 
unacceptable risk of injury due to fire. The risks 
of injury due to fire addressed in this Code are 
those caused by   
OS1.2 - fire or explosion impacting areas beyond 
its point of origin 
  
2) Building is a 
mix of 
3.2.2.24(2) - Except as 
permitted by Article 3.2.2.16, 
[F02 -OS1.2]  [F02-OP1.2] 
F02- To limit the severity and effects of fire or 
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combustible and 
non-combustible 
construction 
the building referred to in 
Sentence (1) shall be on non-
combustible construction, 
and ....  
explosions. 
OS1 Fire Safety - An objective of this Code is to 
limit the probability that, as a result of the design 
or construction of the building, a person in or 
adjacent to the building will be exposed to an 
unacceptable risk of injury due to fire. The risks 
of injury due to fire addressed in this Code are 
those caused by   
OS1.2 - fire or explosion impacting areas beyond 
its point of origin 
F02- To limit the severity and effects of fire or 
explosions. 
OP1 Fire Protection of the Buildings - An 
objective of this Code is to limit the probability 
that, as a result of its design or construction, the 
building will be exposed to an unacceptable risk 
of damage due to fire. The risks of damage due to 
fire addressed in this Code are those caused by  
OP1.2 - fire or explosion impact areas beyond its 
point of origin.   
3) 2nd and 3rd 
floors are required 
to have two exits 
3.4.2.1.(2) - Every floor area 
intended for occupancy shall 
be served by at least 2 exits. 
[F10, F12, F05, F06, OS3.7, OS1.2, OP1.2]: 
F10 to facilitate the timely movement of persons 
to a safe place in an emergency. 
 
F12 To facilitate emergency response. 
 
F05 To retard the effects of fire on emergency 
egress facilities.  
 
F06 To retard the effects of fire on facilities for 
notification, suppression and emergency response.  
 
OS3 Safety in Use - An objective of this Code is 
to limit the probability that, as a result of the 
design or construction of the building, a person in 
or adjacent to the building will be exposed to an 
unacceptable risk of injury due to hazards. The 
risks of injury due to hazards addressed in this 
code are those caused by  
OS3.7 - persons being delayed in or impeded from 
moving to a safe place during an emergency.  
 
OP1 Fire Protection of the Buildings - An 
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objective of this Code is to limit the probability 
that, as a result of its design or construction, the 
building will be exposed to an unacceptable risk 
of damage due to fire. The risks of damage due to 
fire addressed in this Code are those caused by 
OP1.2 - fire or explosion impact areas beyond its 
point of origin.   
 
OS1 Fire Safety - An objective of this Code is to 
limit the probability that, as a result of the design 
or construction of the building, a person in or 
adjacent to the building will be exposed to an 
unacceptable risk of injury due to fire. The risks 
of injury due to fire addressed in this Code are 
those caused by  
OS1.2 - fire or explosion impacting areas beyond 
its point of origin 
4) The fire escape 
from the 3rd floor 
should be stair 
type.  
3.4.7.2(1) - the fire escape 
shall be of metal of the stair 
type extending to ground 
level.  
[F10, F12-OS3.7][F20-OS3.1][F20-OS2.1]: 
F10 To facilitate the timely movement of persons 
to a safe place in an emergency.  
 
F12 To facilitate emergency response.  
 
OS3 Safety in Use - An objective of this Code is 
to limit the probability that, as a result of the 
design or construction of the building, a person in 
or adjacent to the building will be exposed to an 
unacceptable risk of injury due to hazards. The 
risks of injury due to hazards addressed in this 
code are those caused by  
OS3.7 - persons being delayed in or impeded from 
moving to a safe place during an emergency.  
 
F20 To support and withstand expected loads and 
forces.  
 
OS3 Safety in Use - An objective of this Code is 
to limit the probability that, as a result of the 
design or construction of the building, a person in 
or adjacent to the building will be exposed to an 
unacceptable risk of injury due to hazards. The 
risks of injury due to hazards addressed in this 
code are those caused by  
3.1 tripping, slipping, falling, contact, drowning 
or collision.  
 
OS2 Structural Safety - An objective of this Code 
is to limit the probability that, as a result of the 
design or construction of the building, a person in 
or adjacent to the building will be exposed to an 
unacceptable risk of injury due to structural 
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failure. The risks of injury due to structural failure 
addressed in this Code are those caused by 
2.1 loads bearing on the building elements that 
exceed their loadbearing capacity.  
 
 
The main deficiencies in the building relate to the interconnected floor spaces on floors that are not 
permitted in the code, the use of combustible materials in a building required to be of non-combustible 
construction, the lack of two exits for occupants on each floor, and extension fire escapes rather than the 
required stair type systems.  
 The interconnected floor space between the 2nd and 3rd floor offices reduces the effectiveness of 
many of the other measures taken to limit the severity and effects of fire or explosions. A fire may spread 
more easily from floor to floor, affecting areas beyond its point of origin and exposing the building to an 
increased risk of damage and occupants to an increased risk of injury from fires or explosions beyond the 
area of origin. Combustible construction in the building may increase the severity and effects of fire or 
explosions and contribute to the spread of fire and an increased risk of injury to occupants in areas beyond 
fire origin. Similarly, occupant egress is impeded when floor areas have less than the required number of 
exits or, on the other hand, when there are no barriers protecting egress routes, fire and smoke can spread 
to staircases and into corridors with greater risk to occupants and the structure. Finally, the ladder in the 
fire escape slows the timely movement of persons to a safe place, may not be usable by emergency 
responders and may also increase the risk of trips, slips and falls during use.  
 The alternative solution, then must address the deficiencies noted in Table 39 with an explanation 
describing how it still satisfies the objective and functional statements behind the code provisions.  
4.3.4 Case Study 3 - Alternative Solution 
 The alternative solution consists of a set of smaller design changes that are intended to protect the 
quality construction and workmanship of the exterior and interior of the building, maintain the defining 
feature of the building's main entrance while still achieving the objective and functional statements listed 
in Table 39. In addition, the combustible materials will be protected and finishes with low flame spread 
ratings and smoke development classifications will be specified. Draft stops will be installed around 
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interconnected floor spaces and smoke detector coverage throughout the building will be enhanced. Since 
this is a federal government building, the fire emergency organization at the site will be accounted for in 
the overall risk assessment. Fire statistics related to these occupancies will be examined and knowledge of 
fire dynamics used to support some of the assertions behind the alternative solution as well.  
 The first part of the solution involves designing and installing a new exterior exit from the 2nd 
storey connecting to the stairs between the 2nd and 3rd floors. The new stair provides a second direct exit 
from the second storey by which occupants can exit the building without descending a flight of stairs and 
exiting through the lobby of the building. It similarly provides a second path for emergency responders to 
access the 2nd and 3rd floors. The new stair is considered a horizontal exit from the building because 
once occupants exit the building, they are served by a freestanding exterior stair that leads to the ground 
level and then along an exit pathway that runs down the side of the building, which is a fire wall with no 
openings, shielding those occupants using the stairs from the effects of fire inside the building. As shown 
in Figure 17, the exit will be installed on the side of the building away from the front entrance to 
minimize the impact on heritage character. The stair will be free-standing which further preserves the 
exterior of the building since the stairs can be removed and the exterior wall restored if the building use 
changes at a later date.  
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Figure 17 - New Exterior Exit from the 2nd floor on the side of the building [85] 
 To maintain an appropriate fire rating, a fire rated door will be installed in the fire separation that 
separates the office space and the museum space. It will swing in the direction of exit travel from the 
museum into the office space to facilitate egress for museum patrons since the museum is expected to 
have a higher occupant load than the office space. The door will also be signed as an exit on both sides so 
that persons anywhere on the 2nd floor will always have access to two exits.  
 The fire escape will not be changed due to the existing building layout and the need to preserve 
the exterior of the building as much as possible. The 3rd floor office space is 69 m
2 
. The 2nd floor office 
area consists of stairs, a washroom and a kitchenette which occupies approximately 25% of the 216 m
2
 
shown on Figure 17 resulting in a total office area that is approximately 123 m
2
. Table 3.3.1.5A and Table 
3.4.2.1B of the NBC show that an office or museum space with an area of 123 m
2
 is permitted to be 
served by a single means of egress or exit [14]. An argument can then be made that the fire escape on the 
3rd floor is no longer a deficiency and instead augments the existing situation where two exits have 
already been provided for all of the occupants on the second floor.  
 The original combustible construction used in structural members and other building assemblies 
will be preserved in the rehabilitation project. The NBC recognizes that there is a degree of fire safety 
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attained by the use of noncombustible materials in structural members and other assemblies [14]. 
Alternatively, for combustible construction, fire safety can be enhanced by applying intumescent paint to 
the exterior surfaces of structural members and other building assemblies provide an additional 30 minute 
fire resistance [76]. In addition, clear intumescent paint will be applied to exposed combustible elements 
such as ornate finishes, base boards and mouldings since the quality and workmanship was identified in 
the building's heritage character statement. This should delay fire damage to any exposed combustible 
finishes and to the combustible structural elements, protecting them from fire damage, slowing the spread 
of fire and extending the time for egress and protecting building occupants from being exposed to an 
unacceptable risk of injury due to fire. Further, protection of combustible elements and specification of 
furniture with low flame spread ratings and smoke developed classifications will make it difficult for fires 
to ignite and grow making a relatively slow growing or smouldering fire most likely to occur in the 
building.  
 As in case study 1 and 2 above, draft stops will be installed around openings for interconnected 
floor spaces and smoke detector coverage will be enhanced by installing smoke detectors near the draft 
stops as well. Additional smoke detectors will be installed throughout the museum exhibit floor where 
historical artifacts are displayed. In this way, any smoke starting in areas outside of stairwells will be 
detected earlier, providing earlier notification of a fire to building occupants so they can begin evacuation 
and fire fighters so they can begin fire fighting activities.  
 This building will be occupied by a federal agency who will comply with Treasury Board Fire 
Protection Chapter 3-1 Standard for Fire Safety Planning and Fire Emergency Organization. As noted in 
Section 3.2.1.2. This standard goes above and beyond what is required in the NFC and includes training 
of fire emergency organization members on both emergency procedures and identifying and mitigating 
fire hazards. Being a professional work place, all occupants will be alert inside the building which 
shortens evacuation time. The office and museum will have a properly designed heating, ventilation and 
air conditioning system to maintain the temperature in the building eliminating the need for space heaters. 
137 
 
Health and safety requirements prohibit smoking in the workplace and there will be no cooking facilities, 
thus eliminating several possible sources of ignition.  
 The overall alternative solution combines a new exterior exit, protection of combustible materials 
from the damaging effects of fire, installation of draft stops to retard smoke spread, enhanced smoke 
detector coverage for early fire detection, and good workplace practices to reduce the risk and impacts of 
fire and shortens evacuation time should one occur.  
4.3.5 Case Study 3 - Fire Risk Assessment Using Fire Risk Indices 
 The overall fire risk assessment for this heritage rehabilitation project was done using the same 
methods as applied in the case studies above. Due to the nature of the rehabilitation project, it was found 
that in order to assess the alternative solutions, some additions and revisions to the fire risk assessment 
indices used for Cases 1 and 2 were required. These are discussed in the appropriate sections below. 
 As a first step, the various fire resistance ratings of fire separations throughout the building are 
considered and captured in Table 40 Fire Ratings of Assemblies risk index with the items that need to be 
considered for the final fire risk assessment highlighted.  
Table 40 – Case Study 3: Fire Ratings of Assemblies Risk Index 
Fire Rating of Assemblies Risk Index Numerical Value 
Fire rated assembly provides 2hr below required protection level - 2 
 Fire rated assembly provides 1hr below required protection level - 1 
Fire rated assembly provides 0.75hr below required protection level - 0.75 
Fire rated assembly provides 0.5 hr below required protection level - 0.5 
Fire rated assembly provides 0.25hr (15 mins) below required protection 
level 
- 0.25 
Complies with code 0 
Draft stops used to retard flow of combustion products and extend 
usability of egress routes  
0.25 
Use intumescent paint and door closers on existing wood doors to 
compartmentalize rooms from rest of building  
0.25 
Total Fire Ratings of Assemblies Score -0.75 
 
In this building, the interconnected floor space between the 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 floor is a deficiency that must be 
captured when assessing the alternative solution. -1 is the value to be applied because the stair is required 
to have a minimum fire resistance rating of 1 hour. The installation of draft stops around interconnected 
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floor space openings provides a credit for the interconnected floor space and is captured with a score of 
0.25. The final score for Case Study 3 using the Fire Ratings of Assemblies risk index is -0.75.  
 The non-conformance of having combustible construction in this building and the steps taken to 
retard the damaging effects of fire on those elements is captured through development of a new fire risk 
index, the Combustible Construction risk index, shown in Table 41.  
Table 41 – Case Study 3: NEW Combustible Construction Risk Index 
Combustible Construction Risk Index Numerical Value 
Combustible construction used in floor and roof assemblies that are to be of non-
combustible construction and required to have minimum fire resistance rating of 
2hr 
- 2 
Combustible construction used in floor and roof assemblies that are required to be 
of non-combustible construction and required to have minimum fire resistance 
rating of 1hr 
- 1 
Combustible construction used in floor and roof assemblies that are required to be 
of non-combustible construction and required to have minimum fire resistance 
rating of 0.75hr 
- 0.75 
Combustible construction permitted for floor and roof assembly or heavy timber 
used in fire rated assembly that provides the minimum fire resistance rating 
required by the code.  
0 
Combustible construction that are to be of non-combustible construction and are 
protected by systems that provide a 0.5 hour fire resistance rating. 
0.25 
Combustible construction that are to be of non-combustible construction but are 
protected by systems that provides a 0.75 hour fire resistance rating.  
0.5 
Combustible elements that are to be of non-combustible construction but are 
protected by system that provides a 1 hour fire resistance rating.  
0.75 
Combustible elements protected by system that provides a 2 hour fire resistance 
rating. 
1.75 
Total Fire Ratings of Assemblies Score -0.5 
This index aims to capture the negative effects that can accrue when combustible construction is used in a 
building required to have fire rated assemblies that consist of non-combustible construction. The premise 
for this index is based on the inherent fire safety attributed to non-combustible construction. For example, 
a score of -0.25 will be the result when using this index to evaluate a fire separation that uses combustible 
construction when non-combustible materials is required for a fire separation that has the minimum fire 
resistance rating required by the code. The risk index recognizes that combustible elements and 
assemblies can eventually ignite, and then may contribute to the growth and spread of fire, or ultimately 
be consumed. The index also captures the added degree of fire safety attributed to heavy timber [14] since 
wood, when exposed to fire, burns and forms a layer of char which insulates the solid wood underneath 
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[45] and thus affords some measure of fire resistance. Heavy timber is defined as wood where the 
smallest dimension is no less than 80 mm [45]. The reason why net values are not used in this risk index 
is there may be scenarios where a fire separation with combustible construction may employ systems that 
will provide a fire resistance rating greater or less than what is required by the code. There are many 
methods where fire separations with combustible construction can have the fire resistance ratings 
extended to compensate for the lack of "inherent fire safety attributed to non-combustible construction”.  
Intumescent paints applied to the surface of fire rated assemblies may provide up to an additional 30 
minutes of fire resistance on the surface [76] before the fire rated assembly underneath is exposed to fire. 
The additional 30 minutes of fire resistance afforded by the application of intumescent paint helps protect 
the building and occupants by allowing more time for the safe evacuation, and potentially more time for 
emergency responders to operate safely inside the building. Positive benefits of any protection may or 
may not completely compensate for the additional degree of fire safety attributed to noncombustible 
construction so the index is designed in a way that fire separations with combustible construction could 
compensate for fire separations made of non-combustible construction if the right strategy, in the right 
situation were employed. A score of -0.5 is the best outcome that can be achieved in case study 3, where 
intumescent paint is applied.  
 The addition of the new exterior exit door from the 2
nd
 floor with the path down the exterior stair 
to a safe area has the positive effect that occupants in the basement, main floor and 2
nd
 floor all have 
access to two exits. The code requires that the third floor should also have access to two exits. The path 
down the stairs from the third floor to the new exterior exit on the second floor and the existing fire 
escape provide that; however, in the case of the fire exit, the ladder does not comply with the code and in 
the case of the stair, it is not enclosed as required by the code. In assessing the entire compliance, it is 
important to note that the area of the combined office occupancy on the 2nd and 3rd floors are actually 
small enough that it would be permitted to be served by 1 exit if it was on main level, so with the addition 
of the 2nd floor exterior exit, the situation is very similar.  
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 It is proposed that the Vertical Openings risk index does not apply in this case study. The 
justification is that there is an interconnected floor space within a suite that is fire separated from the 
remainder of the building while at the same time, the suite area is of an appropriate size that, under the 
NBC, it can be served by 1 exit.  
 The fire escape is not a stair type but since it is considered to be an extra means of egress above 
and beyond the stairs leading to the new exterior door, no negative effects will be scored against it here.  
 The alternative solution also incorporates the installation of additional smoke detectors near draft 
stops and throughout the museum exhibit space. These additional detectors will be added to the fire alarm 
system which will be monitored by a fire alarm monitoring company and the fire department will be 
notified automatically when the fire alarm is initiated. Table 42 shows that the fire alarm monitoring and 
additional smoke detectors will be accounted for through the Revised Fire Alarms risk index from Section 
3.2.2.5 in the final fire risk analysis. 
Table 42 – Case Study 3: Revised Fire Alarms Risk Index  
Revised Fire Alarms Numerical 
Value 
Fire alarm system required but not provided -5 
Fire alarm system required and provided but does not comply with acceptable 
solution 
-2 
Complies with acceptable solution 0 
Fire alarm system provided but not required (Note: If a numerical value of +5 is 
taken under the smoke detection fire risk index, the numerical value for this section 
is 0) 
+1 
Fire alarm system provided with voice communication system that complies with 
the NBC 
+3 
Fire alarm system includes a central alarm and control facility and automatic 
signals to fire department when not required 
+4 
Fire alarm system provided with automatic signals to fire department and 
interconnected with a monitoring company that is permanently monitored when not 
required  
+5 
 
 How the occupants plan to utilize this building is an important consideration in this case because 
their activities can either reduce or increase the potential for fires in the space. In addition, their 
preparation for, and practice of, fire drills and emergency procedures will affect timely evacuation. Since 
this building has both an office occupancy and museum occupancy that is run by a federal agency, as 
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outlined in more detail in Chapter 3, all of the following items in Table 43, the Occupants Activities risk 
index apply in this case. 
Table 43 - Case Study 3: Occupant Activities Risk Index  
Occupant Activities Risk Index (Cumulative) Numerical Value 
No smoking and no open flames 0.14 
No cooking  0.18 
Use of space heaters and heat generating 
appliances tightly controlled 
0.1 
Fire emergency organization trained to 
identify and remediate fire hazards 
0.1 
Fire emergency organization facilitates 
emergency evacuation 
0.15 
Occupants trained in emergency procedure 
and evacuation 
0.15 
Awake and alert 0.1 
Familiar with the building 0.1 
TOTAL Occupant Activities Score 1.02  
 
 The fire type expected in this building is slow growing or smouldering fire based on the materials 
and operations described in the design brief. Table 44 shows the Expected Fire Type risk index with the 
numerical value that will be used in the final fire risk analysis highlighted in yellow.  
Table 44 - Case Study 3: Expected Fire Type Risk Index  
Fire Type Numerical Value 
Smouldering Fire  1 
Standard Fire  0 
Fast Flaming Fire  -1 
 
 The fire risk analysis with fire risk indexing will combine all the applicable fire risk indices from 
Case Study 3 to determine if the alternative solution is equivalent and relatively safer than a building that 
complies with the acceptable solution.  Table 45 shows the full fire risk assessment for Case Study 3. 
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Table 45 - Fire Risk Assessment for Case Study 3 
Safety Parameters Fire 
Safety 
Means 
of 
Egress 
General 
Safety  
Comments 
1. Number of Stories null Null Null Same for heritage and code compliant 
building 
2. Building Area null Null Null Same for heritage and code compliant 
building 
3. Building Setback null N/A Null Same for heritage and code compliant 
building 
4.  Attic Compartmentalization Null N/A Null Same for heritage and code compliant 
building 
5. Firestopping Null N/A Null Same for heritage and code compliant 
building 
6. Revised Occupancies 
Separation 
Null N/A Null Same for heritage and code compliant 
building 
7. Vertical Openings N/A N/A N/A Office area small enough to be served 
by one exit and is fire separated from 
remainder of building.  
8. HVAC Systems Null Null Null Same for heritage and code compliant 
building 
9. Revised Smoke Detection Null Null Null Additional smoke detector coverage 
does not affect value 
10. Revised Fire Alarms 5 5 5 From Table 42 
11. Smoke Control N/A N/A N/A No smoke control 
12. Revised Exit Capacity Null Null Null Same for heritage and code compliant 
building 
13. Dead ends N/A Null Null Same for heritage and code compliant 
building 
14. Maximum travel distance N/A Null Null Same for heritage and code compliant 
building 
15. Emergency Power N/A Null Null Same for heritage and code compliant 
building 
16. Elevator Control Null Null Null No elevators in building 
17. Sprinklers Null Null Null Same for heritage and code compliant 
building 
18. Fire Rating of Assemblies -0.75 -0.75 -0.75 From Table 40 
19. Fire Type Risk Index 1 1 1 From Table 44 
20. Occupant Activities Risk 
Index 
1.02 1.02 1.02 From Table 43 
21. NEW Combustible 
Construction Risk Index 
-0.5 -0.5 -0.5 From Table 41 
TOTAL Safety Score 5.77 5.77 5.77  
 
Table 45 shows that the alternative solution achieves the functional and objective statements behind the 
code provisions where the building could not comply with the acceptable solution. The design and 
installation of the new horizontal exit from the 2nd floor was effective at addressing several deficiencies 
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related to building protection and occupant safety. Applying intumescent paint to assemblies in order to 
provide an additional degree of fire safety partially addressed the functional and objective statements 
associated with the use of non-combustible construction for situations where combustible construction 
was a fundamental element of the heritage building. Enhancements to the fire alarm system with 
additional smoke detectors throughout the exhibit space, monitoring by the fire department, and 
monitoring by an accredited fire alarm monitoring company should provide earlier detection of fires and 
thus initiate evacuation and fire department response sooner. This will have a positive effect on occupant 
safety as well as structural protection in the event of a fire.  
 While an acceptable alternative solution was found, this case study also uncovered the need to 
create a new Combustible Construction risk index to take into account the use of combustible 
construction in many heritage buildings. The Combustible Construction risk index was created to capture 
steps taken to protect combustible elements in a space that would be required to have noncombustible 
construction in the code compliant solution.  
4.4 Case Study Conclusions 
 The three case studies demonstrate that fire risk assessment using fire risk indexing can be 
effectively used to evaluate the acceptability of alternative solutions in heritage rehabilitation projects by 
comparing them on relative terms to buildings that comply with the acceptable solution in the Code. From 
the three buildings, it was found that the best way to address non-conformances is to use engineered 
systems such as sprinklers, fire alarm systems, and fire separations to compensate for deficiencies. 
Occupant based fire safety systems are resource intensive as they require training and practice; however, 
they can be effective at contributing to a safe environment for occupants and the building and thus should 
be weighted with a level of positive impact, although it should generally be less than that of any 
engineered system in recognition that behaviour is much more variable than an automatic or monitored 
system.  
  
144 
 
5 Conclusion and Recommendations 
 The main contribution of this thesis is the proposal of the new fire protection framework that uses 
fire risk assessment methods from fire risk indexing for developing and evaluating alternative solutions 
for Canadian heritage rehabilitation projects and demonstrating that it works. This was done by analyzing 
the current fire protection framework in Canada and a comparing prescriptive, performance and objective 
based codes. Objective-based codes provide intent, objective, and functional statements behind code 
provisions, deepening the understanding of what a provision is trying to achieve so that alternative 
solutions can be developed and evaluated against that intent. It is also the framework currently in place 
with which Canadian fire protection engineers, designers, owners and occupants are familiar. 
Quantitative, qualitative and semi-quantitative fire risk assessment methods were discussed and compared 
for 1) flexibility and ease in determining equivalency with objective and functional statements, 2) ease of 
use by fire protection engineers, and 3) ease in understanding by fire protection stakeholders. A semi-
quantitative fire risk assessment using fire risk indexing was the framework that best satisfied the three 
criteria noted.  
 The fire risk indexing method proposed in this thesis combines the 17 building parameter fire risk 
indices from the Building Evaluation Method from Chapter ILHR 70 of the Wisconsin Administrative 
Code, with appropriate amendments, and supplements them with additional fire risk indices that consider 
occupant behaviour, fire type, combustible construction, and fire separation designs that delay the spread 
of fire beyond the area of origin and thus reduce the risk of damage to the building and injury to 
occupants. Gaps in the fire risk indices are then filled by using fire science and fire statistics to revise 
existing fire risk indices and create new indices as necessary.  
 The flexibility of fire risk indexing allowed new information on the fire resistance ratings of 
alternative fire separations to be included in the overall fire safety assessment leading to revision of the 
Occupancy Separation risk indices and the creation of the Fire ratings of Assemblies risk index. Canadian 
fire alarm system requirements led to the revision of the Fire Alarm and Smoke Detection risk indices so 
that they matched Canadian requirements. The revision of the Exit Capacity risk index was done in 
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response to the challenge of heritage preservation objectives that preserved existing hand rails, guard 
rails, doors, door frames and door hardware which can also impact door swing of exit doors. Studies on 
human behaviour and fire statistics showed how additional processes undertaken by building occupants 
could reduce evacuation time and limit fire ignition led to the creation of the new Occupant Activities risk 
index. Fire dynamics showed that measures taken to slow the growth of fire could provide more time for 
building occupants to detect, suppress and evacuate in a fire event leading to the creation of the new Fire 
Type risk index. The heritage buildings studied in this thesis incorporated combustible construction. The 
NBC requires non-combustible construction for certain types of occupancies so when heritage buildings 
are rehabilitated for new uses, the existing combustible construction may be a problem. There are several 
methods available that can further protect combustible construction to provide an additional level of 
safety and this is captured in the new Combustible Construction risk index. 
 The final approach was tested on 3 buildings, as outlined in this thesis and was demonstrated to 
be suitable at developing and evaluating alternative solutions for heritage rehabilitation projects in order 
to determine equivalency with acceptable solutions. Going forward, this framework should be utilized for 
more heritage rehabilitation projects in order to increase the sample size for demonstrating the suitability 
and ease of interpretation of fire safety via this framework. It is envisioned that additional gaps from fire 
risk assessment with fire risk indexing of heritage rehabilitation projects may be uncovered requiring 
further revision of some fire risk indices. New indices should be created at the project level to address 
project specific gaps and, if a similar need arises in multiple projects, a new index should then be 
incorporated as an added option to the overall framework.  
 In closing, it is proposed that a new centralized body should be established for the purposes of 
assessing fire safety solutions for Canadian Heritage Rehabilitation Projects. The body should be 
composed of individuals with knowledge and expertise in fire science such as designers, fire protection 
engineers, and AHJs to ensure flexibility and consistency in use of the index in future heritage building 
projects. The centralized body would review the fire risk assessment with fire risk indexing for each 
project and track the acceptable fire risk indices used and the rationale behind the accepted fire risk 
146 
 
indices. This new centralized body will be the new AHJ for this framework and will also be responsible to 
provide guidance on application of the fire risk indices and make all accepted fire risk indices available 
for the fire protection community to use on current and future projects. Research in fire safety science will 
be ongoing as well with new discoveries and deeper understanding on the subject available to be used in 
the field. The centralized body can therefore also be proactive in revising and creating new fire risk 
indices and provide the necessary rationale, guidance and support for ongoing evolution and improvement 
of the method for more general use in industry.  
  
147 
 
6 References 
[1] Parks Canada, “National Historic Sites Introduction” - http://www.pc.gc.ca/en/lhn-nhs/introduction 
(17July2017) 
[2] Treasury Board Secretariat of Canada, “Directory of Federal Real Property" - http://www.tbs-
sct.gc.ca/dfrp-rbif/home-accueil-eng.aspx (17-July-2017) 
[3] Federal Heritage Buildings Review Office (FHBRO) under the direction of Victoria Angel, FHBRO 
Manager "A Guide to Working with the Federal Heritage Buildings Review Office" p. 1-3,© Her Majesty 
the Queen in Right of Canada, represented by the Chief Executive Officer of Parks Canada, 2009  
[4] Watts John M. Jr.; Kaplan, Marilyn E.; "Fire Safe Building Rehabilitation" P. 6-30, © 2003 National 
Fire Protection Association Inc.  
[5] Heritage Perth, "Why Heritage is an Important Community Asset" - http://heritageperth.com.au/your-
heritage/why-is-heritage-important-to-communities/ (17-July-2017) 
[6] Heritage Resources Branch, Saskatchewan Culture, Youth and Recreation, "Historic Buildings 
Modern Uses" P. 2-3, March 2007.  
[7] Canada's Historic Places, "Parliament Hill Centre Block" - http://www.historicplaces.ca/en/rep-
reg/place-lieu.aspx?id=4675&pid=8136&h=Parliament,Hill (5-Jan-2017) 
[8] Public Works and Government Services Canada, "Parliament Hill Cam" - http://www.tpsgc-
pwgsc.gc.ca/citeparlementaire-parliamentaryprecinct/camera-eng.html (5-Jan-2017)  
[9] Parks Canada, "Federal Heritage Buildings Review Office - Introduction" - 
http://www.pc.gc.ca/progs/beefp-fhbro/index.aspx (4Aug2017) 
[10] Petzet, Michael; "Principles of Preservation - An Introduction to the International Charters for 
Conservation and Restoration 40 Years after the Venice Charter" - International Council on Monuments 
and Sites, 2004 http://www.international.icomos.org/venicecharter2004/petzet.pdf (23May2015) 
[11] International Council on Monuments and Sites, "History of the Venice Charter" - 
http://www.international.icomos.org/venicecharter2004/history.pdf  (23May2015) 
[12] Baril, Paul; "Fire Protection Issues for Historic Buildings - CCI Notes 2/6" - Canadian Conservation 
Institute - Copyright Minister of Public Works, 1998. Cat. No. NM95-57/2-6-1998E ISSN 0714-6221 
https://www.cci-icc.gc.ca/resources-ressources/ccinotesicc/2-6-eng.aspx (10April2015)  
[13] Hadjisophocleous, G.V.; Bénichou, N.; "Development of Performance-Based  Codes, Performance 
Criteria and Fire Safety Engineering Methods", International Journal on Engineering Performance-Based 
Fire Codes, Volume 2, Number 4 p127-142, 2000. 
[14] Canadian Commission on Building and Fire Codes National Research Council of Canada, "National 
Building Code of Canada 2010", © National Research Council of Canada 2010, Ottawa, World Rights 
Reserved 
148 
 
[15] Canadian Commission on Building and Fire Codes National Research Council of Canada, "National 
Fire Code of Canada 2010" ©  National Research Council of Canada, Ottawa, World Rights Reserved 
[16] Confederation of Fire Protection Associations (CFPA) Europe, "European Guideline CFPA-E-No 
30:2013 F - Managing Fire Protection of Historic Buildings" P.4-7 - http://cfpa-e.eu/wp-
content/uploads/files/guidelines/CFPA_E_Guideline_No_30_2013_F.pdf  (24 May2015)  
[17] "5 Reasons to enter the Field of Fire Protection Engineering" - 
http://www.fireengineering.com/articles/2013/09/5-reasons-to-enter-the-field-of-fire-protection-
engineering.html (4August2017) 
[18] The Association of Professional Engineers and Geoscientists of the Province of British Columbia - 
"Guidelines for Fire Protection Engineering Services for Building Projects" P. 1-5, © September 2013 
https://www.apeg.bc.ca/getmedia/c7dcdae8-a379-4c8c-9697-9d80f57a5800/APEGBC-
Guidelines_for_Fire_Protection_Engineering_Services_for_Building_Projects.pdf.aspx  
[19] National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), "NFPA550 Guide to the Fire Safety Concepts Tree 
2012 Edition" © 2012 National Fire Protection Association. All Rights Reserved 
[20] Treasury Board Policy on Management of Real Property - http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-
eng.aspx?id=12042 (4July2013) 
[21] Federal Heritage Buildings Review Office - Roles and Responsibilities - 
https://www.pc.gc.ca/en/culture/beefp-fhbro/roles/beefp-fhbro (4Aug2017) 
[22] "A Guide to Working with The Federal Heritage Buildings Review Office" P. 29, © 2009 by Her 
Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, represented by the Chief Executive Office of Parks Canada  
[23] "Federal Heritage Buildings Review Office - Processes - Heritage Evaluation" - 
https://www.pc.gc.ca/en/culture/beefp-fhbro/process/evaluation (4Aug2017) 
[24] "Treasury Board Fire Protection Standard" - http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=17316 
(5August2017) 
[25] Bergeron, D.; Desserud, R.J.; Hayson, J.C; "The Origin and development of Canada's objective-
based codes concept NRCC - 47034" - CIB 2004 World Building Congress 02 May 2004, Toronto, 
Ontario, Canada 
[26] Hussein, Johari; Armitage, Lynne; Too, Linda; "An historical perspective of the evolution of 
Australian built heritage and its management" - 20th Annual Pacific-Rim Real Estate Society Conference, 
19-22 January 2014, Christchurch, New Zealand 
[27] Brightman, Michael; "Is the Conservation of the United Kingdom's Built Heritage Sustainable" - 
Lancashire Business School, University of Central Lacashire. 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/cross_fac/iatl/reinvention/issues/bcur2012specialissue/brightman/ 
(5May2015)   
149 
 
[28] National Research Council of Canada, "Scope of Construction Codes" - http://www.nrc-
cnrc.gc.ca/eng/solutions/advisory/codes_centre/faq/scope.html (27May2015) 
[29] "NFPA's Future in Performance-Based Codes and Standards 0 Report of the NFPA In-House Task 
Group" P.4-5, © 1995 National Fire Protection Association.    
[30] Coté, Ron, and Harrington, Gregory E. "Life Safety Code Handbook 9th Edition" P.36-37, © 2003 
National Fire Protection Association  
[31] Watts John M. Jr, Kaplan, Marilyn E., "Fire Safe Building Rehabilitation" P. 115, © 2003 National 
Fire Protection Association Inc.  
[32] Cote, Arthur E.; Hall, John R. Jr.; Powell, Pamela A.; Grant, Casey C. "Fire Protection Handbook 
19th Edition" © 2003 National Fire Protection Association, Inc. - Puchovsky, Milosh T.; Chapter 13 
Section 3 "Performance-Based Codes and Standards for Fire Safety" 
[33] Cote, Arthur E.; Hall, John R. Jr.; Powell, Pamela A.; Grant, Casey C. "Fire Protection Handbook 
19th Edition" © 2003 National Fire Protection Association, Inc. - Watts, John M. Jr.; Chapter 11 Section 
3 "Simplified Fire Risk Calculations"  
[34] Potworowski, J. André; Murray-Chourhary, Anne; and Losfeld, Bénédicte; "Making it Happen - The 
transition to a Sustainable Society Case Study The transformation of the National Building Code of 
Canada:  From prescriptions to objectives" P.4-7, March 2010,  
http://sites.telfer.uottawa.ca/makingithappen/files/2014/05/Building-Code-Case-Study.pdf  
[35] Gallagher, J.; Theriault, M.;"2005 National Construction Codes: Increasing clarity and flexibility for 
design NRCC-48378" - Construction Canada, 48, 1, pp. 58-60, 62, 64, 2006-01-01 http://nparc.cisti-
icist.nrc-cnrc.gc.ca/eng/view/accepted/?id=853630e4-390f-43f6-b2fe-fb2a29078cb3     
[36] "Performance-based primer codes and standards preparation - Revision 1.0 21 January 2000" P. 8-
10, © National Fire Protection Association 1999 
[37] Tavares, Rodrigo Machado; "Prescriptive Codes vs. Performance-based codes: Which one is the best 
fire safety code for the Brazilian Context?" - Safety Science Monitor Issue 1 2008 Article 3 Volume 12  
[38] Meacham, Brian J.; "The Evolution of Performance-Based Codes and Fire Safety Design Methods" 
P.49-50 NIST-GCR-98-761 Building and Fire Research Laboratory - National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) Issued 1998  
[39] Alvarez, A., Meacham B.J., Thmoas, J.R.; "A Framework for Risk-Informed Performance-Based 
Fire Protection Design for the Built Environment", Fire Technology 50, 161-181, 2014  
[40] NFPA 551 Guide for the Evaluation of Fire Risk Assessments - 2007 Edition. Copyright 2007 
National Fire Protection Association  
[41] Meacham, Brian J.; "An Overview of Approaches and Resources for Building Fire Risk Assessment" 
- Fire Protection Engineering SFPE Magazine, July 1, 2013 http://magazine.sfpe.org/content/overview-
approaches-and-resources-building-fire-risk-assessment   
150 
 
[42] Hadjisophocleous, G.V and Fu, Z.; "Literature Review of Fire Risk Assessment Methodologies", 
International Journal on Engineering Performance-Based Fire Codes Volume 6, Number 1. p28-45, 2004 
[43] Hui, Man-Cheung; "How Can a Fire Risk Approach be Applied to Develop a Balanced Fire 
Protection Strategy", Fire Protection Engineering Magazine 2006-04-01 
[44] Bukowski, Richard W.; "An Overview of Fire Hazard And Fire Risk Assessment in Regulation 
[45] Buchanan, Andrew H.; "Structural Design for Fire Safety" P. 273-274, John Wiley & Sons Ltd. © 
2002 Reprinted June 2008 
[46] Baril, Paul.; "Fire Prevention Programs for Museums Technical Bulletin 18" - Canadian Heritage 
Canadian Conservation Institute, Canadian Conservation Institute Department of Canadian Heritage. © 
Government of Canada 1997.  https://www.cci-icc.gc.ca/resources-
ressources/publications/downloads/technicalbulletins/eng/TB18-FirePreventionProgramsForMuseums.pdf  
[47] Sakenaite, Jurgita; Vaidogas, Egidijus R.; "Fire Risk Indexing and Fire Risk Analysis: A Comparison 
of Pros and Cons", VGTU leidyklos TECHNIKA 1769-M mokslo literatūros knyga, http://leidykla.vgtu.lt 
,ISBN 978-9955-28-592-2 CD, © Vilnius Gediminas Technical University, 2010  
[48] Richardson, Ken; Frye, M. John; "The Fire Risk Indices for the application to the rehabilitation and 
re-use of existing buildings in Manitoba for residential and business and personal services occupancies" 
P.1-3, - A publication of the City of Winnipeg Planning & Land Use Division, 
[49] Wisconsin Administrative Code Industry, Labor and Human Relations - Chapter ILHR 70 Historic 
Building Code, Register, September 1986 NO. 369 
[50] "SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering Fourth Edition" ©2008 by the Society of Fire 
Protection Engineers - Watts, John M. Jr.; Section 5 Chapter 10 "Fire Risk Indexing" 5-168 to 5-182.  
[51]  Wisconsin Administrative Code - Department of Commerce Chapter Comm 70 Historic Buildings 
Dec 2004 
http://dsps.wi.gov/Documents/Industry%20Services/Forms/Commercial%20Buildings/HistoricalCodes/H
istoricBldgs%202004%20Dec.pdf (14June2017)  
[52] 2013 Act 270 Grandfathered Ordinances http://dsps.wi.gov/Programs/Industry-Services/Industry-
Services-Programs/Commercial-Buildings/Act270  
[53] Human Resources and Skills Development Canada "Building Code Data Sheet" -  
http://www.ofntsc.org/sites/default/files/files/Building%2520Code%2520Data%2520Sheet.pdf  
(5Aug2017) 
[54] Coté, Ron, and Harrington, Gregory E. "Life Safety Code Handbook 9th Edition" P. 127-128, © 
2003 National Fire Protection Association  
[55] National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), "NFPA 14 Standard for the Installation of Standpipe 
and Hose System 2016 Edition" © 2016 National Fire Protection Association, All Rights Reserved   
151 
 
[56] Gharahdaghi, Mahnaz; Sylvester, David; "Smoke Control How to Obtain Tenable Conditions" - 
CFAA 2011 presentation by Mahnaz Gharahdaghi and David Sylvester from Morrison Hershfield 
Consulting Engineers and Managers  
[57] Fire Loss in Ontario 2011–2015 – Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services  
http://www.mcscs.jus.gov.on.ca/english/FireMarshal/MediaRelationsandResources/FireStatistics/Ontario
Fires/FireLossesCausesTrendsIssues/stats_causes.html (February 2017) 
[58] Stewart, Deborah, "Agent of Deterioration: Fire" http://canada.pch.gc.ca/eng/1444924750023  
31August2016 
[59] "Fit-up Standards: Technical Reference Manual" Public Works and Government Services Canada 
October 17, 2005 Page A6.2-9 http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2009/tpsgc-pwgsc/P26-3-
2005E.pdf   6Feb2017 
[60] Treasury Board Standard for Fire Safety Planning and Fire Emergency Organization 
https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=12562 20September2015 
[61] Proulx, G., "Occupant Behaviour and Evacuation NRCC-44983", 9th International Fire Protection 
Symposium, Munich, May 25-26, 2001, pp. 219-232 
[62] "SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering Fourth Edition" ©2008 by the Society of Fire 
Protection Engineers - Proulx, Guylene - Section 3 Chapter 12 "Evacuation Time" P3-355 to 3-370 
[63] Proulx, Guylene; "Strategies for Ensuring Appropriate Occupant Response to Fire Alarm Signals", 
NRC Construction Technology Update No. 43 
[64] Cote, Arthur and Bugbee Percy, "Principles of Fire Protection" National Fire Protection Association 
Batterymarch Park Quincy, MA 02269 Copyright 1988 ISBN 0-87765-345-3 P. 44-47 
[65] "SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering Fourth Edition" © 2008 by the Society of Fire 
Protection Engineers - Walton, William D.; Thomas, Philip H.; SFPE Handbook Section 3 Chapter 6 
"Estimating Temperatures in Compartment Fires" page 3-204 to 3-220 
[66] "SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering Fourth Edition" ©2008 by the Society of Fire 
Protection Engineers - Mowrer, Frederick W. SFPE Handbook Section 3 Chapter 9 "Enclosure Smoke 
Filling and Fire-Generated Environmental Conditions" page 3-247 to 3-249 
[67] NIST Fire Dynamics https://www.nist.gov/%3Cfront%3E/fire-dynamics (7November2016) 
[68] Phan, Long T., McAllister, Therese P., Gross, John L. "NIST Technical Note 1681 - Best Practice 
Guidelines for Structural Fire Resistance Design of Concrete and Steel Buildings" November 2010 
National Institute of Standards and Technology P. 186-187 
[69] Phan, Long T., McAllister, Therese P., Gross, John L. "NIST Technical Note 1681 - Best Practice 
Guidelines for Structural Fire Resistance Design of Concrete and Steel Buildings" November 2010 
National Institute of Standards and Technology P. 31 
152 
 
[70] Luo, M. and He, Y. 1988 "Fire Growth and Smoke Spread Model for Fire Safety Design: 
Experimental Verification. AOFST 3" http://www.iafss.org/publications/aofst/3/261/view/aofst_3-
261.pdf 28October2016 
[71] G. Rein, "Smouldering Combustion Phenomena in Science and Technology", International Review 
of Chemical Engineering, Vol 1, pp 3-18, Jan 2009. Copy available at 
https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1842/2678/Rein_SmoulderingReview_IRECHE09.pdf?seq
uence=1&isAllowed=y    
[72] CAN/ULC-S101-07 "Standard Methods of Fire Endurance Tests of Building Construction and 
Materials" © 2007 Underwriters' Laboratories of Canada 
[73] "What is a Standard Fire Test - A Guide to interpreting what those fire endurance ratings really 
mean" - http://www.concreteconstruction.net/business/management/what-is-a-standard-fire-test_o  
15May2016  
[74] Thomas, G.C.; Buchanan, A.H.; and Fleischmann, C.M.; "Structural Fire Design: The Role of Time 
Equivalence" - http://www.iafss.org/publications/fss/5/607/view  20June2016  
[75] "Building Control Technical Guidance Leaflet No. 27. Fire Resistance of Floor with Lath and Plaster 
Ceilings" - http://www.stevenage.gov.uk/content/15953/24595/24598/27-GN-Fire-Resistance-of-Floor-
Lathe-and-Plaster-Ceilings-Dec2013.pdf  5May2015 
[76] Hoefferle, Joseph Jr., "Fire & Building Safety Code Compliance for Historic Buildings: A Field 
Guide (2nd Edition)" University of Vermont Graduate Program in Historic Preservation in Cooperation 
with The Vermont Division for Historic Preservation and The Vermont Department of Public Safety, 
Division of Fire safety. 2006 P7. https://www.uvm.edu/histpres/307/LifeSafetyFieldGuide.pdf   
[77] Wisconsin Department of Safety and Professional Services, "Chapter 9 Fire Protection Systems" 
http://dsps.wi.gov/sb/docs/sb-educationcbi07chpt9pp.pdf  6August2016  
[78] "Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations Chapter ILHR 50 to 64 Building and 
Heating Ventilating and Air Conditioning" 52 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS P.66 
http://dsps.wi.gov/Documents/Industry%20Services/Forms/Commercial%20Buildings/HistoricalCodes/B
ldg_HVAC%201995%2050-64.pdf  28Jan2017 
[79] Federal Heritage Buildings Review Office. "Building Report: 85-07 - Sault Ste Marie Canal 
Buildings Sault Ste Marie, Ontario"  
[80] Practice Tips PT.3 Building Code Data Matrix VERSION: 4 
http://www.oaa.on.ca/professional+resources/practice+tips+&+regulatory+notices/practice+tips/3   
[81] Ohlemiller, T.J. "Smouldering combustion" Chapter 9; Section 2; NFPA HFPE-02; SFPE Handbook 
of Fire Protection Engineering. 3rd Edition, DiNenno, P. J.; Drysdale, D.; Beyler, C. L.; Walton, W. D., 
Editor(s), 2/200-210 p., 2002 http://fire.nist.gov/bfrlpubs/fire02/PDF/f02074.pdf   
[82] "Collingwood, Ontario Federal Building 44Hurontario Street" - http://www.historicplaces.ca/en/rep-
reg/place-lieu.aspx?id=3405 10November2012 
153 
 
[83] FIRE RESISTANT COATING FOR LATH-AND-PLASTER CEILINGS - 
https://envirograf.com/product/fire-resistant-coating-for-lath-and-plaster-ceilings/  
[84] "91-181 Amherstburg, Ontario Hough House Fort Malden" 
http://www.historicplaces.ca/media/15425/1991-181(e)houghhouse.pdf  5April2017 
[85] "Structural Stabilization of Hough House at Fort Malden National Historic Site" 
https://buyandsell.gc.ca/cds/public/2014/05/27/217303bd70e0c2af24107c166ed2e8bf/specs_-
_fort_malden.pdf  10May2017 
